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i 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
As concern mounts about the hazards of global warming, it is becoming 
increasingly important to restrain the use of energy so as to limit 
greenhouse gas emissions. Consequently, as a contribution towards that 
objective, it is important that energy should be used efficiently. It is 
striking, therefore, that many analysts claim that there are numerous 
unexploited opportunities for companies and other organisations to invest 
in measures that would improve their energy efficiency. Furthermore, it is 
claimed that investment in many of these measures would be cost-
effective, meaning that there would be a good financial return from such 
investment. This raises the question why do organisations not take up 
these cost-effective opportunities to improve their energy efficiency. What 
are the barriers that impede them from doing so? 
The claim that there are many cost-effective energy efficiency 
opportunities that are not being exploited arises particularly from 
technologically-oriented analysts who use engineering-economic models. 
Some of these analysts have suggested that the common neglect of such 
energy efficiency opportunities is caused by barriers such as a shortage of 
capital or a lack of information, which prevent markets for energy and 
energy-using technologies from operating efficiently. 
On the other hand, many economists claim that the markets for energy 
and energy-using technologies are broadly efficient. They suggest that if 
energy consumers do not invest in measures that are claimed to be cost-
effective, then perhaps the real barriers lie in the fact that there are risks 
attached to these investments. Or perhaps there are “hidden costs” 
associated with the measures concerned, meaning costs that are not 
captured by the engineering-economic models. Thus, in this view it is more 
questionable whether there really are many unexploited energy efficiency 
opportunities that are genuinely cost-effective, when all the costs and risks 
are fully taken into account. 
This study examines these issues in the context of the Irish economy. 
We consider whether it is true that there are many opportunities for cost-
effective energy efficiency investment that are being neglected. We assess 
the importance of a range of possible barriers to energy efficiency that 
have been suggested to explain why this happens. We also aim to consider 
what would be the appropriate role for public policy in this situation. 
 
To examine these issues, we use case studies from a variety of sectors. 
These case studies are drawn from the mechanical engineering, brewing 
and higher education sectors in Ireland. The mechanical engineering 
industry is selected as an example of light industry that has only low to 
average energy-intensity. The brewing industry is selected as an example of 
an industry with above-average energy-intensity, since it has a considerable 
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requirement for energy in its production processes. The higher education 
sector is selected as an example from the public sector; in this case energy-
intensity is low to average but distinctive decision-making frameworks are 
in place and the availability of capital is constrained by public policy. 
 
 In considering the question whether many cost-effective opportunities to 
improve energy efficiency are being neglected, it is important to note the 
meaning of the term “cost-effective” in this context. Cost-effective here 
means that an investment in energy efficiency would have a significantly 
better rate of return than the cost of capital to the organisation, when one 
takes account of the readily quantifiable costs such as capital costs and 
energy costs (and therefore, ignores any risks or “hidden costs” that could 
be difficult to measure). 
The findings from the organisations in the three sectors studied 
indicate that there are many such cost-effective opportunities, in this sense, 
still available in most of the organisations concerned. A majority of 
interviewees in each of the three sectors agreed that there were many 
energy efficiency opportunities available in their organisations that would 
have quite short payback periods (namely three years, or five years in the 
case of brewing). Investments with such short payback periods would have 
a significantly better rate of return than the cost of capital. Comparable 
research that was carried out on the same three sectors in the UK and 
Germany also concluded that there were many such opportunities to 
improve energy efficiency that were not being taken up. 
Companies in the brewing sector generally considered that there were 
fewer energy efficiency opportunities still available  compared to those in 
the other two sectors. Since brewing is a more energy-intensive sector, 
which should cause it to pay more attention to energy efficiency, it is not 
surprising that the brewing industry would already have taken up more of 
the available energy-efficiency opportunities. 
 
 From a review of existing literature, we identified a total of fifteen 
different barriers to energy efficiency that were previously suggested 
elsewhere as being potentially important. For each of our three sectors, we 
attempted as far as possible to rate the importance of each of these fifteen 
potential barriers. Table 1 shows that eight of these fifteen barriers were 
found to be of high importance in at least one of the three sectors. 
Within this group of eight barriers that appear at least once in Table 1, 
two stand out as being particularly important, namely access to capital and 
hidden costs. These two are very important in all three of the sectors 
studied. Imperfect information is very important in two of the sectors, 
while the other five barriers are of high importance in only one sector 
each. It is also worth noting that seven other potential barriers were 
identified and considered, and although these are not included in Table 1, 
they are all of at least some importance in some sectors. 
These findings from Ireland are similar in significant respects to the 
results from comparable studies of the same three sectors in the UK and 
Germany. In particular, access to capital and hidden costs were found to 
be the most important barriers in all three countries. In addition, imperfect 
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information was found to be commonly of high importance in the three 
countries. 
Table 1: Barriers Considered to be of High Importance in the Different Sectors 
Barrier Mechanical 
Engineering 
  Brewing    Higher  
Education 
      Total 
Access to capital *   *   * 3 
Hidden costs * *(1) * 3(1) 
Imperfect information *  * 2 
Split incentives   * 1 
Principal-agent   * 1 
Form of information, credibility 
and trust 
  * 1 
Values and organisational 
culture 
*   1 
Power or status   * 1 
Notes: *The asterisk means that the barrier is identified as being of high importance.  
 (1) Hidden costs can be of high importance for smaller brewing firms, but not for large firms. 
 
It is noticeable in Table 1 that the number and range of barriers of high 
importance varies between sectors, with the widest range occurring in 
higher education and the narrowest occurring in brewing. It is perhaps not 
surprising that interviewees in the brewing industry perceived only one or 
two really important barriers to energy efficiency while those in the other 
sectors identified more, since this is probably a reflection of the fact that 
brewing is more energy-intensive. Since energy accounts for a larger part 
of total costs in brewing, the benefits that it can gain by investing in energy 
efficiency would amount to savings of a greater proportion of total costs 
than in the case of less energy-intensive sectors. Compared to these 
relatively large benefits, most potential barriers to energy efficiency would 
appear to be quite small and it would be considered worthwhile to 
undertake the effort and expense required to overcome such barriers. In 
less energy-intensive sectors, however, the benefits that can be gained by 
investing in energy efficiency would amount to savings of a less significant 
proportion of total costs. Consequently, a range of barriers that would be 
overcome in a more energy-intensive sector may appear sufficiently great 
to actually prevent investments in energy efficiency in less energy-intensive 
sectors, and hence such barriers would be rated as very important. 
CAPITAL CONSTRAINTS 
A strong general message from the research is the importance of limited 
access to capital as a barrier to energy efficiency. This can apply at two levels: 
(1) an overall limitation on access to capital for the organisation as a whole; 
and (2) restricted access to capital for energy efficiency within internal 
capital budgeting procedures. The result of either or both of these factors, 
from the perspective of those responsible for energy management, is that 
they lack sufficient capital to invest in energy efficiency improvements. 
The limitation on access to capital tends to take different forms in the 
different sectors. In the higher education sector, there were constraints 
associated with public sector funding, especially in the institutes of 
technology, as well as internal budgeting constraints. But in mechanical 
engineering and brewing, the firms in principle have access to commercial 
capital markets. There was practically no evidence that the case study firms 
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had difficulties in borrowing capital at reasonable rates – as would be the 
case if there were capital market failures. Instead, the restrictions on access 
to capital were largely self-imposed internally through a reluctance to take 
on additional borrowing. These self-imposed restrictions mainly took the 
form of applying tight payback criteria (typically paybacks of just a few 
years) when assessing proposed investment projects, including investments 
in energy efficiency as well as other investments. 
There are a number of possible explanations for companies’ use of 
such stringent investment criteria. For example, this can be a method of 
allowing for business, financial or technical risks. It can be an attempt to 
deal with “principal-agent” control problems by ensuring that only very 
clearly cost-effective projects are undertaken. Or it can be a method of 
recovering some of the “hidden costs” such as the salary and other costs 
associated with energy management. Thus, firms’ use of very stringent 
investment criteria can be quite a rational reaction to factors such as risks, 
concerns about financial gearing, or hidden costs, although it may not 
always be entirely rational. 
TIME CONSTRAINTS 
A second strong general message from the research is the importance of 
management time constraints as a barrier to energy efficiency. The general 
importance of “hidden costs” as a barrier that is seen in Table 1 is 
primarily a reflection of the aspects of hidden costs that involve putting 
demands on management time. When it is claimed that certain energy 
efficiency investments would be cost-effective, such claims may not take 
full account of the cost of management time that would be required to put 
such investments into effect. But it can take significant amounts of time 
for managers to keep up to date with technical information, to identify 
energy efficiency opportunities and to implement energy efficiency 
projects. Many interviewees across the different sectors emphasised that 
there were many competing demands on their time. Thus, their time is 
valuable and it cannot be regarded as costless. 
 
 The most important barriers to energy efficiency were identified as 
being: access to capital (in the private sector, specifically a reluctance to 
borrow as manifested in the use of stringent payback criteria); and hidden 
costs (especially demands on management time). A feature of both of these 
barriers is that they may imply that organisations are behaving rationally in 
their own interest, to a considerable extent, in allowing such barriers to 
deter them from investing in energy efficiency. 
However, governments need to have a different perspective. The basic 
reason why governments should aim to improve energy efficiency is 
because of the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions so as to combat 
undesirable climate change. If energy users cause environmental damage 
through greenhouse gas emissions, thereby imposing costs on society at 
large that are not reflected in a commensurate cost or penalty attached to 
the use of energy, this is a form of market failure. In this situation, there is 
a good case for policy intervention to improve energy efficiency and 
reduce energy consumption. 
The Role of 
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Although two particular types of barriers to energy efficiency were 
identified as being most generally important, there are considerable 
variations in the nature and range of the barriers to energy efficiency that 
apply to different sectors or organisations. The importance of some types 
of barriers varies considerably across sectors or companies. Therefore, 
effective policy solutions need to address the differing circumstances of 
energy using sectors and organisations. It is unlikely that there will be a 
single best policy solution for all. For each of the individual sectors 
studied, we have indicated possible policy recommendations. This gives a 
range of suggestions, based on the circumstances in each sector, which 
illustrate the diversity of approaches required. 
However, there are certain broad-based national-level policy 
approaches that influence many or all sectors. For example, the 
introduction of a carbon tax and emissions trading has been announced 
and this should tend to raise energy prices generally. In addition, the 
Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC) licensing system will 
require a range of important industries to use energy efficiently, as well as 
controlling their emissions of pollutants in general. These broad national 
measures should have the potential to achieve significant improvements in 
energy efficiency. 
These types of policy measures are suited to addressing the two most 
pervasive barriers to energy efficiency, namely the access to capital barrier 
resulting from tight payback criteria, and the hidden costs barrier 
associated with management time. These measures would have the effect 
of increasing the incentive to invest in energy efficiency, while at the same 
time giving organisations cause to allocate more management time to 
energy efficiency matters. Companies can be compensated for higher 
energy costs by reducing taxes such as taxes on labour or profits, if it is 
desired to enhance their incentive to invest in energy efficiency without 
increasing their total tax burden. 
While carbon taxes, emissions trading and IPPC licensing can address 
the access to capital and hidden costs barriers, these measures would also 
help to overcome some of the other barriers at the same time. For 
example, these measures should increase the importance of the energy 
management function within organisations, thereby helping to overcome 
the barriers associated with values and organisational culture and the 
power or status of energy managers. 
In addition to these broad national-level measures, however, we have 
also indicated in the individual sector studies how other more specific 
measures at sector or firm level can address other barriers to energy 
efficiency that arise. Sectors with low energy intensity can ill-afford 
management time to be experts on energy matters. Informative energy 
labelling, meters and bills as well as demonstration case studies and 
encouragement to undertake audits could be targeted at these enterprises. 
Their industry associations may be the best conduit for this task and these 
associations may need help to focus their organisations. More intensive 
energy using enterprises could be encouraged to avail of energy service 
companies (ESCOs), provided that the latter can gain trust and expand 
their activities into genuine energy efficiency, with appropriate contracts. 
This aspect requires research and encouragement. 
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More widespread application of energy audits and of industry-specific 
or technology-specific guidelines and calculation of benchmarks of energy 
use could be promoted by Sustainable Energy Ireland (the expanded 
energy agency, previously the Irish Energy Centre). Use of proper 
investment appraisal methods should also be facilitated. This applies in 
particular to state-aided institutions, with incorporation of societal costs of 
externalities and of resources that are subsidised. Finally, in this list of 
measures to remove barriers to energy efficiency at the sector level, help 
should be forthcoming for recording prior and follow-up performance of 
investments, in order to provide future demonstration studies. 
 
 1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
As concern mounts about the hazards of global warming and climate 
change, it is becoming increasingly important to restrain the use of energy 
so as to limit greenhouse gas emissions.  Consequently, as a contribution 
towards that objective, energy should be used efficiently. It is striking, 
therefore, that many analysts claim that there are numerous unexploited 
opportunities for companies and other organisations to invest in measures 
that would improve their energy efficiency. Furthermore, it is claimed that 
investment in many of these measures would be cost-effective, meaning 
that there would be a good financial return from such investment.1 This 
raises the question why do organisations not take up these cost-effective 
opportunities to improve their energy efficiency. What are the barriers that 
impede them from doing so? 
The claim that there are many cost-effective energy efficiency 
opportunities that are not being exploited arises particularly from 
technologically-oriented analysts who use engineering-economic models. 
These models incorporate detailed information on energy-using equipment 
and processes, and they indicate that there are profitable energy efficiency 
investment opportunities that are frequently overlooked.  However, there 
is no firm consensus on the reasons why such opportunities are neglected. 
For example, some have suggested that this problem is caused by various 
barriers, such as lack of capital or lack of information, which prevent 
markets for energy and energy-using technologies from operating 
efficiently. 
On the other hand, many economists claim that the markets for energy 
and energy-using technologies are broadly efficient. They would suggest 
that if energy consumers do not invest in measures that are claimed to be 
cost-effective, then perhaps the real barriers lie in the fact that there are 
risks attached to these investments. Or perhaps there is a range of “hidden 
costs” associated with the measures concerned that are not captured by the 
engineering-economic models. Thus, in this view it is more questionable 
whether there really are many unexploited energy efficiency opportunities 
that are genuinely cost-effective, when all the costs and risks are fully taken 
into account. 
 
These issues have been quite widely debated; for example they were 
among the central themes of a special edition of Energy Policy on “Markets 
for Energy Efficiency” (see Huntington et al. (eds)., 1994). They have also 
been examined in a range of other literature referenced in Chapter 2 
 
1 See, for example, Krause (1996), Lovins and Lovins (1997), Interlaboratory Working Group 
(1997) and Fisher et al. (1998). 
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below. However, it has been recognised that more detailed empirical work 
is required to help to resolve the issues (Jacaard and Montgomery, 1996). 
This study examines these issues in the context of the Irish economy. 
We consider whether it is true that there are many opportunities for cost-
effective energy efficiency investment that are being neglected. And we 
assess the importance of a range of possible barriers to energy efficiency 
that might explain why this happens. In this context, a “barrier” is a 
postulated mechanism the outcome of which is an organisation’s neglect of 
(apparently) cost-effective energy efficiency opportunities. 
A wide range of possible barriers have been suggested in a number of 
different theoretical traditions. In this study, we outline many different 
suggested “barriers”, drawing from ideas in several traditions including 
neo-classical economics, organisational economics, behavioural theory and 
organisational theory. We then test the validity of these ideas using case 
studies from a variety of sectors. These case studies are drawn from the 
mechanical engineering, brewing and higher education sectors in Ireland. 
Each case study involves an examination of the context and process of 
energy decision-making within the organisation, together with an 
examination of the significance of various potential barriers to energy 
efficiency.  
Our objectives include the following. We aim to assess the validity of 
the claim that there are many cost-effective opportunities to improve 
energy efficiency that are not being exploited.  We aim to assess to what 
extent is investment in cost-effective energy efficient technologies 
inhibited by various types of barrier to energy efficiency – what is the 
relative importance of each type of barrier and how does this vary between 
different sectors and different types of organisation? We also aim to 
consider whether there is a legitimate role for public policy intervention, 
and to consider the likely effectiveness of different policy measures for 
delivering energy efficiency improvements. It is assumed that the 
effectiveness of different measures will depend upon the nature of the 
barriers that need to be addressed. 
We focus on organisations in three sectors: 
• The mechanical engineering industry is selected as an example of light 
industry that has only low to average energy-intensity. It largely makes 
use of generic energy-using technologies, such as mechanical drives, 
space heating and lighting, and it does not have a particularly high 
demand for energy for production processes. 
• The brewing industry is selected as an example of an industry with above-
average (although not exceptionally high) energy-intensity. In addition 
to generic energy use such as space heating and lighting, it also has a 
considerable requirement for energy in its production processes. 
• The higher education sector is selected as an example of a largely publicly 
funded sector.  Here, energy-intensity is low to average and energy use 
is largely generic, but distinctive decision-making frameworks are in 
place and the availability of capital is constrained by public policy. 
We do not include any example of the most highly energy-intensive 
sectors, such as production of steel, cement or certain chemicals. Such 
industries are not a particularly large proportion of the Irish economy. 
Furthermore, energy decisions in such industries are often site-specific and 
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strategic, and energy accounts for such a large proportion of total costs 
that it can be assumed that it attracts serious management attention. 
In the cases that we have selected, energy forms a smaller proportion 
of the organisation’s total costs. In this context, energy may be neglected 
by management since managers have other priorities. However, a range of 
studies in the UK and elsewhere have suggested that many cost-effective 
opportunities to improve energy efficiency are available in these sectors. 
Furthermore, these types of sectors account for a large proportion of total 
final energy demand. If climate change targets are to be met, significant 
improvements must be achieved in the energy efficiency of sectors such as 
these. 
It should also be mentioned that the research reported here was 
conducted as part of an international project that was carried out 
simultaneously in the United Kingdom and Germany as well as in Ireland. 
Highly summarised results from all three countries are reported in Sorrell 
et al. (2000), although that report has not actually been published. We 
concentrate here on presenting the full findings from Ireland, but we also 
refer at times to comparisons from the UK and Germany, particularly in 
our conclusions in Chapter 6. 
The contents of the remainder of this report are as follows: 
• Chapter 2 sets out the theoretical framework for the research in some 
detail. It draws from a variety of theoretical traditions in order to 
identify and describe a range of possible barriers to energy efficiency. 
This leads to the development of a systematic classification of fifteen 
possible barriers, which is then used to guide the subsequent empirical 
research. 
• Chapters 3, 4 and 5 present the results of the empirical research in the 
mechanical engineering, brewing and higher education sectors 
respectively. The layout of each of these chapters is quite similar. It 
includes a description of key features of the sector, a structured 
description of the case study organisations, and an analysis of the 
evidence for each of the fifteen barriers to energy efficiency that are 
identified in the theoretical framework in Chapter 2. Within this, an 
attempt is made to identify which of these barriers are most important 
in each sector. Finally, there is some discussion of policy responses, 
although this topic is also addressed in Chapter 6. 
• Chapter 6 presents the overall conclusions and recommendations.  
 4 
2. UNDERSTANDING 
BARRIERS TO ENERGY 
EFFICIENCY 
A barrier to energy efficiency is a mechanism that inhibits investment in 
technologies that are both energy efficient and apparently cost-effective for 
the potential investor in such technologies.2 The energy efficiency gap is 
the gap between what appears to be an attainable cost-effective level of 
energy efficiency and the level of energy efficiency actually observed in 
practice. This chapter develops a systematic classification of barriers to 
energy efficiency, based on a comprehensive review of the literature.3 The 
aim is to define each barrier and to describe its mode of operation. Our 
classification of barriers synthesises ideas from three broad areas of 
literature: economics; behavioural/ 
psychological theories; and organisational theories. Within this, the 
economics literature is given the greatest emphasis as the concept of a 
barrier originates from within it. We refer to mainstream neo-classical 
economics as well as ideas from organisational economics and transaction 
cost economics. 
Our review of the literature leads to an initial broad classification of 
barriers into the three groups: (i) economic; (ii) behavioural; and (iii) 
organisational. Table 2.1 introduces these three perspectives. In practice 
this typology is not exclusive since individual barriers can simultaneously 
have economic, behavioural and organisational aspects (Weber, 1997, 
p.834). The three groups form perspectives that highlight particular aspects of 
a complex situation. But it should be noted that these perspectives can 
overlap. 
 
2 “Apparently cost-effective” in this context means that, considering the measurable costs 
such as capital costs and energy costs (i.e. ignoring any hidden costs or risks), the investment 
concerned would be cost-effective. 
3 More detail is provided in Chapter 3 in Sorrell et al. (2000), which contains a comprehensive 
literature review and a more detailed examination of concepts. 
Table 2.1: Perspectives on Barriers 
Perspective Examples Actors Theory 
Economic Imperfect information, 
asymmetric information, 
hidden costs, risk 
Individuals and 
organisations conceived of 
as rational and utility 
maximising 
 
Neo-classical 
economics 
      
 
 
Behavioural Inability to process 
information, form of 
information, trust, inertia 
Individuals conceived of as 
boundedly rational with 
non-financial motives and 
a variety of social 
influences 
 
Transaction cost 
economics,  
Psychology, decision 
theory 
Organisational Energy manager lacks 
power and influence; 
organisational culture leads 
to neglect of 
energy/environmental 
issues 
Organisations conceived of 
as social systems 
influenced by goals, 
routines, culture, power 
structures etc. 
Organisational theory 
 
Historically, the theory of market barriers has been developed from 
within an economic perspective, and the contribution of alternative 
perspectives to the understanding of barriers is less well defined. However, 
we cannot assume from the outset that standard economic theories are 
sufficient on their own to provide an adequate explanation for the energy 
efficiency gap. Therefore, other perspectives also need to be explored. In 
the following sections we discuss in turn (1) economic barriers that arise 
from market failures, (2) economic barriers that arise from organisational 
failures, (3) economic barriers arising from neither market nor 
organisational failures, (4) behavioural barriers, and (5) organisational 
barriers. We conclude this chapter with a summary of all the potential 
barriers. 
 
 A potential source of barriers to energy efficiency is market failures. 
Market failures occur if the basic requirements for efficient allocation of 
resources through well functioning markets are violated. It is recognised in 
neo-classical economics that violations of the necessary requirements can 
lead to four broad types of market failure: 
• incomplete markets; 
• imperfect competition; 
• imperfect information; and  
• asymmetric information. 
Most of the discussion of market failures in energy service markets 
centres on the last two – imperfect information and asymmetric 
information. 
Market failures in the first two categories can be important, but they 
are less relevant to explaining the energy efficiency gap. For example, if an 
energy user causes environmental damage, thereby imposing costs on 
many others with no commensurate cost or penalty for the energy user, 
this is called an environmental externality and it represents a form of 
incomplete markets. But this would not explain why energy users do not 
adopt available energy efficient technologies that should be to their own 
financial advantage at current prices. The discussion below will concentrate 
on issues of imperfect and asymmetric information, since these are the 
types of market failures that are most relevant to explaining the energy 
efficiency gap. 
2.1 
Economic 
Barriers 1: 
Market Failures 
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2.1.1 IMPERFECT INFORMATION IN ENERGY SERVICES 
MARKETS 
The importance and policy implications of imperfect information is one of 
the central issues in the energy policy debate. The primary claim is that the 
energy service market produces and transmits insufficient information 
about the energy performance of different technologies. This leads energy 
consumers to make sub-optimal decisions based on provisional and 
uncertain information, and consequently to under-invest in energy 
efficiency. Since imperfect information is one of the basic market failures 
recognised by economists, this is claimed to provide a rationale for policy 
intervention. The editors of a special edition of Energy Policy on energy 
efficiency note that: “Information problems taking different forms are the 
principal source of market failures that account for the ‘gap’ in energy 
efficiency investments” (Huntington et al., 1994). 
The information we are interested in falls into three broad categories: 
• information on current energy consumption; 
• information on energy-specific investment opportunities; and 
• information on energy consumption of new buildings and purchased 
equipment. 
There are several dimensions to imperfect information. Following 
Golove and Eto (1996, p.20) we can distinguish: 
• Lack of information: Energy consumers may lack information on the 
energy performance of different technologies. As Eyre (1997, p.31) 
notes: “Faced with good information on capital costs and poor 
information on operating costs, consumers may rationally and 
systematically choose the low capital option”. 
• Cost of information: There are costs associated with searching for and 
acquiring information on the energy performance of technologies. 
Because of these costs, energy consumers may act without full 
information. 
• Accuracy of information: Accurate information may be difficult to obtain, 
since sellers of technologies may have incentives to exaggerate or 
manipulate performance data. Unbiased information may be available 
from other sources but this may be more costly. 
As Hewett (1998, p.2.11) notes, the problem of imperfect information 
is likely to be most serious when:  
1. the product or service is purchased infrequently;  
2. performance characteristics are difficult to evaluate either before or 
soon after purchase; and  
3. the rate of technology change is rapid relative to the interval between 
purchases. 
All these apply in the case of energy service markets (Hewett, 1998, 
p.2.11). Energy efficiency consists of a wide range of complex products 
and services, purchased from an equally wide range of firms. Most 
products (boilers, lighting equipment, insulation etc.) are purchased 
infrequently and the technology will have changed substantially since the 
previous purchase. Also, customers may have great difficulty in evaluating 
performance claims. It is very difficult to evaluate the energy performance 
of technologies such as control systems, motors and variable speed drives, 
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even after purchase. This is partly a consequence of the lack of 
information on energy consumption patterns and hence the lack of 
detailed feedback on inefficient purchases and behaviours (Hewett, 1998, 
p.2.13). Without low level sub-metering, all that is available is a monthly 
energy bill, which makes the operating costs of individual technologies 
fairly invisible. Kempton and Montgomery (1982) have compared the 
information value of the average energy bill to that of receiving a single 
monthly bill from the grocery store for “food”! 
These features are important when we compare the purchase of energy 
efficiency to that of energy supply (e.g. electricity or gas). Here we have a 
simple, uniform and easy to understand product that is purchased from a 
small number of large, well established and trusted firms. Purchases are 
made regularly, market information is widely available and “performance” 
is judged largely on price. In short, the costs of acquiring information on 
energy efficiency greatly exceed those for energy supply. Now energy 
supply and energy efficiency may be understood as different means of 
delivering energy services (heat, light etc.). Viewed in this way, the latter is 
disadvantaged relative to the former. The result is likely to be over-
consumption of energy and under-consumption of energy efficiency. 
Problems of imperfect information provide a rationale for policy 
intervention, such as government information schemes. 
2.1.2 ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION IN ENERGY SERVICES 
MARKETS 
Asymmetric information is a special form of imperfect information where 
parties to a transaction have access to different levels of information. For 
example, a seller may know more about the quality of a good than the 
buyer. Similarly, an insuree may know more about her level of 
precautionary behaviour than the insurer. Two important consequences of 
asymmetric information are adverse selection and moral hazard. In addition, the 
more familiar barrier of split incentives may also be interpreted as a 
consequence of asymmetric information.  
These ideas are discussed in turn below. 
Adverse Selection in Energy Services Markets 
Adverse selection exists when one party in a transaction has private 
information that is not easily available to the other party before entering 
into a contract to sell or buy, and this may adversely affect the decisions of 
buyers or sellers, or both. For example, sellers who have superior products 
to sell may have difficulty in communicating that information effectively to 
potential buyers, because buyers may be unable to observe the superior 
quality of the products. If so, buyers will tend to select goods on the basis 
of visible aspects such as price, and they will be reluctant to pay the price 
premium for high quality products. As a result, too little of the high quality 
products may be sold. And hence, too few of such products may be 
offered for sale.  
Problems of adverse selection may pervade the energy services market. 
Take housing as an example. In a perfect market, the resale value of an 
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energy-efficient house would reflect the discounted value of energy 
efficiency investments. But asymmetric information at the point of sale 
prevents this. Buyers are unable to recognise the potential energy savings 
and to account for them when making a price offer. Estate agents have 
greater resources than buyers, but they similarly neglect energy efficiency 
when valuing a house. In such cases, one party (e.g. the builder) may have 
the relevant information, but transaction costs impede the transfer of that 
information to the potential purchaser. The result may be to discourage 
house builders from constructing energy efficient houses as they will not 
be able to capture the additional costs in selling prices. 
The same processes are at work in a range of energy services markets. 
In many cases, producers may be unable to market desirable technologies 
since consumers are unable to observe their characteristics prior to sale 
(Howarth and Sanstad, 1995, p.106). For example, the energy efficiency of 
commercial buildings depends heavily on the detailed features of heating, 
ventilation and controls such as Building Energy Management Systems 
(BEMS). But in comparison to highly visible features such as outward form 
and aesthetics, the performance of building services equipment is 
extremely difficult for the customer to observe. Substitution of an 
inefficient or oversized piece of equipment in place of efficient equipment 
could be relatively easy. Thus, we may have bad (inefficient 
equipment/buildings) driving out good (efficient equipment/buildings), in 
a manner analogous to Akerlof’s (1970) analysis of the second-hand car 
market. 
The likelihood of adverse selection will depend on the nature of the 
good or service. Here, it is important to recognise that the energy services 
market is highly differentiated (Golove and Eto, 1996, p.28). At one end 
we have energy supply (kWh) and at the other we have energy efficiency 
investments, such as insulation. But in between, there are products that use 
energy (e.g. appliances) and products that affect the use of energy (e.g. 
building materials). These may be purchased directly, or via intermediaries 
such as construction firms or maintenance firms. In these intermediate 
cases, energy efficiency is a secondary feature of the product or service and 
often relatively invisible. 
As Hewett (1998, p.2.14) points out, most energy efficiency products 
and services have the characteristic that consumers cannot readily ascertain 
their true quality even when they have had experience with their purchase. 
Inadequate sub-metering together with complicating factors such as 
changes in weather or production output will mean that the energy 
performance of newly purchased equipment cannot be observed, even 
after purchase. In this context, the purchasing decision is heavily 
influenced by the perceived trustworthiness of the seller. 
Moral Hazard and Principal-Agent Relationships in Energy 
Services Markets 
The term moral hazard originated in the insurance industry (Pindyk and 
Rubenfeld, 1998, Chapter 17). Insurance companies lack the ability to 
monitor the actions of policyholders after they have issued a policy. But 
the holder may act in a way that makes the insured loss more likely to 
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occur. The term is now used more widely to describe any behaviour under 
a contract that is inefficient (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, p.195). It refers 
to situations where the actions of one party are unobservable to a second 
party. Since the interests of the two parties may differ, this creates an 
incentive for the first party to act in an opportunistic manner to the 
detriment of the other. 
An important example of moral hazard occurs within firms in the 
context of principal-agent relationships.  Here, the “agent” is the party who 
acts (e.g. an employee) and the “principal” is the party whom the action 
affects (e.g. an employer). The principal’s problem is to ensure that the 
agent acts to her benefit, but she lacks complete information – i.e. she 
cannot fully monitor and evaluate how hard the agent is working or 
whether she is being honest. There is an extensive literature on moral 
hazard and principal-agent relationships (Mohlo, 1998; Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1992; Prendergast, 2002). 
Principal agent relationships are more relevant to barriers to energy 
efficiency within organisations than to the wider energy services market, 
and such barriers within organisations are discussed below in Section 2.2. 
But some features of the wider energy services market may be interpreted 
in these terms. For example, construction companies may be interpreted as 
acting as agents for the client. The latter may either be the ultimate 
occupier of the building or a speculative developer. The construction 
company may have incentives to take actions which are different from 
what the principal would prefer – notably to cut corners on energy 
efficiency to maximise profits. This is possible because the agent’s actions 
are largely unobservable by the principal. In a similar manner, 
subcontractors to the main construction company may also face incentives 
to maximise profits by, for example, putting in cheaper and less efficient 
components. 
Split Incentives (Appropriability) in Energy Services Markets 
One of the most familiar barriers to energy efficiency is split incentives. 
The most commonly cited example is landlords and tenants in the housing 
market (Scott, 1997). The landlord of a building may be unwilling to 
retrofit an apartment to reduce energy use since the resulting savings 
would be realised by the tenant. But at the same time tenants will be 
unwilling to retrofit since they may move out before benefiting fully from 
the cost savings. 
This type of problem may also be interpreted as a form of market 
failure resulting from asymmetric information (Jaffe & Stavins, 1994b, p. 
805). One party may have the relevant information on the costs and 
benefits of an energy efficiency investment, but it may be difficult to 
convey this to the other party. If there were no information problems, 
landlords and tenants would be able to enter into contracts to share the 
costs and benefits of the investment. In practice, however, the gains that 
would be achievable through such arrangements are swamped by the 
information problems and transaction costs involved. The arrangements 
that would be needed to make rents reflect the capitalised value of energy 
savings could be highly complex. 
10 BARRIERS TO ENERGY EFFICIENCY 
 
 
Split incentives may, therefore, be understood in the more familiar 
terms of inability to appropriate the benefits of an investment, or 
alternatively as a manifestation of asymmetric information and transaction 
costs. In either case, the situation can be understood as a true market 
failure in the neo-classical sense. 
Most literature on split incentives has focused on the household sector. 
But similar problems also arise in the public, commercial and industrial 
sectors through the leasing of buildings or equipment. This barrier is 
particularly important in commercial buildings as the leasing of office 
space is very common. In many leases, tenants simply pay a fixed pro rata 
share of the building’s energy bill. This means the savings generated by one 
tenant’s investment would accrue to all other tenants as well, diluting the 
investment incentive. The problem could be overcome through sub-
metering, but this appears to be relatively rare. 
 
 Organisational failures fall into two broad categories: 
– Principal-agent relationships within organisations 
– Split incentives and appropriability within organisations 
These are discussed below. 
2.2.1 MORAL HAZARD AND PRINCIPAL-AGENT 
RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN ORGANISATIONS 
Barriers within organisations are exemplified by the use of stringent 
payback criteria for energy efficiency investments. It is common to observe 
both: (a) the use of payback criteria in preference to discounted cash flow 
analysis; and (b) the use of very stringent payback criteria (2 or 3 years or 
even less) which implies a rate of return that is significantly greater than 
the firm’s cost of capital (DeCanio, 1994). These observations run counter 
to the recommendations of neo-classical economics which are that firms 
should proceed with all investments where risk-adjusted rates of return 
exceed the firm’s cost of capital. The fact that departures from this 
recommendation appear to be the norm demands explanation. Principal-
agent relationships within the organisation may provide one possible 
explanation for this. 
As indicated in Section 2.1.2, principal-agent relationships exist where 
the interests of one actor, the principal, depend on the action of another 
actor, the agent. The agency problem arises when the principal tries to 
ensure that the agent behaves in ways that are consistent with the 
principal’s interests. Such principal-agent relationships are pervasive within 
hierarchical firms. Since the objectives of the principal and agent can 
diverge, the principal commonly aims to protect her interests by strictly 
monitoring the agent, and/or by creating an appropriate incentive structure 
(Rowlinson, 1997, p.31). 
Principals (e.g. the company owner) cannot fully observe either the true 
quality of decision making or the true profitability of proposed investment 
projects. This creates the risk that profits are dissipated into “managerial 
slack” – defined as the excess use of resources over the minimum required 
for the task (DeCanio, 1993, p.909). One method of reducing this slack is 
2.2 
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to set the hurdle rate for investment projects to be substantially above the 
cost of capital to ensure that only genuinely profitable investments are 
undertaken (Antle and Eppen, 1985; Statman, 1982). Furthermore, we 
would expect the hurdle rate to be higher for small investments, since the 
transaction costs of determining the profitability of the investment 
represent a greater portion of the expected savings. Energy efficiency 
investments typically fall into this category of small, cost saving 
investments. 
Several formal models have been developed to demonstrate this 
outcome (Narayanan, 1985; Chaney, 1989), which leads to second-best 
expedients. The principal second-best expedient is the use of high hurdle 
rates (short payback criteria) for energy efficiency investments. But the 
widely observed practice of capital rationing (Ross, 1986) may also be 
explained in these terms.  Here, top-level managers reduce the funds 
available for small, cost saving projects to reduce the risk that, in the 
absence of effective monitoring, resources will be misallocated. 
2.2.2 SPLIT INCENTIVES AND APPROPRIABILITY WITHIN 
ORGANISATIONS 
It is often the case that managers remain in their posts for relatively short 
periods of time (DeCanio, 1993, p.908).  In large companies, there may 
even be a policy of job rotation. But a manager who is in a post for only 2-
3 years may have no incentive to initiate investments that have a longer 
payback period. The incentive structure is, therefore, skewed towards 
projects with rapid returns – although these may prove inferior to others if 
a full discounted cash flow analysis were performed. As with landlords and 
tenants, problems of information and communication prevent the 
incentive structure from being modified. Statman & Sepe (1984) point to a 
related issue in that, even without job rotation, management incentive 
structures are typically biased towards short-term performance. 
The use of sub-metering and cost centres is another issue. It is 
necessary to ask, what are the personal incentives for investing in energy saving? The 
greatest incentive would be if the divisional managers were responsible for 
their own energy costs and could directly benefit from any savings. If the 
benefits of cost savings accrue elsewhere, then this incentive is diluted. To 
introduce such accountability, it may be necessary to sub-meter energy use 
by individual cost centres. Alternatively, accountability could be 
centralised, with individual posts of energy management staff made self-
funding from the savings from efficiency improvements. 
Very similar issues arise in equipment purchasing. The purchaser may 
have a strong incentive to minimise the capital costs of the purchase, but 
may not be accountable for running costs.  Alternatively, maintenance staff 
may have strong incentives to minimise capital costs and/or to get failed 
equipment working again quickly, but may have no incentive to minimise 
running costs. 
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The third category of economic barriers refers to factors that cannot be 
classified as either market failures or organisational failures. Here, the 
barriers are real features of the decision-making environment of firms, 
although the features concerned have proved difficult to incorporate in 
engineering-economic models. Thus, when engineering-economic models 
indicate that a particular investment in an energy-saving measure would be 
both energy-efficient and cost-effective for the investor, they may actually 
be overlooking some real cost or obstacle that would confront some or all 
potential investors. By not making such an “energy efficiency” investment, 
therefore, an organisation may be acting quite rationally when one takes 
full account of all its circumstances. 
The three main barriers in this group are heterogeneity, hidden costs and 
risk. Problems with access to capital may also be included here, although this 
category is more contentious and it is sometimes less clear whether it really 
belongs in this group.  These barriers are discussed in turn below. 
2.3.1 HETEROGENEITY 
The heterogeneity (or diversity) argument is straightforward (Jaffe and 
Stavins, 1994b, p.805; Golove and Eto, 1996, pp.13-14). The estimates of 
cost effectiveness for a particular technology are based on the 
characteristics of an average user within a particular class. For example, 
small scale CHP may be demonstrated to be cost effective for medium 
sized sites in the brewing industry. But within this definition of a class of 
users, there may be wide variation in actual characteristics. In the case of 
CHP, profitability depends on high annual utilisation and typically requires 
at least two-shift, 6 days/week working patterns. While this may be the 
norm in a particular sector, it may not apply in all cases. Hence, for a 
subset of the population with low annual operating hours, CHP will not be 
profitable. 
The size of this subset will depend on the distribution of characteristics 
within a population. In some cases it could be large. If engineering-
economic models do not reflect this variation, they will overstate the 
opportunities for a particular technology in a particular sector. Whether 
heterogeneity can provide an explanation for the apparent efficiency gap is 
an empirical question. It cannot be settled in the abstract. 
2.3.2 HIDDEN COSTS 
Hidden costs represent one of the most important arguments against the 
“efficiency gap” hypothesis. The claim is that engineering-economic 
studies fail to take account of the reduction in benefits associated with 
energy efficient technologies or the additional costs associated with them 
(Nichols, 1994). As a consequence, the studies overestimate efficiency 
potential. 
Three broad categories of hidden costs can be identified: 
• general overhead costs of energy management; 
• costs specific to a technology investment; and  
• loss of benefits associated with an efficient technology. 
2.3 
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Possible elements of each type of cost are indicated in the following 
table. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.2: Possible Components of Hidden Costs 
Category Example 
General overhead 
costs of energy 
management 
• costs of employing specialist people (e.g. energy manager) 
• costs of energy information systems (including: gathering of energy 
consumption data; maintaining sub-metering systems; analysing data and 
correcting for influencing factors; identifying faults; etc.); 
• cost of energy auditing; 
Costs involved in 
individual 
technology 
decisions 
• cost of (i) identifying opportunities; (ii) detailed investigation and design; 
  (iii) formal investment appraisal; 
• cost of formal procedures for seeking approval of capital expenditures; 
• cost of specification and tendering for capital works to manufacturers and 
contractors 
• cost of disruptions and inconvenience; 
• additional staff costs for maintenance; 
• costs for replacement, early retirement, or retraining of staff; 
Loss of benefits in 
individual 
technology 
decisions 
• problems with safety, noise, working conditions, extra maintenance, reliability, 
service quality etc. (e.g. lighting levels). 
 
An empirical example is provided by Hein and Blok (1994). They 
found that the search and information costs of a range of energy efficiency 
investments formed between 3 per cent and 8 per cent of the total 
investment cost. 
The salary part of overhead costs of energy management may be of 
particular importance. For example, the UK EEBPP (the Energy 
Efficiency Best Practice Programme) recommends that a sum equivalent to 
5 per cent of an organisation’s annual energy expenditure should be 
reserved for energy efficiency investment. For a site with a £1million bill, 
this would equal £50,000. But the salary costs for a full-time energy 
manager may be £30,000, or 60 per cent of the annual investment budget. 
In this context, stringent payback criteria for investment projects may be 
justified as a means to recover the salary overhead costs. But is it 
reasonable to load all of the salary overheads onto investment projects? 
Much of energy management may be seen as an essential overhead, 
including tasks such as negotiating with energy suppliers and overseeing 
maintenance. The question of what proportion of overheads should be 
recovered through investment projects is difficult to answer and may vary 
between different organisations. 
The inclusion of information costs as a hidden cost leads to an overlap 
with the true market failures discussed in Section 2.1. The argument is that 
there are costs entailed in, for example: identifying the investment 
opportunity; identifying the options available; identifying the energy 
performance of different technologies; verifying the quality of information; 
assessing the reliability of equipment suppliers, and so on. These costs may 
easily be neglected in standard engineering-economic models. But is the 
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difficulty and cost of obtaining information a consequence of a failure in 
the market for information, or is the market working efficiently? The 
empirical starting point is the same – identifying whether information costs 
exist – but interpretation of the results is contentious. 
2.3.3 RISK 
Both the use of high discount rates for energy efficiency investments and 
the rejection of particular energy efficient technologies may represent a 
rational response to risk. For example, if there is some doubt that a 
business will survive over the next three years, stringent investment criteria 
may be entirely appropriate.  
We may distinguish three broad categories of risk: 
• External risk: e.g.  
• overall economic trends (e.g. recession);  
• expected reductions in fuel and electricity prices;4  
• political changes and government policy; 
• Business risk: e.g. 
• sectoral economic trends;  
• individual business economic trends; 
• financing risk (reaction of capital markets to increases in 
borrowing); 
• Technical risk: e.g. 
• technical performance of individual technologies 
• unreliability. 
Risk, therefore, has many dimensions. Risk may be difficult to evaluate 
objectively and while perceptions of risk may inhibit investment, this does 
not necessarily mean that those perceptions are rational. These factors 
make risk particularly difficult to incorporate within engineering-economic 
models. 
Technical risk will be specific to particular technologies. Many of the 
technologies recommended in energy efficiency literature are well proven 
and apparently low risk. This makes it unlikely that technical risk will often 
provide a rational reason for rejection, but there may be site-specific 
reasons. 
Some economists argue that discounted cash-flow models are 
theoretically inadequate for studying energy efficiency investments and 
must be supplanted by more sophisticated techniques that take account of 
risk and uncertainty (Hassett and Metcalf, 1993; Metcalf, 1994; Sutherland, 
1991). These models tend to predict use of higher discount rates and 
suggest that this represents a rational response to risk. As with other neo-
classical approaches, the argument assumes that economic agents make 
optimising decisions. Furthermore, the suggested models imply highly 
sophisticated decision-making techniques which generally seem implausible 
to non-economists (Howarth and Sanstad, 1995, p.105). 
 
4 This could justify stringent investment criteria for energy efficiency projects if the direction 
of energy price changes was expected to be downwards. 
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Sutherland (1991) applies the Capital Asset Pricing Model to efficiency 
investments and concludes that investors will require higher returns from 
assets where yields are uncertain and where it is not possible to diversify 
risks. But Sanstad, Blumstein and Stoft (1995) have shown that 
Sutherland’s model explains only a small risk premium. Also, Howarth and 
Sanstad (1995) have argued that uncertainty over the benefits of energy 
efficiency does not imply that such investments increase overall risk. 
Hasset and Metcalf (1993) and Johnson (1994) present a similar 
argument to that of Sutherland. They develop a model which suggests that, 
given (a) fuel and capital price uncertainty and (b) the irreversibility of 
efficiency investments, the required rates of return for efficiency 
investments should be higher than conventional investment models 
predict. One reason for this is that there is an opportunity cost in acting 
today, rather than delaying the decision and resolving some uncertainties. 
The full cost of investment should, therefore, include the cost of 
foreclosing such options (Pindyck, 1991). 
Again, Howarth and Sanstad (1995) have strongly criticised this model. 
They note that the model: 
• fails to account (by some distance) for the observed high discount 
rates; 
• ignores the costs involved in delaying decisions (e.g. the loss of 
services if an appliance is not replaced); and 
• assumes that consumers are fully informed about the characteristics of 
technologies. 
Hence, the argument that high discount rates can be considered a 
rational response to risk for all types of efficiency investment does not 
seem plausible. The quantitative predictions of the models fail on their 
own terms, quite apart from the implausibility of the behavioural 
assumptions. However, external, business or technical risk may be a 
relevant and important factor in individual circumstances. 
2.3.4 ACCESS TO CAPITAL  
Many energy consumers (particularly low-income households but also 
some SMEs) have access to capital only at costs that are well above the 
average rate of return on capital in the economy. Access to capital is, 
therefore, a commonly cited barrier to energy efficiency investments (Hirst 
and Brown, 1990; Eyre, 1997). 
A neo-classical response to this point is that while inability to access 
capital may constitute a barrier, it need not imply a market failure in capital 
markets. In a perfect market, capital is allocated to projects with the 
highest risk adjusted rate of return. Sutherland (1996) and others argue that 
groups such as low-income households are high-risk borrowers. Hence the 
market is working efficiently in restricting capital to such groups. 
This observation is important but it runs the risk of becoming a 
tautology. Are all low income consumers high risk? Some evidence 
suggests not. For example, the Gramreen bank in Bangladesh has lent 
micro-credit to very poor people for many years and has never had a 
default (Righter, 1998). If this is the case, then imperfections in capital 
markets may impede economic efficiency and thereby justify intervention. 
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Golove and Eto (1996, p.22) argue that this barrier can be better 
understood as an information problem. There is a cost entailed in 
investigating the creditworthiness of small firms and individuals. This cost 
may be sufficiently high to diminish the economic viability of such loans. 
Historical evidence may suggest that the probability of a default increases 
for smaller firms. While the risk could be investigated in a particular 
instance, the cost of acquiring information will be large because of the 
large number of potential clients. 
Another aspect of the capital availability problem relates specifically to 
the public sector (and hence to the higher education sector in our study). 
In the public sector, access to capital is frequently directly rationed by 
government with the aim of controlling public borrowing. The assumption 
is that private sector investment is more productive and that excessive 
public expenditure will damage economic objectives (Eyre, 1997, p. 33). 
But such a ruling can pre-empt assessment of the cost effectiveness of 
individual projects and hence can inhibit economic investment. 
Within private sector firms, restrictions on capital are often self 
imposed. Here firms seem to be reluctant to borrow money to finance low 
risk energy efficiency projects with rates of return that significantly exceed 
their weighted average cost of capital. There are two dimensions to this 
problem. First, there is a restriction on overall borrowing. Second, available 
finance is allocated to projects according to a priority list and energy 
efficiency typically comes low on the list. But are such restrictions rational? 
Capital constraints may be self-imposed through concerns about the 
risk of increased gearing. Gearing refers to the ratio of loan finance to 
equity and there is a voluminous theoretical and empirical literature on the 
effect of gearing on a firm’s cost of capital (Mclaney, 1994, Ch. 11).5 The 
key observation here is that loan finance carries risk in that it imposes 
obligations both to meet annual interest charges and to repay the principal. 
In contrast to share dividends, these are fixed obligations and are not at the 
firm’s discretion. High levels of gearing or loan finance expose the firm to 
the risk that it will not be able to meet its payment obligations should it 
experience a downturn in business. 
The lenders have the legal right to enforce loan repayments, whereas 
ordinary shareholders do not have rights to enforce the payment of a 
dividend. This situation means that high levels of gearing expose the 
shareholders to greater risk as all the firm’s profits could be eaten up in the 
repayment of loans. As a result, shareholders will demand higher returns as 
compensation.  Furthermore, high levels of gearing also expose the lenders 
to greater risk as, should the firm go out of business, the asset value may 
be insufficient to pay off the outstanding loans. Hence, lenders too will 
demand higher interest payments on loans. 
The net result of this is that high levels of gearing increase risk and 
raise a firm’s cost of capital. That is, the cost of obtaining additional capital 
(the effective interest rate) may exceed the average cost under the existing 
debt/equity mix (Ross, 1986). Management will, therefore, restrict the level 
 
5 The key article in this field is Modigliani and Miller (1958), which challenged the traditional 
view of the effect of gearing. This was the starting point for much of the subsequent debate. 
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of gearing to a level they feel comfortable with. Whether this is rational in 
any one case depends upon the current level of gearing, judgements about 
how the financial market will respond to any increase in gearing, and 
judgements about the future business situation – including movements in 
exchange and interest rates. Since most energy efficiency investments 
involve relatively small sums of money, these should have little impact on 
the level of gearing for the firm as a whole. But borrowing requirements 
and “financing risk” are likely to be assessed for the firm as a whole, and 
not for individual investments. The effect would be to restrict the overall 
capital budget for investment, including that for energy efficiency. 
These considerations suggest that it is particularly difficult to assess 
whether self-imposed restrictions on borrowing represent a rational 
response to financing risk. The answer will vary with the circumstances.  If 
it is a rational response, then access to capital becomes a risk issue rather 
than a problem with capital markets. If it is not a rational response, then 
restrictions on borrowing can be considered as an organisational failure, 
rather than rational behaviour. 
 
 Many of the economic barriers outlined in the previous three sections 
would impede economic efficiency even with fully rational agents – that is, 
with utility maximising consumers and profit maximising firms. But despite 
its dominance in economic models, the rationality hypothesis is widely 
criticised as a poor representation of actual behaviour (Hodgson, 1988). In 
the energy literature, a wide range of empirical research has demonstrated 
that assumptions of economic rationality on the part of energy users are 
fundamentally flawed (Katzev and Johnson, 1987). For example, Kempton 
and Montgomery (1982) demonstrate that energy consumers systematically 
deviate from cost minimising behaviour even when motivated to make 
careful decisions. As Sanstad and Howarth note, “...while consumers often 
lack complete information about the energy decisions they must make, 
they more importantly lack expertise in processing and applying the 
information that is available to them” (Sanstad and Howarth, 1994, p. 816). 
The implication of this is that neo-classical economic analyses of 
barriers would be insufficient to explain the efficiency gap. Concepts from 
behavioural perspectives should also be employed. The following sections 
discuss two such approaches. Section 2.4.1 introduces an alternative 
conception of rational behaviour, known as bounded rationality, which 
emphasises constraints on agents’ time, attention and the ability to process 
information. Section 2.4.2 summarises some additional insights on “the 
human dimension” that have emerged from psychological studies of 
energy decision making, focusing on the form of information, credibility 
and trust, inertia and values. A difference between the two approaches is 
that bounded rationality is considered by some economists to be amenable 
to modelling using modifications to the standard tools of optimisation 
theory (Howarth and Andersson, 1993).  Bounded rationality has also been 
incorporated into several alternatives to mainstream economics, including 
evolutionary economics and transaction cost economics. In contrast, 
researchers in the “human dimension” tradition consider economic 
2.4 Behavioural 
Approaches to 
Barriers 
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concepts to be insufficient for analysing and understanding energy related 
behaviour (Stern, 1986; Shove, 1995). 
2.4.1 BOUNDED RATIONALITY 
The concept of bounded rationality was first introduced by Herbert Simon 
in the 1950s and it has been highly influential (Simon, 1957; Simon, 1959). 
Simon draws a distinction between substantive and procedural rationality 
where: 
• Substantive rationality implies that agents make decisions in the manner 
prescribed by formal optimisation models – or at least that their 
choices are consistent with the predictions of such models.   
• Procedural rationality implies that people make decisions subject to 
constraints on their attention, resources and ability to process 
information – and hence that their choices are likely to differ 
significantly from the predictions of optimisation models. 
Procedural rationality has two important implications. First, individuals 
and companies will aim to make satisfactory decisions rather than expend 
time and effort searching for the very best or optimum decision. This 
process is termed satisficing rather than optimising. As March and Simon 
note:  
Most human decision making, whether individual or 
organisational, is concerned with the discovery and selection 
of satisfactory alternatives; only in exceptional cases is it 
concerned with the discovery and selection of optimal 
alternatives. To optimise requires processes several orders of 
magnitude more complex than those required to satisfice. 
(March and Simon, 1958, p.171). 
Second, individuals and organisations are rational in the sense that 
decisions are goal directed. But constraints on time, attention, resources 
and the ability to process information lead to optimising analyses being 
replaced by imprecise routines and rules of thumb. Means are found to 
economise on scarce cognitive resources. In organisations, this could mean 
focusing on core activities, such as the primary production process, rather 
than peripheral issues such as energy use. Decisionmaking is also divided 
up between specialists, with abstract global objectives being replaced with 
tangible sub-goals the achievement of which can be measured. 
These basic ideas have been extensively developed. For example, they 
provide a central theme of evolutionary economics (Dosi and Nelson, 1994; 
Nelson and Winter, 1982).  Evolutionary economics emphasises the:  
...general occurrence of various rule-guided behaviours, often 
taking the form of relatively invariant routines whose origin is 
shaped by the learning history of the agent, their pre-existing 
knowledge and, most likely, their value system and 
prejudices...the behavioural foundations of evolutionary 
theories rest on learning processes involving imperfect 
adaptation and mistake ridden discoveries. (Dosi and Nelson, 
1994, p.159). 
Empirical studies of energy decisions overwhelmingly support the 
hypothesis of bounded rationality. For example, the provision of accurate 
information on costs and benefits does not necessarily improve the quality 
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of decision making. In a survey of energy information programmes, 
Robinson (1991) concludes that “... it is clear that, with the exception of 
some labelling programmes, energy information programmes on their own 
have not to date resulted in significant energy savings”. 
An example of the importance of routines is given by de Almeida’s 
study of the French market for energy efficient motors (de Almeida, 1998). 
In the general absence of neo-classical market failures, energy consumers 
consistently chose inefficient motors. De Almeida argues that this results 
from the use of cognitively efficient rules of thumb. For example, when 
small end-users had to buy motors in an emergency, the only parameters 
they considered were delivery time and price. The rule of thumb was to 
buy the same type and brand as the failed motor from the nearest retailer. 
Similarly, maintenance departments in large firms evaluated motors only in 
terms of maintenance costs and reliability. De Almeida’s work 
demonstrates the importance of analysing specific technology decisions. 
The extent and importance of bounded rationality will vary with the 
decision – for example between emergency replacement, routine 
replacement and new requirement. 
Three important conclusions follow from this.  First, bounded 
rationality may be considered as an additional barrier that does not fit into 
conventional economic models (Sanstad and Howarth, 1994). Some 
commentators term this barrier a market failure. For example, Eyre notes 
that: “...There is a market failure to the extent that consumers do not 
attempt to maximise their utility or producers their profits.” (Eyre, 1997, 
p.36). The benchmark for this judgement is substantive rationality. As 
Sanstad & Howarth note: “...individuals and firms do not always behave 
according to the logic of economic rationality but they should.” (Sanstad and 
Howarth, 1994, p.179). 
Second, real world departures from the substantive rationality assumed 
in most engineering-economic models can account for a proportion of the 
efficiency gap.  How large a proportion is a (difficult) empirical question. It 
is not possible to determine, a priori, the relative importance of neo-
classical barriers and bounded rationality. 
Third, the existence of bounded rationality may also undermine some 
intervention programmes designed to improve energy efficiency. If agents 
lack the ability to use information, there may be little point in providing 
more information. Instead, it may be necessary to employ a different type 
of intervention such as imposition of performance standards. 
Rules and Routines as Solutions to Bounded Rationality 
Simon’s original work was focused on organisations and he saw the 
division of labour within organisations as a means of economising on 
bounded rationality (Simon, 1957). Regular and predictable patterns of 
behaviour in organisations may be understood as the result of routines 
rather than rational choice (Dosi and Nelson, 1994; Nelson and Winter, 
1982). The importance of rules and routines depends upon the 
organisational structure, but rule following is pervasive. Most decisions are 
the consequence of applying a set of rules to a situation, rather than a 
systematic analysis of alternatives. As Stern notes: “Organisations generally 
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solve problems and respond to environmental demands by applying 
existing routines rather than developing new ones” (Stern, 1984, p.109). 
Payback rules represent one type of routine (Stern, 1984, p.109). Their 
attraction, from a bounded rationality perspective, is that they are simple, 
easy to communicate and intuitive. They economise on managerial effort 
in examining investment proposals across widely different operations. 
Capital budgeting procedures represent a second type of rule, used in 
delegating the authority to spend money. Typically, the primary concern 
when evaluating an investment opportunity is whether there is money in 
the budget, rather than what is the rate of return (Stern, 1984, p.110). 
Expenditure that exceeds the budget (breaks the rule) requires 
administrative approval, a potentially complex and lengthy process that 
discourages attempts to do so. Routines, therefore, facilitate information 
handling, but can be inflexible. 
Other types of rule include operation, safety and maintenance 
procedures, relationships with particular suppliers, design criteria, 
equipment replacement routines and so on. They may either be formally 
specified in written procedures or embedded in social practices. Routines 
are a means of allocating attention. Energy efficiency opportunities may 
receive little attention if they do not form part of standard routines and 
operating procedures. 
2.4.2 THE HUMAN DIMENSION 
The second approach in the behavioural literature derives from social 
psychology rather than economics and it has paid particular attention to 
improving the effectiveness of energy efficiency programmes (Stern, 1986; 
Katzev and Johnson, 1987). Many of these programmes date from the 
1973 oil crisis, and the range of psychological literature seems to have 
declined in the 1980s as these programmes declined (Lutzenhiser, 1993, 
p.253). This literature is overwhelmingly dominated by studies of 
household energy consumption, with very few studies of organisations. 
Nevertheless, some useful insights can be drawn for our purposes. 
The primary aim of this literature is to derive realistic descriptions of 
how individuals and organisations make decisions about energy use. It is 
argued that people do not respond to price signals in the way assumed in 
energy models. The following observations are typical (Stern, 1986): 
• Economists assume people respond to marginal prices, but in practice 
they are more likely to respond to average prices or total costs. 
• Demand is not a smooth function of price. People respond more to 
rapid change since the stimulus is more noticeable. 
• People generally require a higher rate of return for smaller 
investments. 
Similar points are made by Hewett (1998, p.2.16) who notes that the 
mental shortcuts used to economise on bounded rationality lead not simply 
to “limitedly rational” decisions but to systematically biased or erroneous 
decisions. Quoting Piattelli-Palmarini (1994), she terms these cognitive 
illusions. 
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A systematic alternative to economic theories of rationality has been 
developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Termed “prospect theory”, 
this notes that:  
• people treat gains differently from losses and hence they undervalue 
opportunity costs; 
• outcomes received with certainty are weighted more than those with 
uncertain outcomes;  
• choices depend strongly on how a decision is framed, that is, on the 
reference point. 
These and similar observations lead to three concepts from the 
psychological literature that may be framed as barriers: 
• form of information; 
• credibility and trust; 
• inertia. 
A further concept, values, is also discussed below. This does not strictly 
represent a barrier, but it may be an important variable in explaining energy 
decision making. 
Form of Information 
The costs of acquiring and verifying information have already been 
discussed. But the behavioural literature emphasises that there is more to 
information than cost. This is demonstrated by US evaluations of energy 
efficiency programmes which demonstrate that people ignore useful 
information even when it is costless (Kempton, et al., 1984, p. 19). As Stern 
notes: ‘... the cost of searching does not seem to be the main reason people 
are ill informed. The effectiveness of information depends on more than 
its availability and content.’ (Stern, 1984). In other words, the form of 
information is crucial. 
Such a point is obvious to social psychologists and marketing 
departments, but it also has implications for energy efficiency policy. Five 
elements of information in particular are important: 
• Information should be specific and personalised, e.g. individual energy 
audits will be more effective than general information on cost saving 
opportunities. 
• Information should be vivid. For example, a US study showed that 
people who viewed a video about implementing domestic energy 
saving measures were significantly more likely to cut energy use than 
those who received the information in writing (Winett et al., 1984, 
n24).  Similarly, demonstration of tangible success with a technology is 
likely to have far more persuasive power than a sales pitch – hence the 
emphasis in government information programmes on technology 
demonstration schemes. 
• Information should be clear and simple. 
• Information should be available close in time to the relevant decision. 
• Feedback should be given on the beneficial consequences of previous 
energy decisions if subsequent efficiency measures are to be 
encouraged (Seligman et al., 1981). 
Absence of information in a suitable form that is easy to assimilate 
could be considered a barrier to energy efficiency. 
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Credibility and Trust 
A further dimension of information is the credibility of the source (Stern, 
1984, p.43). Credibility involves a combination of expertise and 
trustworthiness. One possible explanation for why people ignore 
information that is both useful and free is that they do not trust the source. 
A classic study by Craig and McCann (1978) illustrates this point. One 
thousand New York households were sent a pamphlet describing how to 
save energy. Half the households received the mailing from the local 
electric utility, and the other half from the state regulatory agency. The 
following month, households that had received pamphlets from the agency 
used about 8 per cent less electricity than those that had received the 
identical pamphlets from the utility. 
Perceptions of credibility will depend on a variety of factors including: 
the nature of the source (e.g. private, governmental, charity or pressure 
group); past experience with the source; the nature of interactions with the 
source; recommendations from colleagues; and 
recommendations/impressions from a wide range of contacts within 
professional and social networks. Of these, it is clear that interpersonal 
contacts and recommendations count for significantly more than labels, 
pamphlets and paper qualifications (Stern, 1984, p.67). Most of these 
effective contacts are made through existing professional and social 
networks which, therefore, play a fundamental role in transmitting 
information and establishing trust. 
Inertia 
Some of the behavioural literature suggests that inertia may be an 
explanatory variable for the non-adoption of energy-efficient technologies. 
The findings of “prospect theory” are relevant here. First, we have the 
observation that gains are treated differently from losses. This means that 
opportunity costs, the gains foregone, are undervalued (Hewett, 1998, 
p.2.17). Organisations will consider themselves “endowed” with their 
existing buildings, equipment and energy bill. Foregone energy savings are 
considered an opportunity cost, while the investment costs of energy 
efficient equipment will be an out-of-pocket cost: 
[A] certain degree of inertia is introduced into the consumer 
choice process since goods that are included in the individual’s 
endowment will be more highly valued than those not held in 
the endowment ... This follows because removing a good from 
the endowment creates a loss while adding the same good (to 
an endowment without it) generates a gain.6 
Second, potential energy savings are uncertain, while continuing with 
the existing “endowment” will give predictable outcomes. Since outcomes 
that are known with certainty will be given greater weighting than those 
that are uncertain, this will reinforce the tendency to inertia.   
A third factor is the desire to minimise regret: 
 
6 Thaler (1991, p 8), quoted in Hewett (1998, p 2.17) 
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Action and decisions require a greater justification than 
inaction, than failing to decide ...  Our mental economy has a 
built in economy for action. If our actions do not pan out, or 
cause a loss, we regret having acted.  If, instead, we do not act, 
if we leave things as they are, and our investment does not pan 
out, or we lose, we still suffer regret but the regret is lesser.7 
All three factors may cause individuals and organisations to favour the 
status quo, contrary to the predictions of neo-classical economics. Rather 
similar conclusions follow from a separate behavioural theory known as 
cognitive dissonance (Stern, 1984, p.69). This makes the following 
observations: 
• people tend to rationalise previous decisions, emphasising the positive 
aspects of the decision and the negative aspects of the unchosen 
alternative; 
• this tendency is greater for difficult, costly or irreversible decisions; 
• people remember the plausible arguments for their own position and 
forget the plausible arguments opposing their position; 
• once someone makes a small commitment in a given direction, that 
person is more likely to make a subsequent larger commitment. 
Hence people resist change because they are committed to what they 
are doing, and they justify that inertia by the downgrading of contrary 
information. Thus, inertia may help explain the neglect of cost-effective 
energy efficiency opportunities. However, any positive results from 
efficiency investments that are undertaken can create a momentum leading 
to further savings in the future. 
Values 
In one sense, personal values and norms concerning the environment 
should not be relevant to explaining the “energy efficiency gap” in the 
sense in which we use that term. In specifying the existence of such a gap, 
potential energy efficiency investments are defined as being cost-effective 
under normal commercial criteria, and the basic motivation for investment 
is assumed to be the economic motivation. “Barrier” hypotheses purport 
to explain why an apparently cost-effective investment does not go ahead. 
But in reality, economic considerations may provide only one element 
of a decision. The environmental impact of energy use has motivated 
energy efficiency for many years, and the recognition of global climate 
change has made it more relevant than ever. Values can, therefore, be 
explanatory variables in explaining the take-up of energy efficient 
technologies. 
We can distinguish between personal values and corporate values, 
where the latter are embedded in the wider organisational culture. Issues of 
organisational culture are discussed below in Section 2.5. The personal 
values of influential individuals such as top management can be relevant, 
since it is often such a product champion who initiates action on energy 
efficiency. Values may play a role in sensitising an individual or 
 
7 Piatelli-Palmarini, 1994, p 27-28, quoted in Hewett (1998, p 2.17) 
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organisation to cost effective opportunities to save energy that may 
otherwise go unnoticed. A related dimension to this is the visibility of 
energy efficiency performance, and the impact of this on the public profile 
(image) of the organisation. 
Household studies demonstrate that the relative importance of values 
in energy-related decisions depends on the cost and difficulty of the 
efficiency measure. For example, Stern et al. (1987) found that personal 
norms were a reliable predictor of low cost domestic energy conservation 
measures, but showed a weak relationship to major household investments. 
While the absence of relevant environmental values does not strictly 
constitute a “barrier” in the classic sense, the importance of values should 
nevertheless be explored. If this were not done, we would miss a 
potentially important element of energy decision making. 
 
 Organisational theory approaches to barriers are the least well 
developed of the three perspectives and what follows is necessarily 
tentative. 
A broad distinction can be made between organisational theory and 
organisational economics  (Rowlinson, 1997). The latter was described in 
previous sections and represents an application of a small number of 
relatively precise economic ideas to explain the structure and operation of 
organisations. In contrast, the discipline of organisational theory is 
notoriously diverse and eclectic. Ideas are borrowed from a wide range of 
disciplines and are employed as metaphors to explain different facets of 
organisational behaviour, e.g., organisations viewed as machines, as 
cultures, as political systems, etc. 
While there is a wealth of literature on the behaviour of organisations,8 
there are very few studies dealing explicitly with energy efficiency.  A 
notable exception is Cebon’s (1992) study of US universities. Research in 
environmental management has borrowed extensively from the 
organisational literature (Welford, 1997), but energy policy research has 
largely neglected it. This is unfortunate, as it may have a lot to offer. An 
illustration of this is that ideas from organisational theory have been taken 
up in promotional best practice literature published by government agencies 
(EEO, 1995). 
For our purposes, we select three concepts from the organisational 
theory literature that seem particularly relevant to energy efficiency. These 
are:  
• organisational structure;  
• power; and 
• organisational culture. 
2.5.1 ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE 
Organisational structure is a primary focus of organisational theory. While 
we cannot formulate structure as a barrier to energy efficiency, it is clear 
 
8 For good overviews see Hatch (1997) and Morgan (1986). 
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that organisational structure will constrain the range of viable opportunities for improved 
energy efficiency (Cebon, 1992). The reasons for this can be related both to 
bounded rationality and power relations (discussed below). Hence, while 
structure is not a causal mechanism, it provides an important framework for 
understanding the operation of barrier mechanisms.  
A tradition in organisational theory known as contingency theory 
emphasises that there is no one best way of organising (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979). The appropriate structure will depend upon both the 
nature of the task and the demands of the environment. Management must 
be concerned with achieving a good fit between organisation, task and 
environment. Different approaches to management may be necessary to 
perform different tasks within the same organisation and different types of 
organisation may be appropriate in different environments. 
An early study by Burns and Stalker (1961) established the distinction 
between mechanistic and organic approaches to organisation. Burns and 
Stalker argue that there is a continuum of organisational forms ranging 
from mechanistic forms, that are formal, hierarchical and stable, to organic 
forms, that are more informal, flexible and constantly evolving. They 
emphasise how the nature of different tasks and different environments 
lead to corresponding differences in the organisation of work, the nature 
of authority, the form of communications system and the nature of 
employee commitment. The more organic and flexible forms of 
organisation are required to deal with the more rapidly changing 
environments and technologies. 
Subsequent work by Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) refined this approach 
by showing that organisation styles may differ within organisations, as sub-
units perform different tasks and face different environments. For 
example, the organisational structure appropriate for a production task 
may be entirely inappropriate for an R&D laboratory. In relatively stable 
environments, conventional bureaucratic modes of organisation such as 
hierarchy, rules and so on may work quite well. In more turbulent 
environments, they need to be replaced by other modes, such as the use of 
multidisciplinary project teams. Matrix forms of organisation, midway 
between the hierarchical form and the multidisciplinary teams, represent a 
compromise between the two – combining a functional, departmental 
structure with a project-team structure (Galbraith, 1971). 
Cebons’s (1992) paper represents a valuable case study on how 
organisational structure at two universities influenced the type of energy 
efficiency technologies that were adopted. One university was 
administratively uniform with its different parties sharing centralised 
resources. The second was much more decentralised, with faculties 
managing their own budgets. Cebon examined the implementation of two 
very different technologies – compact fluorescent lighting and building 
energy management systems (BEMS). 
The centralised university successfully implemented BEMS and similar 
technologies that were complex, expensive, technical and did not require 
significant interactions with users. The decentralised university, in contrast, 
was very late in implementing BEMS but was much more successful with 
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compact fluorescent lighting and comparable technologies which were 
cheap, simple and involved the active participation of users. 
Cebon emphasises that organisational structure acts as a filter on 
technology choices. The proposed causes for this are: (i) information 
limitations; and (ii) power and resources. In the case of information, the 
estates department in the centralised university could assess technical 
information and implement technical solutions, but lacked important 
contextual information such as the needs of users. The reverse was true for 
the decentralised university. This restricted the options available to each. 
More generally we can note that structure will influence: 
• flows of information within and outside organisations; 
• asymmetries of information, including principal-agent relationships 
and the scope for moral hazard; and 
• the capacity to acquire and analyse information within individual 
departments. 
The organisational structure in Cebon’s universities corresponded to 
the mechanistic structure in Burns and Stalker’s typology, and we may 
expect this type of structure to be more prone to such informational 
problems. The organic structures characteristic of new high technology 
industries tend to have highly skilled workers, lower status hierarchies, 
better communications and a more problem solving focus. This may act to 
reduce some of the informational barriers to energy efficiency. But equally, 
we must remember Lawrence and Lorsch’s point about internal 
differentiation. If energy responsibilities are located in maintenance or 
estates departments with limited communication with other groups, some 
barriers are likely to remain. 
Cebon’s general point is that an actor will only be able to implement 
the subset of energy conservation technologies that are compatible with 
their access to information, and their extent of access will depend on the 
organisational structure (Cebon, 1992, p.808). Similarly, they will only be 
able to implement the subset of technologies that are compatible with their 
level of power or status within the organisation, since they need the co-
operation and support of other groups. 
2.5.2 POWER OR STATUS 
Viewing the organisation as a political system focuses attention on the 
power relationships inherent in organisational structures and on the ability 
of individuals or departments to influence decisions. The relationship of 
this to the barriers debate hinges on the power available to those actors 
responsible for energy efficiency. 
This perspective on organisations borrows ideas from political science. 
Organisations are viewed as: “...networks of people with divergent interests 
who gather together for the sake of expediency” (Morgan, 1986, p.154). 
Divergent interests lead to multiple goals, and structural divisions foster 
conflict. Hierarchical structures in particular lead to competition for 
limited resources. Power is the medium through which conflicts of 
interests get resolved. Power influences who gets what, when and how. It 
can take a variety of forms, including (Morgan, 1986, p.158): 
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• Formal authority: Typically associated with an agent’s position in the 
organisational structure. 
• Control of scarce resources: Such as skills, raw materials, particular 
technologies and, most importantly, money. Most organisational 
politics surrounds the process of budgeting and allocation of finance. 
Power rests in controlling resources on which an organisation is 
dependent. 
• Structure: The size and status of a group or department within an 
organisation provides an indication of its power. Of particular 
importance is the degree of centralisation or decentralisation. 
• Information and knowledge: Information is a key resource, which can 
influence the definition of organisational situations and create patterns 
of dependency. 
The important question from the barriers perspective is: How much 
power is available to the actors responsible for implementing energy efficiency? In 
particular, what is their status within the hierarchy? How much control do 
they have over key resources? Do they have the required information? 
Responsibility for energy matters is often assigned to engineering or 
maintenance departments that have a relatively low status within an 
organisation. Top management often views energy as a peripheral issue, of 
limited importance to the strategic direction of the organisation. Energy is 
often one of several responsibilities assigned to a single, low status 
individual. Lacking power, funds and management support, the scope for 
effective action is circumscribed. In addition, the best people will not be 
attracted to energy management if the compensation and prestige are less 
than the rewards of other positions. 
The role of a product champion is also relevant to the power dimension. 
Product champions acquire a degree of power through their charisma and 
drive and win top management support through demonstrable success. 
But, product champions may have an uphill task in overcoming barriers 
created by divisional structures. DeCanio (1994) reports the blockage of 
promising energy efficiency retrofits because of “turf battles” between 
different divisions. 
2.5.3 CULTURE 
The concept of organisational culture is analogous to the personal values 
discussed in Section 2.4.2. Thus, while culture cannot be framed as a 
barrier, it may nevertheless be a relevant variable in explaining the 
adoption of energy efficient technologies. Culture is broadly defined as the 
mix of knowledge, ideology, values, norms, laws and day-to-day rituals that 
characterise a social group (Hatch, 1997, Chapter 6). Values are the 
principles and standards held to have worth, while norms are unwritten 
rules of behaviour. As Hatch (1997, p.135) notes:  
The essence of a culture is its core of basic assumptions and 
established beliefs. This core reaches outward through the values 
and behavioural norms that are recognised, responded to and 
maintained by members of the culture. The values and norms, in 
turn, influence the choices and other actions taken by cultural 
members. 
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Organisations may be viewed as mini-societies that have their own 
distinctive patterns of culture and sub-culture (Morgan, 1986, p.121). 
Organisations may be composed of many and different value systems that 
create a range of competing sub-cultures. Despite this, management 
theorists look to a uniform corporate culture as the “normative glue” that 
holds an organisation together (Morgan, 1986, p.135). 
A consistent feature of the literature on organisational culture is the 
crucial role played by top management in shaping the values that guide an 
organisation (Morgan, 1986, p.126; Gladwin, 1992). Morgan argues that: 
“the attitudes and visions of top corporate staff tend to have a significant 
impact on the ethos and meaning system that pervades the whole 
organisation” (Morgan, 1986, p.126).  Similarly, Schein argues that: “...the 
unique and essential function of leadership is the manipulation of culture.” 
(Schein, 1985). 
The relevance of this to the barriers debate is that the place of energy 
efficiency and environmental values within an organisation’s culture may 
have a significant impact on the adoption of energy efficient technologies. 
Recognition of this is implicit in the strategy of agencies responsible for 
promoting energy efficiency, which place much emphasis on manipulating 
“soft” cultural factors – for example, encouraging the adoption of a 
corporate energy policy and marketing the benefits of energy management 
throughout an organisation (EEO, 1995; Higher Education Funding 
Council for England, 1996). If aspects of organisational culture can be 
levers for encouraging energy efficiency and improved environmental 
performance, then they should also be relevant in explaining differences in 
technology adoption between organisations. 
 
 Table 2.3 brings the discussion of the previous sections together. It sets 
out the taxonomy of fifteen potential barriers to energy efficiency 
developed for this study, and it summarises the claim that is being made in 
each case. This framework provides the basis for the empirical research 
that is reported in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. The empirical research aims to 
assess the relevance and importance of each claim through case studies of 
organisations in three different sectors. 
In conducting the empirical research it was found that the distinctions 
between some of the barriers could not always be sustained in practice. In 
particular, in reporting some of the case study results, it was found to be 
necessary to combine values with organisational culture because of the 
difficulty of distinguishing between these two in practice.  
It is also worth noting that, even at the conceptual level, the fifteen 
potential barriers to energy efficiency listed in Table 2.3 are not all entirely 
separate and independent from each other, since there are certain overlaps 
between them. For example, “access to capital” is listed as one potential 
barrier. It may be that the constraint on access to capital for investment in 
energy efficiency occurs in the form of the use of stringent payback criteria 
or tight capital budgeting. At the same time, the potential barriers called 
“risk” and “principal-agent relationships” would commonly have their 
effects by causing payback criteria or capital budgets to be tightened, so 
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that these barriers could be at least part of the reason for the “access to 
capital” barrier. Another example of interdependence between the 
potential barriers is the fact that “imperfect information” is listed as one 
potential barrier, while at the same time various types of imperfect 
information could be at least part of the cause of other potential barriers 
such as “adverse selection”. A third example is the fact that demands on 
management time can be seen as part of the “hidden costs” barrier, while 
demands on management time would also be part of the cause of the 
“bounded rationality” barrier. 
Such overlaps or interdependencies between some of the potential 
barriers arise partly because these concepts are drawn from different types 
of literature, which have their own particular perspectives but are at least 
partly addressing the same or similar phenomena. However, despite the 
overlaps between some of the barriers, there are elements in each of them 
that are distinctive. 
A final issue worth mentioning in relation to the taxonomy in Table 2.3 
concerns the use of the term “market failure”, and its implications for 
policy intervention. Market failures occur when the requirements for 
efficient allocation of resources through well functioning markets are 
violated. Some of the barriers listed in Table 2.3 are identified as arising 
from market failures while others are not, although it must be 
acknowledged that the classification of barriers as market failures or 
otherwise can be somewhat blurred and contentious. Neo-classical 
economists would say that public policy intervention to encourage 
economic efficiency is usually only justified when there exists some form 
of market failure. Furthermore, even in cases of market failure, they would 
say that this may not be sufficient to justify intervention; it is also necessary 
that the benefits arising from an intervention exceed the costs associated 
with the intervention (Jaffe and Stavins, 1994b, p.808). From this 
perspective, therefore, the occurrence of the “market failure” barriers may 
present grounds for policy intervention, whereas the other types of barriers 
would not in themselves justify intervention.  
However, it is very important to note that there may also be other 
market failures related to energy use, i.e., market failures that do not give 
rise to “barriers” that would help to explain the energy efficiency gap.  
Such market failures are naturally not reflected in our taxonomy of barriers 
to energy efficiency in Table 2.3. These other market failures may justify 
public policy intervention to overcome barriers that are not in themselves 
market failures. The obvious example of such a market failure is 
“environmental externalities”. If energy users cause environmental damage, 
thereby imposing costs on society at large that are not reflected in a 
commensurate cost or penalty attached to the use of energy, this is called 
an environmental externality and it is a form of market failure. In this 
situation, there may well be a case for policy intervention to improve 
energy efficiency and reduce energy consumption, even if the most 
important “barriers” to energy efficiency are not in themselves market 
failures.  
  
 
Table 2.3: A Taxonomy of Barriers to Energy Efficiency 
Perspective Sub-
division 
Barrier Claim 
 
Economic Non 
market 
failure 
Heterogeneity While a particular technology or measure may be cost effective on average, it may not be so in all cases. This may 
explain the non-adoption of some technologies at some of the organisations studied. 
 
  Hidden Costs Engineering-economic analyses fail to account for either the reduction in benefits associated with energy efficient 
technologies, or the additional costs associated with them. As a consequence, the studies tend to overestimate 
efficiency potential. Examples of hidden costs include overhead costs for management, disruption, inconvenience, staff 
replacement and training, and the costs associated with gathering, analysing and applying information. 
 
  Access to 
Capital 
If an organisation has insufficient capital through either internal funds or borrowing, energy efficient investments may be 
prevented from going ahead. In the public sector, additional borrowing may be inhibited by public sector rules. In the 
private sector, companies may be reluctant to borrow due to concerns about the risk of increased gearing. Where 
internal funds are available, other priorities may take precedence, thereby also preventing the energy efficient 
investment. 
 
  Risk The short paybacks required for energy efficiency investments may represent a rational response to risk. This could be 
because efficiency investments represent a higher technical or financial risk than other types of investment, or that 
business and market uncertainty encourages adoption of short time horizons. 
 
Economic Market 
failure 
Imperfect 
Information 
Lack of information may lead to cost-effective energy efficiency opportunities being missed. This may be considered a 
market failure in that information has public good aspects, which make it likely that it will be under-supplied by markets. 
Furthermore, unlike energy supply, energy efficiency consists of a wide range of complex technologies and services, 
which are purchased infrequently and for which it is difficult to determine their quality either before or after purchase. As 
a consequence, the transaction costs for obtaining and processing information on energy efficiency are higher than for 
energy supply. Over-consumption of energy may be the result. 
 
  Split 
Incentives 
Energy efficiency opportunities are likely to be foregone if the party cannot appropriate the benefits of that investment. 
For example, individual departments in an organisation may not be accountable for their energy use and, therefore, have 
no incentive to improve efficiency. 
 
  Adverse 
Selection 
Suppliers know more about the energy performance of a good than purchasers. The latter face difficulties in both 
obtaining information prior to purchase and verifying performance subsequent to purchase. As a result, purchasers will 
tend to select goods on the basis of visible aspects such as price, and be reluctant to pay the price premium for high-
efficiency products. In some cases, inefficient products will drive efficient products out of the market. 
 
  Principal-
agent 
Relationships 
Principal-agent relationships occur when the interests of one party (the principal) depend on the actions of another (the 
agent). This type of relationship is pervasive in hierarchical firms. It is characterised by information asymmetry, since the 
principal lacks detailed information about the activities and performance of the agent – and in particular about the merits 
of individual investment projects proposed by the agent. Such monitoring and control problems can lead principals to 
impose stringent investment criteria to ensure that only unambiguously high value projects are undertaken. 
  
Table 2.3: (cont’d) 
Perspective Sub-division Barrier Claim 
 
Behavioural Bounded 
Rationality 
Bounded 
Rationality 
Actors do not make optimising decisions in the manner assumed in standard economic models. Instead, 
constraints on time, attention, and the ability to process information lead to reliance on imprecise routines and 
rules of thumb. These economise on scarce cognitive resources. A consequence of this type of decision-
making is that actors may not maximise utility, even when given good information and appropriate incentives. 
Hence, bounded rationality may be considered as an additional barrier that does not fit into conventional 
economic models. 
 
 The Human 
Dimension 
Form of 
information 
The cost of acquiring information is only one aspect of decision-making. Research demonstrates that the form 
of information is critical. To be effective, information must be specific, personalised, vivid, simple and available 
close in time to the relevant decision. 
 
  Credibility and 
Trust 
Also critical is the credibility of the source and the trust placed in the source. Trust is particularly encouraged 
through interpersonal contacts. If these factors are absent from information on energy efficiency, inefficient 
choices will be made. 
 
  Inertia Agents resist change because they are committed to what they are doing and justify inertia by downgrading 
contrary information. Individuals also treat gains differently from losses, thereby undervaluing opportunity 
costs; give greater weighting to certain outcomes than uncertain outcomes; and have a strong desire to 
minimise regret. All these factors cause individuals to favour the status quo. Inertia creates a bias against 
energy efficiency since (unlike energy purchasing) this involves investing in hardware with uncertain outcomes 
and represents a departure from the status quo. 
 
  Values Energy efficiency has clear environmental benefits. Individuals motivated by environmental values may, 
therefore, give a higher priority to efficiency improvements than those that are not. Efficiency improvements 
are most likely to be successful if “championed” by a key individual within top management. Hence, the 
environmental values of key individuals is a relevant variable in explaining organisational performance on 
energy efficiency. 
 
Organisation 
Theory 
 Power or 
Status 
Organisations can be viewed as political systems, characterised by conflicts between groups with divergent 
interests. The influence of a particular group depends upon its formal authority, the control it has of scarce 
resources (particularly finance) and its access to information. It is commonly the case that energy 
management has a relatively low status and is viewed as a peripheral issue by top management. Lacking 
power, funds and top management support, the scope for effective action by energy management may be 
circumscribed. This may constitute an organisational barrier to efficiency improvement. 
 
  Culture Organisations may encourage efficiency investment by developing a culture (values, norms and routines) that 
emphasises environmental improvement. This is more likely to be successful if “championed” by a key 
individual within top management. Hence, organisational culture is a relevant variable in explaining 
  
 
organisational performance on energy efficiency. 
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3. THE MECHANICAL 
ENGINEERING INDUSTRY 
The mechanical engineering industry is the branch of manufacturing that 
makes productive machinery and equipment for use in most sectors of 
industry, as well as in agriculture and many types of services. Mechanical 
engineering in Ireland employed 11,810 people and had gross output 
valued at £1,044 million in 1999. The sector accounted for 4.7 per cent of 
total Irish manufacturing employment and 1.8 per cent of total 
manufacturing gross output.9 This means that mechanical engineering 
makes up a smaller share of total manufacturing in Ireland than in the EU 
as a whole. 
Foreign-owned firms accounted for 15 per cent of the industry’s “local 
units” or factories, 46 per cent of its employment and 55 per cent of its 
gross output in 1999.10 This degree of foreign ownership is not unusual in 
manufacturing in Ireland, since foreign firms account for a similar 
proportion of total manufacturing (Barry, Bradley and O’Malley, 1999). 
The output of the mechanical engineering industry in Ireland is spread 
across quite a wide range of categories of product, with no major 
specialisation in any particular large product category. However, compared 
with much larger economies such as Germany or the UK, there are some 
substantial gaps in the product range in Ireland. For example, there are no 
large firms in Ireland producing tractors, combine harvesters or bulldozers. 
Among the more important components of the industry in Ireland are 
tool-making, pumps and compressors, lifting and handling equipment, 
non-domestic cooling and ventilation equipment, and agricultural machinery. 
A further point worth noting is that manufacture of parts of machines (as 
opposed to complete pieces of machinery), together with activities such as 
installation, repair and maintenance, constitute a significant minority of the 
value of the industry’s sales. 
The mechanical engineering industry is highly export-oriented. As 
much as 72 per cent of its production was exported in 1999.11 The fact 
 
9Census of Industrial Production (1999). These figures refer to NACE Rev 1 sector 29, 
“manufacture of machinery and equipment not elsewhere classified (n.e.c.)”, excluding 
category 297, “manufacture of domestic appliances”. Some of the other statistics quoted 
here will refer to the whole of sector 29, without excluding 297, because of data constraints.  
10These data refer to the whole of sector 29. 
11The figure quoted refers to all of sector 29. 
3.1 
Characterising 
the Sector 
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that the industry exports such a high proportion of its output suggests that 
many of its firms must be internationally competitive. 
3.1.1 ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY INTERVENTIONS 
Government support for energy efficiency declined in the 1980s reflecting 
the softening of oil prices from the mid-eighties and onwards. In the 
1990s, however, the Operational Programme for Economic Infrastructure 1994-
1999 included a Sub-Programme on Energy Efficiency. This sub-
programme represented the principal national programme for energy 
efficiency during that time and it had funding of £34 million over the 
programme period. Co-ordination and implementation of the energy 
efficiency programme were the responsibility of the then Irish Energy 
Centre (now Sustainable Energy Ireland). The principal elements of the 
programme that applied to manufacturing industries were as follows: 
– The Energy Audit Grant Scheme (EAGS) 
– The Energy Efficiency Investment Support Scheme (EEISS) 
– Energy Self-Audit and Statement of Energy Accounts Scheme 
– Best Practice Programme 
– Steam System Boiler Evaluation Scheme.12 
The EAGS provided grants to organisations that engaged consultants 
to carry out energy audits and surveys. A grant of 40 per cent, subject to a 
maximum of £5,000, was available towards the cost of conducting an 
audit. 
The EEISS provided grants to organisations that invested in energy 
saving technologies or measures. A grant of up to 40 per cent of the cost 
could be awarded (limited in general to £100,000 per site). 
The Energy Self-Audit and Statement of Energy Accounts scheme 
provided a formal framework within which an organisation could make 
energy a strategic component of corporate policy. Companies in the 
scheme made a public commitment to assess energy consumption, define 
targets and strategies for reduction, and provide an annual statement on 
energy performance. The scheme was directed primarily at companies that 
were substantial users of energy by Irish standards, and there was a 
relatively small number of participants but they accounted for over 25 per 
cent of the industrial sector’s spending on energy. 
The Best Practice Programme aimed to promote energy efficient 
technologies and practices. Information on best practice technologies was 
transmitted through seminars, workshops, site visits and publication of 
best practice guides and case histories. 
The Steam System Boiler Evaluation Scheme aimed to encourage fuel 
savings in the use of boilers, through grant aid, training and awareness 
programmes, and a boiler awards scheme that publicly acknowledged good 
practice. 
The above-mentioned schemes were applicable to the mechanical 
engineering industry, as well as to many other industries, for a number of 
 
12The following brief account of these schemes draws from H. Greer of Network Resources 
Limited (NRL), “Energy Efficiency Policy and Programmes in Ireland: A Review”, 1997, 
personal communication. 
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years up to the time when our study was carried out. Since mechanical 
engineering was not a particularly energy-intensive industry, it was not a 
high priority sector for policy attention, but this did not prevent companies 
in the sector from applying to participate in the various schemes. 
3.1.2 ENERGY USE 
In 1999, the mechanical engineering industry spent £11.1 million on fuel 
and power, which amounted to 1.1 per cent of the value of its gross 
output. Expenditure on fuel and power can also be expressed as a 
percentage of expenditure on industrial inputs, where “industrial inputs” 
means purchases of materials for processing and industrial services as well 
as fuel and power. Spending on fuel and power in 1999 amounted to 2.1 
per cent of purchases of industrial inputs in mechanical engineering.13 For 
comparison, expenditure on fuel and power amounted to 2.0 per cent of 
purchases of industrial inputs in all Irish manufacturing, indicating that 
mechanical engineering has about the same level of energy-intensity as the 
average industry. Energy use in the sector tends to be quite largely for 
generic purposes such as space heating and lighting, while most of its 
production processes are not particularly energy-intensive. 
Spending on electricity is the largest component of the industry’s 
expenditure on energy, accounting for 56 per cent of total energy 
expenditure in the mid-1990s, followed by petroleum oils (30 per cent) and 
piped gas (5 per cent). The share of piped gas has been increasing.    
Since the mid-1980s, the value of energy purchases by the mechanical 
engineering industry has increased more slowly than the value of the 
industry’s production. Thus the industry’s expenditure on fuel and power 
declined as a percentage of the value of its gross output between the mid-
1980s and the end of the 1990s. Its expenditure on fuel and power 
expressed as a percentage of purchases of “industrial inputs” also declined 
during that period. However, much of this decline occurred in the second 
half of the 1980s, and sharply declining fuel prices in 1985-87 were largely 
responsible for that trend, rather than a real decline in the energy-intensity 
of the industry. We estimate that there was actually some real increase in 
the industry’s energy-intensity in the late 1980s and that there was little or 
no real decline in the industry’s energy-intensity at least up to the mid-
1990s.14 
As regards opportunities to improve energy efficiency, there is little 
formal documentation available from Irish sources on energy efficiency 
opportunities which are specific to mechanical engineering. However, 
based largely on UK sources, we identified a list of 23 conventionally 
recommended measures for improving energy efficiency that would 
commonly be appropriate for mechanical engineering firms. This list of 23 
measures was given in Question 9 of the “pre-interview” questionnaire 
sent to participating firms, which is reproduced as Appendix 1. The 
purpose of this question was to try to identify the extent to which 
 
13 These figures refer to sector 29 excluding 297. 
14 Some of the data used to make such estimates are not available for more recent years. 
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companies had availed of opportunities to improve their energy efficiency. 
Following further consultation with the then Irish Energy Centre, we also 
identified a shorter list of the seven most important energy efficiency 
measures that would be suitable for Irish mechanical engineering 
companies. This shortlist is as follows:   
1. A detailed energy audit has been conducted; 
2. A Building Energy Management System (BEMS) has been installed; 
3. Energy efficient equipment has been purchased; 
4. Programming of heating and ventilation controls to match occupancy 
patterns and outside temperature; 
5. Replacement of tungsten filament lamps with slim or compact 
fluorescence or high pressure sodium lighting; 
6. Specification of high standards of energy efficiency in new buildings; 
7. Use of variable speed drives in pumps, fans and other applications. 
This shortlist was taken into consideration in our study, as a further 
yardstick when assessing the extent to which firms had adopted energy 
efficiency opportunities, as discussed below. 
 
 In this section we now proceed to describe the selection of the case 
studies. 
3.2.1 SELECTION 
Firms employing over 50 people were to be selected to participate in the 
project. A total of eleven companies in mechanical engineering were 
identified from the list of the top 1,000 companies, published by the 
business magazine Business and Finance. The eleven were contacted, and 
seven of these agreed to participate as case studies. These seven 
companies, being among the larger firms in the industry in Ireland, were all 
branches of multinational companies.  They make products that include 
dies, tools, pumps, fasteners, lifting and handling equipment, engine 
components and machinery for agriculture and specific manufacturing 
industries. 
The initial approach to companies was made by phone to identify the 
person having most responsibility for energy matters and to ask if the 
company would participate. There was usually no one person with the job 
title of “energy manager” in firms in this sector. Persons spoken to at the 
initial stage included the technical manager, maintenance manager, safety 
and environment manager, production manager and chief executive. If 
they agreed to participate they were sent a “pre-interview” questionnaire 
(or PIQ). The return of the PIQ was followed up with detailed follow-up 
interviews of key individuals in the establishments, focusing most closely 
on any aspects having a bearing on barriers to energy efficiency that had 
been suggested by replies to the pre-interview questionnaire.  
The detailed follow-up interviews were semi-structured, using a more 
lengthy questionnaire based on the theoretical framework developed in 
Chapter 2, and they were administered by telephone. For an example of 
the interview protocol, readers are referred to Appendix 2. Between one 
and three people were interviewed in each enterprise, the average number 
being two persons, as Table 3.1 shows. There being no energy manager as 
3.2 
Case Studies 
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such in these enterprises, the persons having most dealings with energy 
went under a variety of titles and it appeared that division of responsibility 
was not always clearcut. 
Table 3.1: Number of Persons Interviewed in Each Case Study, their Job Titles and 
Background 
Case Study 
Code Number 
Number of 
Interviewees 
Job Titles (and background, in brackets) 
1 2 Maintenance Manager (electrical engineer), Managing Director 
2 2 Maintenance Supervisor (engineer), Accounts Manager  
3 3 Health Safety and Environment Manager (engineer, plus safety and 
environmental management qualification), Technical Manager, 
Operations Manager 
4 1 Electrical Maintenance Manager (electrician) 
5 1 Engineering Manager (engineer),  
6 2 Works Manager, Manufacturing Engineer (engineer) 
7 3 Quality Manager (engineer), Purchasing Officer, Operations Manager 
 14 Total number interviewed 
 2 Average number of persons interviewed per case study 
 
3.2.2 DESCRIPTION OF CASE STUDY COMPANIES 
Before describing the seven case studies, it is interesting to note that there 
was a quite consistent pattern in the companies’ responses relating to 
implementation of energy efficiency measures and their perceptions of 
barriers to energy efficiency. Firms were ranked according to the number 
of energy efficiency measures that they had implemented, recorded in the 
PIQ (pre-interview questionnaire), and also according to the number from 
the shortlist of seven really important measures. The numbers of measures 
implemented are shown in the first two columns. Of course, this is a little 
arbitrary since certain measures might not be applicable to all the firms. 
The firm that implemented most measures was ranked firm 1, the firm 
implementing the second most was ranked firm 2, with the firm 
implementing least measures ranked firm 7, as shown on the left-hand side 
of Table 3.2. These rank numbers are used as the codes for the case 
studies from here on.  
The ranking can be compared with firms’ self-assessment of their 
management of energy in the third column, and with the number of 
barriers to energy efficiency that they perceived as “often important”, in 
the fourth column. The ranking can be further compared with their 
perception of whether or not there were energy efficiency opportunities 
still available with paybacks of less than three years, in the final column. 
Table 3.2:  Ranking of Firms by Number of Measures Implemented, and Firms’ Perceptions 
of their Energy Management, Barriers to Energy Efficiency and Opportunities 
 Number of Measures 
Implemented 
Self- Assessed 
Profiles 
Number of Barriers 
“Often Important” 
Opportunities 
Exist with  
 From 
Shortlist 
From PIQ 
List 
  Payback <3yrs? 
 S TO ENERGY EFFICIENCY 
 
 
Firm 1  6.5 10 2+ 2  Disagree  
Firm 2  5 12.5 2 5  Disagree 
Firm 3  4.5 12 1+ 3  Agree 
Firm 4  4 7 1- 12  Neutral 
Firm 5  2 4 0+ 5  Agree 
Firm 6  2 1.5 0+ 12  Agree 
Firm 7  0(1) 0(2) 1 12(8)  Agree 
Notes: In the columns showing number of measures implemented, a measure would be considered to be half adopted if it 
was revealed in subsequent conversation that it had been partially implemented only. Two different replies might be 
given if the pre-interview questionnaire (PIQ) was filled in by two different people, and this accounts for there being 
two entries in some cells. 
 
A few interesting points emerge from the table. Twenty-three possible 
barriers to energy efficiency were listed in the PIQ and respondents could 
tick the barriers that they considered were often important. It is seen in the 
fourth column that in general more barriers are perceived to be important 
by firms that had implemented the least number of energy efficiency 
measures. In addition, the last column shows whether or not firms agree 
that they are missing potential opportunities for energy efficiency that 
would yield a payback in less than three years. The adopters of most 
energy efficiency measures (ranked at the top) indicate that there are no 
remaining opportunities, while the non-adopters say that there are 
untapped opportunities. This pattern of responses is reasonable and 
consistent. 
In the third column a score is given that represents each firm’s self-
assessment of its energy management practices, recorded in the PIQ; the 
higher the score, the more developed the energy management practices. 
Here again a consistent pattern can be discerned, with the firms that adopt 
most energy efficiency measures also having the highest score on energy 
management practices, self-assessed. This analysis is of course not exact. 
But the general pattern of responses does at least show an encouraging 
degree of rationality and consistency on the part of the respondents.  
Next, we should ask how representative of the sector are these seven 
case studies? Being relatively large firms they were not typical, but they 
were reasonably representative of the sector in some significant respects. 
As Table 3.3 shows, the number of employees accounted for by the case 
studies is 1,431, which amounts to 13 per cent of the total number 
employed in mechanical engineering in 1998. Sales by the case study firms, 
amounting to about £142 million, represent 14 per cent of the sector’s 
gross output. Total expenditure on energy by the firms, at £1.5 million, 
amounts to 1.07 per cent of their own value of sales, and this compares 
with the figure of 1.1 per cent of gross output for the sector as a whole.  
Table 3.3: Firms’ Employment, Sales and Energy Expenditure 
 Number of Sales Total Energy 
 Employees £m Expenditure £000 
Firm 1 285 20 190 
Firm 2 326 21 297 
Firm 3 180 20 500 
Firm 4 125 25 73 
Firm 5 138 19 96 
Firm 6 165 6 81 
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Firm 7 212 31 280 
Total 1,431 142 1,516 
Average 204 20 217 
 
It is worth mentioning some characteristics of the individual firms. 
First, it can be seen from Table 3.3 that the first five firms have similar 
levels of sales, in the range £19 million to £25 million, and that Firms 4, 5 
and 6 have the lowest energy bills. In terms of employment the largest 
firms are the first two, and their sales are similar. Firm 1, however, uses 
considerably less energy, partly due to the fact that it contracts out its heat 
treatment. This fact in itself could be an efficiency measure, if the outside 
contractor is specialised and efficient. Firm 2, though having the second 
highest energy bill, had the highest number of employees and said that it 
considered that “energy is not an issue, wages are what matters”, adding 
that the overriding consideration was that “production must go on”. 
However, its record on adoption of energy efficiency measures put it high 
in the ranking.  
Firm 3 had within the last year taken on a safety and environment 
manager, which is not surprising since it has the highest energy bill. The 
high bill had stimulated the firm to lobby for cheaper fuel but also to 
undertake conservation measures. Firm 4 had the lowest number of 
employees and the lowest energy expenditure. Accordingly, only low cost 
energy efficiency measures were taken and the three year payback criterion 
was applied, the rationalisation being that if it were longer the “machines 
could be out of date”. In firm 5 the driving need for production to go on 
was underlined by the award of bonuses related to production and 
machine uptime, but not to energy efficiency. Firm 6 was subject to 
foreign customer pressure to ensure that its processes were safe healthwise, 
for example, but the only internal pressure to improve energy or 
environmental performance came from the staff to supply more heat to 
the premises. 
Finally, firm 7 was an outlier. It had the highest level of sales with 
possibly the lowest adoption of energy efficiency measures. However, it 
was in the initial phase of ISO 14001 certification, on the instruction of its 
head office which is situated abroad. Its line of work is not renowned for 
being environmentally friendly and head office had become conscious of 
their public image. The consequence of a poor image is that the share price 
can deteriorate. Firm 7 was in a good position to explain its perceptions of 
the barriers at this initial stage of a major reform, which entailed 
establishing an entirely new structure of energy management. 
In trying to apply benchmarks such as energy intensity, one is 
hampered by the fact that the industry is very heterogeneous. This makes it 
difficult to devise meaningful measures of energy intensity, apart from the 
broad measure of expenditure on energy as a share of sales or turnover. 
The Energy Efficiency Office in the UK has calculated benchmarks based 
on floor area, as shown in the first two rows of Table 3.4. However, the 
figure of 85 kWh in the third column in the table clearly relates mainly to 
light manufacturing. The level of detail available from our own case studies 
is insufficient to enable real comparisons to be made except at the 
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aggregate level, that is, for buildings and process energy, in the final 
column.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.4: Benchmarks for the Engineering Sector, General Manufacturing and for the 
Combined Seven Irish Case Studies, kWh/m2/year 
 Average 
Number of 
Shifts 
Buildings 
Energy 
Process 
Energy 
Buildings 
and Process 
Energy 
Engineering 1.7 302 85 387 
General Manufacturing 3.0 409 495 904 
Seven Irish case studies 2.9 (Fuel 390) (Electricity 332) (Total 722) 
Source: Energy Efficiency Office in the UK (1993). 
 
The average annual amount of total energy used by our case studies is 
722 kWh per metre squared, which is within the UK range, at any rate. The 
average for fuel use, that is non-electric energy, in our case studies is 390 
kWh and for electricity it is 332 kWh per square metre, again roughly 
within the UK range. However, the figures for fuel consumption in our 
case studies are only approximate. Only one firm actually answered the 
question on quantities of energy used. For the other firms, only replies on 
energy expenditure were given and these had to be converted to quantities 
using assumed prices. Therefore, the resulting figures on quantities are 
only estimates. 
Table 3.5: Energy Intensity: Energy Use Per Employee and in Relation to the Value of 
Sales 
 Total Energy per Employee 
 
Total Energy/Sales 
 
Firm £/Employee kWh/Employee Thousand  
kWh/£m Sales 
Expenditure as 
% of Sales 
1  667 16,880 241 0.95 
2  911 24,369 378 1.41 
3  2,778 123,789 1,114 2.50 
4  581 12,216  61 0.29 
5  694 15,033 111 0.51 
6  490 10,224 281 1.35 
7  1,321 33,858 232 0.90 
 
Table 3.5 shows the estimated energy intensity of the case study firms, 
in terms of energy per employee and per unit of sales, and there are 
remarkable differences in the figures between firms. If any pattern is 
discernible it is that the first three firms, the ones that have implemented 
most energy efficiency measures, tend to have higher energy use per 
employee, shown in the first two columns. Firm 7, a high user, is an 
exception as mentioned and was just embarking on a programme of energy 
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efficiency within the ISO 14001 framework. But overall the sector seems 
to be very heterogeneous. 
It follows therefore that the benchmark measure expressed in terms of 
kWh per square metre discussed above is unlikely to be very informative 
unless it is applied to products that are more narrowly defined. Table 3.6 
shows this benchmark measure, such as it is, in the first column and the 
variation in it is notable. Shown in the last three columns are the 
respondents’ expenditure on energy and the percentage breakdown 
between electricity and other fuels. 
Table 3.6: Benchmark Measure of Energy Use and Percentage Breakdown of Energy 
Expenditure 
 Total Energy Total Energy Breakdown of Expenditure 
 Benchmark 
kWh/m2/Year 
Expenditure 
£000 
Electricity 
% 
Fuel 
% 
Firm 1  481 190 79 21 
Firm 2  475 297 66 34 
Firm 3  1,599 500 50 50 
Firm 4  314 73 86 14 
Firm 5  519 96 89 11 
Firm 6  241 81 86 14 
Firm 7  773 280 89 11 
 
The breakdown of expenditure shown in the last two columns suggests 
that firms at the top of the table that have adopted most energy efficiency 
measures also have a higher share of fuel as opposed to electricity. This 
pattern could be the result of chance or of the nature of the outputs 
produced. Alternatively, it is possible that these firms have deliberately 
tried to reduce electricity use and to switch to other fuels, because of the 
cost of electricity relative to that of other forms of energy. It is reasonable 
to suggest that firms at the top end of the energy efficiency league are the 
ones that are most likely to have attempted to switch to alternatives to 
electricity. 
We already saw in Table 3.2 that a clear pattern emerges in the extent 
of implementation of energy efficiency measures and in behaviour and 
perceptions. Table 3.7 adds further information about energy management 
behaviour. The pattern here is faint but is again suggestive of consistent 
behaviour, particularly in relation to monitoring energy use. Those firms 
that have implemented most energy efficiency measures tend to be those 
that monitor trends in energy use.  
Table 3.7: Energy Management Behaviour 
 Monitor 
Trends? 
Electricity 
Metered at 
Use Monitoring and 
Targeting? 
Use Benchmarks? 
Firm 1  Yes Site No No 
Firm 2  Yes Bldg+equip Yes No 
Firm 3  Yes/no Bldg No Yes 
Firm 4  Yes Site No ans No 
Firm 5  No Bldg No No 
Firm 6  No Site No No 
Firm 7  Yes Site No No 
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Metering at building level, monitoring and targeting and use of 
benchmarks are not prevalent practices, evidently. However, those firms in 
which these tasks are undertaken tend to be closer to the top of the table.  
 
3.2.3 SUMMARY OF CASE STUDIES 
The firms selected and agreeing to participate show a good degree of 
consistency in their responses on the pre-interview questionnaire. 
However, one should have some reservations about the extent to which 
replies truly reflect reality within the firm, since different interviewees 
sometimes gave different answers, an interesting finding in itself. 
Firms revealed a wide range of performance on energy efficiency. 
Some had installed most of the potential measures on the shortlist of really 
important actions and others had barely implemented any. Similarly, their 
perceptions of the number of barriers that were important ranged from 
very few to about a dozen. Importantly, over half of the firms felt that 
there were energy efficiency opportunities available with paybacks of less 
than three years, which could be implemented in their company. The 
others, firms ranked at the top of the list, said that there were few 
remaining untapped possibilities. 
A fairly coherent picture has emerged of implementation of energy 
efficiency measures, of perceptions and of behaviour. The next task is to 
see what this tells us about each of the hypothesised barriers to investment 
in energy efficiency, which are the subject of the next section. 
 
 We have seen that most firms felt that there were untapped 
opportunities for improving energy efficiency. In this section evidence 
from the case studies is used to investigate the barriers that might explain 
the various levels of adoption of energy efficiency measures. The firms 
that had implemented many measures, ranked at the top of our list of 
firms, evidently did not face barriers or else had succeeded in overcoming 
them. The firms at the bottom of the list who are foregoing energy 
efficiency opportunities are assumed to be impeded by barriers. The 
question is: which are the important barriers to energy efficiency? The 
major barriers proposed as candidates in Chapter 2 will now be 
investigated in turn starting with heterogeneity. 
3.3.1 HETEROGENEITY 
Heterogeneity operates as a barrier if energy efficiency measures that are 
generally suitable in most firms in a sector are not suitable in certain 
specific firms. In the mechanical engineering sector, it appears that this 
could be a possibility because the sector is rather heterogeneous. On the 
other hand, many of the energy uses are generic in type, such as 
compressed air, heat treatment, space heating and so on, such that many 
straightforward energy saving measures might be applicable to all firms. So 
what was the evidence? 
3.3 
Evidence of 
Barriers in the 
Mechanical 
Engineering 
Industry 
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Two of the firms did say that certain energy efficiency technologies 
would be inappropriate at their site. Firm 1 for example contracted out the 
heat treatment of its product and so the option of furnace heat recovery, 
insulation and controls does not apply. Firm 4 manufactured a specialised 
product and consequently off-the-peg technology might not always be 
suitable. They find that when they “look into it in detail, it is not quite the 
relevant machine” for their purposes and they build a lot of machinery in 
house. 
While this evidence is not very strong, variations of process and 
product within the sector combined with the statements from the two 
firms above suggest that heterogeneity is a factor in some cases. That said, 
mechanical engineering is not an energy intensive sector and a lot of its 
energy use is indeed for generic uses rather than specialised applications. 
The environmental manager in firm 3 endorsed this by saying that their 
energy use does not entail “rocket science – it is compressed air and gas 
usage”.  
Firms were specifically asked how important they thought that energy 
efficiency technology being “inappropriate at this site” would be as a 
reason for not undertaking energy efficiency opportunities. Figure 3.1 
shows firms on the horizontal axis, ranked in the same order of adoption 
of energy efficiency measures as before. Firms could rate this 
heterogeneity barrier as “rarely important”, “sometimes important” or 
“often important”, and these ratings were allotted scores of 1, 2 and 3 
respectively, on the vertical axis. The illustrated pattern of replies suggests 
that this barrier is perceived to be more important by those firms that have 
adopted less measures, that is, by those on the right hand side of the chart. 
The pattern in the chart is only broken by firm 5 but, as this firm states 
that it only invests in low cost measures in any case, this reply is 
reasonable. This points to a verdict that heterogeneity is not often a 
barrier, but it is a factor in some cases.  
3.3.2 HIDDEN COSTS 
Hidden costs are real and they comprise all costs other than known costs 
of purchasing and installing energy efficiency equipment. Hidden costs 
include, for example, the cost of identifying and assessing the investment, 
the cost of retraining staff to use new equipment, potential disruption and 
loss of product quality and so on. Such costs, if perceived by the firm to be 
substantial, could lead it to forego implementing a measure, although the 
measure is deemed financially worthwhile based on its known costs alone. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Importance of Heterogeneity as a Barrier as 
 Perceived by Firms 
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Note: On the vertical axis, the reason “technology inappropriate at this site” is 
considered to be: 
 1 = rarely important, 2 = sometimes important, 3 = often important, for not 
making energy efficiency investments. 
 
Firms were presented with a list of these hidden costs, which included 
six types. These were the cost of (1) production disrupt- 
ions, hassle and inconvenience; (2) identifying opportunities, analysing cost 
effectiveness and tendering; (3) staff replacement, retirement and/or 
retraining; (4) possible poor performance of equipment; (5) difficulty and 
cost of obtaining information on the energy consumption of purchased 
equipment, and (6) lack of time and the existence of other priorities. Again, 
the rating system of allotting scores of 1, 2 and 3 according to increasing 
importance is applied. 
Looking at two of the above hidden costs at a time, each of the 
following three graphs in turn shows all the firms’ views about their 
importance. Starting in Figure 3.2 with the first two hidden costs, which 
are the problems of disruption/hassle and costs of analysing/tendering, 
over half of firms perceive the latter as often important. Disruptions rate 
hardly less strongly, being at least sometimes important to all but one firm. 
The indications from this group of firms are that these two barriers matter. 
It is again worth noting the general pattern of responses. The firms that 
have adopted most energy efficiency measures attach less importance to 
these barriers. This could be an example of how the fulfilment of a task 
can leave one feeling that it was not so difficult and the barriers were 
unimportant. In addition, or alternatively, these firms may have good 
coping and analytical skills that enabled them to proceed with the adoption 
of technologies. 
The next two hidden costs to be considered are the costs of staff 
replacement, retirement and retraining, and the possible poor performance 
of equipment. As Figure 3.3 shows, the latter is 
 
Figure 3.2:  Hidden Costs: Importance of Disruptions/Hassle and 
Costs of Analysing and Tendering 
Barrier: Heterogeneity
0
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Note:  On the vertical axis, 1 = rarely important, 2 = sometimes important,  
3 = often important. 
 
considered to be no more than just “sometimes important”, except by firm 
2. The respondent for this firm was the maintenance supervisor who 
would be mindful of the need to guarantee continuing production, though 
adding that poor performance is unlikely because they are not risky 
machines in their case. Firm 4 cited an example of poor performance of 
variable speed drives that took too long to get to full speed, while firm 6 
said that they experienced benefits, such as more silent compressors.  
Figure 3.3:  Hidden Costs: Importance of Staff Retraining and 
Possible Poor Performance of Equipment 
 
Note: On the vertical axis, 1 = rarely important, 2 = sometimes important, 3 = often 
important. 
 
More serious is the hidden cost centring on staff retraining, which is 
often important in the view of three firms. The pattern is again seen that 
firms on the left, having adopted the most technologies, perceive training 
to be less important as a barrier. Again we are not sure about the direction 
of causation: do these firms think these barriers are unimportant because 
they have overcome them or were they minor issues to them in the first 
place? 
The next two types of hidden costs are the difficulty/cost of obtaining 
information on the energy consumption of purchased equipment, and lack 
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of time/other priorities, illustrated in Figure 3.4. Looking first at the 
difficulty and cost of obtaining information, our firms consider that this 
barrier is not prominent. The exception is firm 4, which is relatively 
specialised. 
Figure 3.4: Hidden Costs: Difficulty/Cost of Obtaining Information 
on Equipment and Lack of Time/Priorities 
 
Note: On the vertical axis, 1 = rarely important, 2 = sometimes important,  
3 = often important. 
 
The barrier of lack of time and the existence of other priorities, 
however, is a serious consideration. Most firms saw it as often important, 
and only firm 1 saw it as rarely important. The managing director in firm 1 
strongly believed that energy efficiency saves money, so this initial belief 
would automatically make energy efficiency a priority for this firm. Among 
the “non-adopters”, firm 7 admittedly is out of line but it had just recently 
allotted the time to designated people to implement efficiency measures 
that were now a priority for head office. 
To sum up on the six types of hidden costs, the first two and the last 
hidden costs are serious considerations. It is useful to grade the four 
serious hidden costs according to their perceived importance, albeit 
crudely. Using the same weights for levels of importance, the ranking in 
Table 3.8 is obtained. 
Table 3.8: Ranking of Hidden Costs by Importance 
Rank Hidden Cost 
First Lack of time/other priorities (6) 
Equal second Identifying opportunities, analysing cost effectiveness and 
tendering (2) 
Production disruptions/hassle/inconvenience (1) 
Fourth Staff replacement, retirement, retraining (3) 
Source: Pre-interview questionnaire.  
 
Finally, a factor that possibly increases hidden costs is small size of firm 
in terms of numbers employed. The more people that are employed, the 
more feasible it is for staff to have specialised functions. It may be no 
coincidence that the first two firms are the largest employers. Though the 
seventh firm had not implemented much in the line of energy efficiency 
measures and is also large, it had taken the decision to undertake a serious 
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programme of environmental/energy reforms. Size is described as an 
important factor by other studies, such as Gruber and Brand (1991), who 
show that SMEs are at a disadvantage for reasons such as lack of a person 
who can be “afforded” time to develop specialised knowledge of energy 
consumption. Our findings are consistent with this. 
Having identified the significant hidden costs, it would be helpful to 
estimate their magnitude. How much actual time is put into “identifying, 
analysing, tendering” and the like? Unfortunately, most firms could only 
estimate the hours spent on day-to-day energy management, and were not 
able to distinguish time spent on investments in energy efficiency. This 
difficulty may stem from the fact that the energy saving part of an 
investment can be impossible to isolate from other benefits such as saving 
money generally and improving production. Person-hours spent on day-to-
day energy management amounted to between about one hour and 
seventeen hours per month. 
That said, firm 7 did give a helpful indication of the person-hours that 
would be spent over the next few years on appraising various investments 
and on establishing policies and routines within the firm. Unfortunately, 
this applies to environmental and energy matters jointly, being the 
resources that they will devote to gaining ISO 14001 certification. The 
operations manager charged with the implementation of the programme 
“for my sins” (vividly indicating a perception of hassle and inconvenience) 
said that they would now be spending fifty hours per week, involving 4 or 
5 people. This could amount to an annual cost of between 
£40,000 and £50,000 for a year or two and would include the time devoted 
to environmental, health and safety issues as well as to energy efficiency 
measures.  
It is not possible to say what proportion of this outlay would apply to 
energy efficiency alone. One might take a figure of  
£15,000, or £30,000 worth of personnel time spent over the two years, 
which needs to be seen in the context of an energy bill of some £0.28 
million, annually. Working backwards by applying their 3-year payback rule 
and assuming for the sake of argument that a 10 per cent saving on their 
annual energy bills is offered by advanced technology, they could justify an 
investment of  
£84,000, ignoring discounting. If they intend in any case to invest in cleaner, 
safer technology and if there is a choice of machines that vary only by 
energy usage, this is the extra amount that they could spend on the energy 
efficiency component. The personnel costs of £30,000 would therefore 
represent a sizeable share or addition, though ISO certification would also 
have been achieved. 
In practice, attributes of machinery are not usually separable in this way 
and it is not easy to isolate investment costs attributable to energy 
efficiency measures, let alone hidden costs. Therefore, even with a real 
example, it is difficult to calculate the hidden costs ratio. 
3.3.3 ACCESS TO CAPITAL 
It emerged from our case studies that access to capital for the purpose of 
investment in energy efficiency was the most important barrier to energy 
48 BARRIERS TO ENERGY EFFICIENCY 
 
 
efficiency, and yet access to capital was generally not a problem at the level 
of the firm as a whole. Although firms generally had access to funds, 
whether internal or borrowed, an investment could still be barred due to 
other priorities taking precedence. In some cases, strict adherence to 
capital budgets could be the barrier especially in the presence of other 
priorities. 
All of the firms bar firm 5 were able to borrow for capital investment 
in general although they tended to favour availing of internal funds. For 
large investments they might require approval from head office which, 
with some exceptions, seemed to exercise fairly relaxed control where 
decisions about energy efficiency were concerned. Despite this, lack of 
capital and other priorities for investment were still considered to be 
important as Figure 3.5 illustrates.  
Figure 3.5: Importance of Lack of Capital and Other Priorities for 
Investment, as Barriers to Energy Efficiency 
Improvement 
Note: On the vertical axis, 1 = rarely important, 2 = sometimes important,  
 3 = often important 
 
As the graph shows, all but firm 1 thought that lack of capital or other 
priorities for capital investment were often or sometimes important as 
barriers. In order to explain how this could be true, given that most firms 
were able to borrow and energy efficiency technologies are cost effective, 
one has to consider the investment criteria used by firms.  
The firms mostly use the payback period as a criterion and the length 
of period chosen was between two and five years. One firm uses 2.5 years 
but calculates the proper Net Present Value for big investments, and firm 
1 simply stated that if the investment produces a good return it would be 
considered. In firm 3 some investments were required to show a 15 per 
cent return. At least two operated both a payback period and a fixed 
investment budget. 
Application of such short payback criteria could rule out a number of 
projects with good Net Present Values. Furthermore, in cases where the 
investment budget is fixed, these projects might find themselves squeezed 
out by projects that were deemed “essential” or “an environmental 
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imperative”. The latter category, imposed by licence requirements or 
perhaps necessary to avoid a bad image, could also be termed “essential” 
for the continued operation or wellbeing of the firm.  
The payback rule alone would not explain everything as four firms in 
our sample said that there were unexploited energy efficiency opportunities 
in their company that would yield paybacks of less than three years at 
current energy prices. There are likely to be other factors besides finance 
that are squeezing out potential schemes in such cases.  
In theory, at least, third party finance could be used to overcome 
barriers arising from strict payback rules or relegation by other priorities 
vying for fixed capital budgets. Third party finance will be discussed later 
in the section on policy. 
3.3.4 RISK 
Risk usually makes for more cautious behaviour and could delay or reduce 
investment in non-essential measures. Two sorts of risk were mentioned. 
Technical risk is the risk that the technology would be found wanting or 
outdated. The second type of risk is business risk or market uncertainty. In 
the replies technical risk was considered no more than sometimes 
important and only firm 6 thought that market uncertainty could often be 
important (Figure 3.6). 
In subsequent elaboration of the kinds of risks facing them firms 
mentioned: 
– Currency fluctuations; 
– A big customer in financial difficulty; 
– Reduction in customer use affecting their sales; 
– Competitors in Europe, and in countries where labour is cheap.  
Two instances of non-market risk were quoted: 
– Stiff environmental legislation, and  
– Machines not performing. 
Figure 3.6:  Importance of Risk as a Barrier to Energy Efficiency 
Investment 
 
Note: On the vertical axis, 1 = rarely important, 2 = sometimes important,  
3 = often important 
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Despite the fairly low importance attributed to risk as shown in the 
graph, the risks actually faced could justify the use of cautious investment 
criteria. A strict payback rule is likely to be a safeguard, adopted in order to 
screen out lengthy and therefore risky paybacks. As was seen, firm 4 
thought the “machines could be out of date in a few years”, adding “there 
is a lot of technical change going on”. Risk may be part of the reason for 
cautious investment criteria, another being the need to have simple rules, 
an idea that will be developed below. 
3.3.5 IMPERFECT INFORMATION 
Firms may not be aware of energy efficiency opportunities or may not 
know how to get information. Their understanding of their current energy 
usage is the starting point and, as already described, their knowledge of 
current energy use is patchy. 
An objective assessment of firms’ knowledge of opportunities was not 
attempted, but roughly a half of firms had undertaken an audit at some 
time. Experience varied considerably. Some had done full audits that 
pointed to good opportunities that were taken up, so they were very 
satisfied. One had an audit that told them a lot of what they already knew. 
Another only took part of the advice on board. The Irish Energy Centre 
(now Sustainable Energy Ireland) had supplied one firm with advice on 
consultants. The Electricity Supply Board had undertaken an audit of 
compressors in one firm and advised them on a supplier of equipment. In 
response the firm shifted its timing of electricity use to avail of better rates 
and consequently reduced its bills considerably, though not its energy 
consumption. In most cases, where a proper audit was undertaken it did 
help to overcome information barriers. 
When asked about the adequacy of information on energy efficiency 
opportunities, two firms said that they had access to good information and 
would tend to contact the then Irish Energy Centre. Two others 
mentioned the Electricity Supply Board. Some firms reckoned that the 
problem was not the information but the time needed to use it, although 
most firms agreed that inadequate information is sometimes or often an 
important barrier. Figures on energy use of equipment were sometimes 
considered to be hard to get. The same applied to information on energy 
use of buildings and refurbishment. 
Figure 3.7 shows in summary form how useful were the various 
sources of information to firms. The four potential sources represented by 
the four lines in the graph are: 
– The Irish Energy Centre (denoted IEC), 
– Professional associations, trade and technical journals (denoted 
Assoc./jls), 
– Technical conferences and seminars, 
– Energy suppliers. 
Firms were able to answer that the information sources were: 
Excellent,  coded as 4 on the vertical axis 
Good,  coded as 3 
Average,  coded as 2 
Poor,  coded as 1 
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Don’t use,  coded as 0 
Where two respondents from the firm gave different answers, an 
average of the codes was used. 
A clear message is that the then Irish Energy Centre was perceived by 
those who use it as supplying useful information, as represented by the 
bold line. The firms at the left hand side of the figure are those that have 
implemented most measures and they are the ones that declare the 
usefulness of information from the Irish Energy Centre to be excellent. 
Figure 3.7: Firms’ Ranking of the Usefulness of Information Sources 
 
Note: On the vertical axis, 0 = don’t use, 1 = poor, 2 = average, 3 = good, 4 = excellent 
 
 
 
Firm 7, which was about to embark on an environmental programme, 
also found the Irish Energy Centre to be good but the others did not use 
it. Professional associations and trade and technical journals were 
considered to be good except, perhaps, by those implementing least energy 
efficiency measures, and the same applies to technical conferences and 
seminars. The journal called The Plant Engineer, published by the UK 
Institution of Plant Engineers (now the Society of Operations Engineers), 
was mentioned as providing worthwhile information on equipment and on 
what others were doing, as well as on maintenance of machines. Energy 
suppliers were considered to be good and seemingly replaced the other 
sources of information for those firms that had implemented least 
measures.  
Firms also gave their opinions on other sources of information that 
were listed in the questionnaire. These sources include equipment 
suppliers, considered by firms to be rather middling. Views on consultants 
as a source of information were strikingly varied, ranging from “very 
good” to “don’t use” and “poor”. Networks of contacts within the sector 
and energy manager groups ranged from good to poor. The only 
“excellent” verdicts were awarded to the Irish Energy Centre by the two 
firms that had introduced most energy efficiency measures, and to 
“colleagues within the company” by two other firms. 
Firms were also asked about their awareness of grant schemes and 
information sources. Several were not aware of any grant schemes. 
Another heard about a scheme too late, although the firm had availed of 
Usefulness of information
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grants for low-energy lighting, which were useful. Another claimed that 
their firm was small and therefore not targeted. Meanwhile another firm 
believed that there was a government agency but was not familiar with it, 
and in any event received such a mountain of information that one “would 
go brain dead”. 
This leads to another important issue which is the form of information. 
Much information may be available, but the form in which it is presented 
may amount to a barrier. This can be significant given the stated scarcity of 
time available to management of firms in the mechanical engineering 
sector. Another consideration is the technical ability of management. 
Information needs to be well targeted, concise and relevant to the firm’s 
specific circumstances. Firms made plentiful suggestions as to the sorts of 
information that they find most helpful.  
Firms felt that information should not be theoretical or merely pilot 
studies, but should be targeted at their specific industry and should relate 
to similar technology. They wanted information that told them about 
equipment and on what others were doing. Case studies were considered 
to be worthwhile but only if they were in their field. “Before and after” 
figures on specific plant were thought to be very desirable, in fact the next 
best thing to seeing it for oneself. Those that used information from the 
Electricity Supply Board valued the way in which it analysed the bill and 
advised on it. The view was expressed that information needs “to make us 
start to measure and set targets”. 
The desired method of receiving information tended to be conferences 
or seminars, preferably half-day conferences that were relevant. Emphasis 
on the word “relevant” seemed to suggest a wide gap between available 
information and knowing what to do specifically, and that practical on-site 
solutions were what they would ideally like. However, it should be restated 
that most firms that had audits undertaken felt that they gained most or all 
the information that they needed. 
In sum the form of information is probably a barrier to small firms if it 
is not geared quite closely to their specific requirements. Having an audit 
undertaken is possibly the most useful way to obtain information. 
3.3.6 SPLIT INCENTIVES 
Split incentives prevail when those implementing energy efficiency 
measures will not be major beneficiaries of their efforts. This can occur 
when buildings or machinery are leased rather than owned. This was rarely 
the case and it was therefore not applicable. Rapid job rotation would be 
another instance where split incentives could impede implementation 
because any incentive to save energy is diluted if the employee is not in 
place to see the programme through. This too did not seem important. 
Accountability for energy costs on the part of departments within firms 
was an issue of some importance according to the respondents. 
Respondents mostly felt that departments would change their behaviour 
were they made accountable. However, they appeared not to think that 
huge savings would materialise and several foresaw problems in attributing 
energy use separately. In the short run, therefore, this barrier would not 
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appear to hold much force, though it is interesting that respondents 
seemed to feel that in principle accountability was an important issue. 
3.3.7 PRINCIPAL-AGENT 
In hierarchical organisations, monitoring and control problems can lead 
the principal to specify strict investment criteria, such as a short payback 
rule, for the agent to follow. If use of over-simplified rules cannot be 
removed, it could be worth having additional simplified rules that 
incorporate energy considerations into standard operating procedures. 
Firms that indicated that such additional rules were incorporated into 
company practices were the two firms at the top of our list. While this 
could suggest that such rules are good for overcoming barriers, it is 
interesting to speculate whether the rules are indeed the cause, or whether 
they are actually the result of other factors.  
Rather than just impose rules, it is possible for a firm to implement a 
reward system, although monitoring and assessment can be a problem. The 
performance of investment by our firms would appear not to be assessed, 
at least not properly with “before and after” calculations. With an ever-
changing business climate, knowledge of what would have happened in the 
absence of the investment would be imperfect in any case. In three firms 
nevertheless there must have been some evidence that the agent effected 
an improvement compared to the “before” case because, as Figure 3.8 
shows, these firms rewarded energy efficiency improvements by their 
employees. In firm 1 the reward was quite substantial. In firm 2 the 
respondent received recognition and in firm 3 there are bonuses for 
environmental achievements. In firm 7 the branch would be rewarded with 
a bonus for making or saving the company money. The close relationship 
of the incentive with energy efficiency performance is remarkable.  
3.3.8 CREDIBILITY AND TRUST 
If firms are to devote funds to energy efficiency measures they need to feel 
confident that advice received is trustworthy and credible. 
Firms were fairly evenly divided between those that used, and therefore 
presumably trusted, the Irish Energy Centre and the Electricity Supply 
Board. One firm felt that the only source was the Electricity Supply Board 
and where the Irish Energy Centre’s advice was concerned they “wouldn’t 
be looking for it”. One had received “useful” grants from the Irish Energy 
Centre but seemed vague about its information value. The Clean 
Technology Unit in Cork was a source for one firm, as was the 
Environmental Protection Agency. 
Figure 3.8: Is the “Energy Manager” Rewarded for Energy Efficiency? 
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Note: On the vertical axis, 3 = substantial reward, 2 = reward, 1 = recognition, 0 = no reward. 
 
 
As mentioned, several said that they would like to see case studies, with 
before and after information. It appears that they were not aware of any. 
3.3.9 VALUES AND ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE 
The values held by key individuals in a company are likely to influence that 
company’s performance. This in fact appears to be borne out in the case 
studies. 
Firms 3, 4, 5 and 6 appeared not to have a culture strongly motivated 
by environmental values, either on the part of respondents or on the part 
of senior management. These respondents appeared not to belong to any 
environmental group, neither did they volunteer the information that they 
participated in an activity that would heighten their awareness of the 
environment. From the other three firms that had or were about to 
implement significant energy efficiency measures, respondents stated that 
they were a “fisherman”, “belong to Birdwatch” or “I was born in the 
country and can see what’s happened to the countryside”, adding “you 
need commitment from the top”. 
From four firms (firms 1, 2, 3 and 7), statements about management 
reveal that direction had indeed come from the top. In firm 1 the 
managing director brought up the profile of energy in the organisation, 
though emphatically for cost-saving reasons. Firms 3 and 7 said it was head 
office that was pushing forward the environmental/energy efficiency 
programme. These four firms with impetus coming from the top are also 
big energy users, each spending about £0.2 million or more per year on 
energy. 
In one firm in particular the new emphasis on the environment derived 
from the importance of image and its effect on share price. Share prices 
can now deteriorate if the company receives bad publicity, because the 
“public are buying shares directly”, whereas financial institutions are less 
discerning on that score. There is a growing consciousness of share value 
within companies because “employees own shares in their company”. 
However, apparently “energy is not seen to be as important as the 
Principal-agent: energy manager rewarded
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environment”, so that effort tends to be directed more towards 
environmental rather than just energy improvements. 
3.3.10 POWER AND STATUS 
The power and the status of energy management personnel determine their 
ability to get things done. 
It was clear that firm 1’s energy manager has the formal authority to 
influence energy related decisions, since he did not need to “fight his 
corner”. The same would, or will, apply in four other firms but the 
respondents had insufficient time, or energy efficiency was low on their list 
of priorities. Another seemed not to have as much influence as he would 
like, and similarly with another energy manager who stated that the 
production manager “gets his way”.  
The pattern of formal authority and power fits closely with the culture 
and interest in energy efficiency of senior management. The status of 
energy management, however, also reflected to some extent the energy 
intensity of the firm. Accordingly, the status was quite low in the 
mechanical engineering sector in general. This was evident from the 
difficulty we sometimes encountered in identifying the relevant person, or 
persons, to approach about energy efficiency in the firm. 
3.3.11 COMMENTS ON BARRIERS BY RESPONDENTS 
Respondents themselves were asked to sum up by saying what they 
thought were the major barriers to energy efficiency. Most said it was 
shortage of time. An exception was the firm that said that they had 
exhausted all opportunities, even if a ten-year payback were to be applied, 
while another felt that the barrier was cost, probably implying that not 
enough money would be saved. 
In the nature of case study analysis, the sample is rather small and 
therefore, not able to support strong generalisation about the population. 
However, the insights are useful and very coherent, which is encouraging. 
There is a good level of consistency within and between the replies. The 
pattern is also consistent with many previous writings on behaviour in 
relation to energy use and with a body of economic literature, which lends 
a ring of truth to the findings. 
3.3.12 SUMMARY OF BARRIERS 
We now attempt to distil the results of the investigation of barriers. Table 
3.9 summarises what emerge as four prominent categories of barriers. A 
more detailed tabular presentation is given in Annex 3.1 at the end of this 
chapter. The four main categories are hidden costs, access to capital, 
imperfect information and values/ 
organisational culture. 
Closer inspection of some of the barriers reveals that they are 
unavoidable, such as market risk for the firms’ product. The hidden costs 
barrier might also be unavoidable, to some extent. Hidden costs include 
management time and inconvenience and hassle. However, many of the 
barriers can be reduced if they are understood and some effort to address 
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them can be afforded. The next section, on policies, explores the 
possibilities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.9: Barriers to Implementing Energy Efficiency Measures Found to be of High 
Importance in the Mechanical Engineering Sector  
Barrier category 
 
Specific instances Comments 
Hidden costs Management time/other 
 priorities. 
Identifying/analysing/ 
tendering. 
Production. 
disruptions/hassle. 
Staff 
replacement/retraining. 
 
Among the hidden costs, lack of time and other priorities 
were the most quoted reasons for not implementing 
energy efficiency investments. 
Access to capital 
(Related are:  
Risk, 
Principal-agent 
problems) 
Other priorities for capital. 
Strict adherence to 
budgets and payback 
rules. 
Access to borrowing is apparently not restricted, but 
tight payback rules or capital budgeting restrict some 
good investments. NPV, IRR or calculations based on 
“reasonable” length-of-life are rarely used. Strict 
payback rules may be applied to contain risk, stemming 
from market uncertainty, meaning that risk is indirectly 
significant. The rule may also be due to principal-agent 
problems stemming from concerns about control.  
 
Imperfect 
information 
(Related are:  
Form of 
information, 
Credibility of 
information and 
trust) 
On opportunities for 
energy saving. 
On opportunities in 
buildings. 
On energy use of 
equipment. 
 
 
The form of information is important in order to avoid 
having to spend a lot of managerial time absorbing it. 
Unwise choices, delays or inaction result when agents 
are poorly informed. Low take-up of energy efficiency 
opportunities was associated with failure to undertake 
audits or consult with specialists such as the Irish 
Energy Centre. A desire for “relevant” case studies 
indicated a need for believable advice to counteract the 
related barrier of lack of credibility and trust. 
 
Values/organisati
onal culture 
(Related are:  
Power and status 
of the energy 
manager, 
Split incentives) 
Attitude of top 
management. 
No identifiable person with 
responsibility for 
energy. 
Accountability. 
Performance declines where top management is not 
concerned about energy and/or environmental matters. 
Absence of incentives or rewards is associated with low 
performance. 
Lack of accountability through separate metering is 
perceived as a barrier, though overcoming it could be 
impracticable except at construction/refurbishment 
stage. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Barriers to energy efficiency measures in the mechanical engineering 
industry have been discussed and distilled into four main categories of high 
importance. These comprise hidden costs, access to capital, information 
and, fourthly, values/organisational culture. With a view to overcoming 
3.4 
Possible Policy 
Responses 
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these barriers, directions for policy are now suggested. Possible policies 
will be discussed in broad terms only and they fall into three levels of 
policy decision, namely: 
1. Policy at the level of the firm – the firm’s organisational policy; 
2. Sector specific policy, directed at and by the mechanical 
engineering sector; 
3. Energy efficiency policy at national level. 
These levels of policy response will now be looked at in turn. 
3.4.2 POLICY AT THE LEVEL OF THE FIRM 
The case studies suggest several things that firms can do to make their 
organisations more amenable to undertaking worthwhile energy efficiency 
measures. It is in firms’ own interests to introduce efficiency measures if 
they will be profitable, taking hidden costs into account. They might also 
find it desirable to introduce such measures if they are subject to pressure 
of one form or another.  
Pressure that simultaneously renders energy efficiency more profitable 
is likely to come from the introduction of emissions trading and a carbon 
tax, which are among the measures announced in the government’s 
National Climate Change Strategy and the Green Paper on Sustainable Energy 
(DELG, 2000; DPE, 1999). Under emissions trading, the price paid by 
energy suppliers for emissions permits would naturally be passed on to 
energy consumers so that the result will be a price rise, as with a carbon 
tax, if less predictable.  
Starting with the policy suggestions emanating from respondents 
themselves, those firms that had availed of advice and schemes of the then 
Irish Energy Centre found it very helpful. The view was also put that 
management needs to become more aware, because savings are indeed 
possible. Being in contact with the IEC was therefore a good move. 
From their own experience, firms benefit from undertaking an audit 
and should be encouraged to do so. An audit gives good insights, and 
indicates what firms ought to know and the extent to which they are 
unable to account for their energy use. Firms would also find advice from 
elsewhere helpful, such as that from suppliers, though it is better if advice 
can be supplied by an impartial party. Journals from elsewhere provided 
what some respondents needed, that is, relevant case studies in like 
companies using similar technology.  
The dictum “if we can’t measure we can’t manage” and the issue of 
accountability were dear to several respondents who would have liked the 
units within their organisations to be accountable for the energy they used. 
While this did not appear practicable or profitable in the short term, it may 
be practicable in the medium term. When investing in new or refurbished 
buildings firms might consider installing separate accounting at very little 
or no extra cost, in contrast with the cost of retro-fitting. Firms could also 
be more demanding of equipment sellers about information on the energy 
use of equipment.  
In addition, firms could profitably review the investment criteria that 
they use. Worthwhile investments are better flagged by use of NPV or IRR 
criteria and these should be combined with a realistic assumption on length 
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of use of the equipment. Risk needs to be taken into account but a less 
crude method than the three year payback is to look at outcomes for 
various pessimistic assumptions. Firms could also ask head office to look 
into producing benchmarks. 
Firms would benefit by allocating responsibility for energy matters to a 
designated energy manager, with clear areas of control. A system of 
rewards or recognition is suggested by evidence from the study. The 
problem is that such measures need to be directed from the top, and both 
administrative resources and attitudes held at the top can be determining 
factors. It appears that head office or the MD needs to put energy 
efficiency “on the map”. 
3.4.3 SECTOR SPECIFIC POLICY 
We saw that many firms in this sector are small, lacking expertise in energy 
matters and producing a specialised good. Sectors with these characteristics 
are quite difficult to encourage, especially when the general environment 
and low energy price have been unsupportive of energy efficiency.  
Because of the varied nature of this sector, advice on energy efficiency 
should concentrate on such broad categories of energy use as space 
heating, compressed air, heat treatment and so on. This would be the 
approach that was employed by the Irish Energy Centre towards 
organisations of small or medium size and with low energy intensity. 
Management time is one of the most serious hidden costs. Firms 
tended not to use benchmarks in terms of energy use per employee, per £1 
million turnover, or whatever, and they could benefit from the Irish 
Energy Centre’s successor or their trade organisations calculating such 
things for them to use. There may be modules of benchmarking that can 
be promoted for specific branches of mechanical engineering. Deciding on 
investments is difficult at the best of times. By contrast negotiating a lower 
gas price for example could be more clear-cut and financially rewarding, 
whereas energy efficiency could be viewed as an unknown journey. 
Benchmarks could act as signposts.  
Information directed at this sector also needs to be in a form that firms 
can avail of easily, such as half-day seminars specific to the sector. Firms 
repeatedly said that they would find case studies particularly useful. They 
felt that they receive a lot of irrelevant and unfocused literature. 
Efforts on the part of firms themselves is also likely to be beneficial. 
This underlies the thinking behind the existing self-audit schemes aimed at 
large energy users. Firms are likely to absorb more effectively things that 
they have learned themselves and in this way they can build up a 
knowledge base. There is a strong argument for reinforcing activities by 
the state body that assimilates and disseminates information, given the 
economies of scale and the external benefits. 
The examples of case studies that respondents said that they would like 
could be drawn from the recent experience of programmes of audits and 
efficiency grants. The analysis would entail using figures of energy use 
before and after the investment, and would need to allow for “other things 
not being equal” such as output, weather and the like. Uncertainty in 
respect of actual achievable financial savings could be reduced with the 
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help of evidence from the many actual investments that have taken place 
in programmes of the recent past. None of our case study firms had gone 
back to appraise the investments they had made, mostly with the help of 
grants. Evidence from analysing recent programmes should go a long way 
to dispel distrust. It may be found that savings are actually small owing to 
the decline in the real price of energy in recent years. This would lend 
weight to the need for refocusing national policy, to which we now turn. 
3.4.4 ENERGY EFFICIENCY POLICY AT NATIONAL LEVEL 
As mentioned above, the introduction of carbon taxes and emissions 
trading have been announced. Until now energy efficiency has been 
unsupported by policies, like carbon taxes, that would charge the polluter. 
Therefore, energy prices have been rather low, and consequently the 
barriers of management time, access to capital, imperfect information, 
values and low status have been perceived as substantial, relative to the 
potential gains from reducing energy consumption. With higher energy 
prices, such barriers become relatively less significant, although of course 
many would still be there.  
Also countervailing the barriers to energy efficiency is the change in 
attitudes to the environment, though the link in the public mind between 
energy use and environmental damage is still weak. The shift in attitudes 
on the environment has been helped to some extent by NGOs in Ireland, 
whose work goes largely unsupported by public policy. NGO action and 
environmental image is apparently now taken seriously by some industrial 
head offices. This is the background that forms the context for general 
policy. 
The barrier of management time can be reduced by provision of 
information in many forms, which should be possible with the energy 
agency’s increased allocation of funds in the National Development Plan 2000-
2006 (Stationery Office, 1999). According to our case studies, 
implementation of monitoring and targeting and use of benchmarks and 
audits were patchy, and most firms had no idea what typical energy 
consumption in their industry would be, or could be. A central agency is 
well placed to undertake and disseminate the calculations. An example 
might be energy use per employee and per million pounds of turnover, at 
the most detailed level of industrial classification derived from the Census of 
Industrial Production. Ready reckoners and packs or software for calculating 
performance, combined perhaps with a support service, would help. 
Past work on audits by the agency has stimulated the interest of 
availing respondents and evaluation of such schemes should be 
undertaken. Such follow up needs to be costed in the initiation of schemes 
and used as material in presentation of case studies, to overcome the 
barrier of credibility and trust. It could be a clearly specified condition of 
any future grants that “before and after” information be provided to the 
agency to enable it to do the analysis. 
Improvements could be made in information on energy use of 
equipment. The same can be said of buildings. Certification of materials 
and designs and the specification of standards need to be improved. It 
would also be worth considering whether energy bills should be required 
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to be more informative and readily understandable. They could give trends 
and graphs, of the past and previous years’ consumption, say, as well as 
interpretations of metered breakdowns of energy use and proportions, 
presented in an understandable manner. Perhaps the Regulator could 
encourage such a measure. Furthermore, the readability of meters might be 
an area for improvement, over the long run at least. These are suggestions 
for investigation, to help reduce management time, to overcome the 
information barrier and to improve credibility and trust. 
The barrier of access to capital can of course be typically addressed by 
subsidies but certain problems arise. Subsidies often entail paperwork and 
bureaucracy. As pointed out by Gruber and Brand (1991) firms, especially 
small firms, do not have time to read brochures or to fill in application 
forms. Subsidies need therefore to be very straightforward and this runs 
the risk of subsidies going to firms that do not need them. Another 
problem is that subsidies have to be successfully publicised. In the above-
mentioned study, some 57 per cent of small and medium-sized firms in 
West Germany had not heard of a subsidy programme on energy 
conservation that had existed for ten years.  
Another measure that facilitates investment is third party finance, 
which operates rather like a mortgage. More specialised agencies that can 
take over aspects of energy management, such as Energy Service 
Companies (ESCOs), including CHP companies, Contract Energy 
Management, and Facilities Management, additionally can share risk and 
overcome the barriers of information and expertise. The companies that 
were interviewed had generally not heard of ESCOs, and had not availed 
of their services except for audits and some investment advice. When the 
potential role of ESCOs was explained and companies were asked if they 
considered that contract energy management could be an attractive option, 
opinions varied. Replies ranged from “It would appeal to us – ESCOs have 
resources while we don’t” to “We would consider it, but our processes 
aren’t rocket science, we could do it ourselves” through to “We wouldn’t 
trust them. It would reflect badly on us if they saved money”.  
Though a heterogeneous sector, mechanical engineering consists of 
many firms where energy use is not especially large and where 
management time is ill-afforded to acquire specialist knowledge about it. 
Financing energy efficiency investment might also be seen as a risky 
prospect. These factors all suggest that the sector could benefit from 
engaging ESCOs, Contract Energy Management or Third Party Finance 
and that there would be a latent demand for the role that these could play.  
Unfortunately, many firms in mechanical engineering would not have 
sufficiently high energy consumption, which would need to be above 
£100,000 per year, for ESCOs to consider it worthwhile becoming 
involved. With the exception of our large users of energy, despite the 
factors that favour the use of ESCOs, there is a notable mismatch between 
the companies that could benefit and the type of client that appeals to 
ESCOs. Another issue is the lack of trust, hinted at above, and this may 
point to the need for the sector association to arrange for third party 
finance and ESCO-type provision.  
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Turning to other national policies, it pays to do a regular check of the 
fiscal system and to review energy policies generally to see whether there 
are incentives or disincentives that operate perversely. These may operate 
directly or, equally important though less perceptible, they may operate 
indirectly or in relative terms. For example, energy efficiency investment 
enjoys the usual capital allowances for investment, with plant and 
machinery being written off over seven years. More favourable terms, 
however, are allowed for investment in new companies set up to invest in 
renewable energy generation. Companies supplying electricity under the 
Alternative Energy Requirement (AER) also have their sales prices 
guaranteed. These favourable treatments are applied to renewable energy 
but not to energy efficiency per se, which might find it easier to compete for 
funds if there were a more level playing field.  
Understandably, special fiscal treatment for energy efficient investment 
is sometimes called for. However, one needs to bear in mind the aim to 
simplify the tax system overall and to have low rates of tax, which are 
made possible by having a streamlined system in which exemptions and 
special regimes are kept to a minimum. If special regimes are operated, 
they are better for being overt, as in subsidies, to enable easier tracking. 
Subsidies can also perform a useful service as the carrot in a carrot-and-
stick approach, often considered to be a fruitful approach, especially when 
carbon taxes or tradable permits are introduced. Subsidies bring their own 
problems, of course, and gradual introduction of carbon taxes, optimal 
reduction of other taxes and due regard for implementation issues could 
be the best course (McCoy and Scott, 2002; Scott, 1999). 
Fairly low energy prices have kept down the profitability of energy 
efficiency measures in recent years. Every firm in the sample made some 
comment relating to profitability of energy efficiency investment, from 
statements such as “the electricity bill concentrates the mind a bit more 
than government policy”, “measures must save money”, to “we’d look at 
the monitoring system if the bill became higher…the heating system could 
be looked at”. 
A switch in taxation away from labour taxes to a carbon tax could help 
these firms “to concentrate the mind” and, in the case of labour intensive 
firms, may improve the bottom line. This is because mechanical 
engineering as a whole is not energy intensive and some firms could be at 
an advantage if taxes were switched in this manner. Meanwhile, ongoing 
deregulation of the energy market is likely to reduce energy prices although 
the extent of price declines on foot of deregulation is uncertain. The 
carbon tax could be undermined somewhat thereby, although it is 
obviously still worth introducing. 
If the announced introduction of emissions trading is limited to large 
energy importers/users, then mechanical engineering firms, being small, 
would not be directly involved. This would save them from having to 
devote further scarce management time to negotiating allocations of 
emissions permits and to trading. There has been a good deal of 
uncertainty surrounding aspects of current policy, contributing to the 
barrier of risk.  
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Ireland’s national energy authority, Sustainable Energy Ireland 
(formerly the Irish Energy Centre), with twice the staff and five times the 
budget of the previous organisation is well-placed to help with some of the 
requirements emerging from this study. Its mission is to promote and assist 
the development of sustainable energy in Ireland, with programmes in the 
fields of renewable energy, energy efficiency in industry and built 
environment, research and development, and consumer information 
(Department of Public Enterprise, 1999). The research and development 
programme is designed to assist the development of a least-cost path to 
CO2 reduction and will focus on increasing energy efficiency, on product 
and service innovation and international collaboration (Department of the 
Environment, 2000). These goals are in line with the areas found here to 
be in need of development, including the provision of sectoral 
benchmarks, the development of third-party finance and focused case 
studies and documentation of the performance of investments. 
 
 This chapter has described the investigations into barriers to energy 
efficiency in the Irish mechanical engineering sector, a sector that employs 
over 11,000 people and produces gross output valued at 1.3 billion euro.  
Over half the output of the sector is accounted for by foreign-owned 
firms, which tend to be larger than Irish-owned ones. The sector produces 
a wide range of categories of output, the majority of which is exported. 
Energy would tend to be used mostly in generic applications, such as space 
heating, lighting and heat treatment, and most opportunities for efficiency 
lie in these areas. 
Seven firms were selected and agreed to participate as case studies, 
representing 13 and 14 per cent respectively of the sector’s employment 
and sales. The firms were engaged in the manufacture of dies, tools, 
pumps, fasteners, lifting and handling equipment, engine components and 
machinery for agriculture and specific industries. For ease of discussion, 
firms were ranked according to the number of energy efficiency measures 
that they had implemented. This ranking revealed that the firms that had 
adopted most energy efficiency measures tended to be the larger firms that 
spent most on energy. They had undertaken an energy audit, tended to 
undertake most energy reporting routines, and perceived there to be less 
unexploited opportunities and less barriers. 
The firms’ patterns of adoption of measures were investigated to see 
which of the dozen or so possible barriers suggested in Chapter 2 stood 
out. The barriers identified were distilled into four main categories. These 
include hidden costs and management time in particular. Time would be 
needed to identify the opportunities, analyse them and tender for new 
technology. It was felt that other priorities received precedence over 
energy efficiency. A second important barrier was access to capital for the 
purpose of investment in energy efficiency. Although companies did not 
experience a general difficulty in obtaining capital it was difficult for energy 
managers to access capital within their company. This problem of access to 
capital operated via the imposition of short payback rules or strict capital 
budgeting rather than through more sound criteria such as net present 
3.5 
Summary 
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value or internal rate of return, possibly for reasons of risk avoidance and 
managerial control. It is worth adding that compared with the firms 
studied in the UK’s mechanical engineering sector, Irish firms appeared to 
have more discretion over their investment and its funding.  
Third, imperfect information on opportunities for energy saving in 
buildings and equipment use was an obvious impediment. Encouragement 
to firms to undertake well-executed audits is recommended and the studies 
of firms in the UK and in Germany also supported such encouragement. 
This applies to both SMEs and large companies. In some of the Irish cases 
it was more a question of the relevance of the information received. The 
final barrier centred round values and organisational culture. Again a 
consistent pattern was found, with performance declining where top 
management was not concerned about energy or environmental matters. 
Evidently a range of policy measures is required to address these 
diverse barriers. A selection of possible measures is now discussed, starting 
at the level of the firm, proceeding to the level of the mechanical 
engineering sector, and then to national level. These suggestions are 
supported by those emanating from the studies of the sector in Germany 
and the UK. Some of the barriers, such as the existence of market risk, 
would be unavoidable. Others can be reduced.  
At the level of the firm, a prerequisite would be to vest responsibility 
for energy matters in a person who would be charged with energy 
efficiency and monitoring. Another prerequisite would be to undertake a 
well-executed energy audit. Outsourcing utilities management could also 
be a worthwhile route.  
Turning to the sectoral level, because many firms in the sector are 
small they cannot afford an energy manager. They would benefit from 
receiving centralised information of a generic nature, on such issues as heat 
treatment and compressed air. Sustainable Energy Ireland or the trade 
association could help with information, including sectoral benchmarks, 
and illustrations of relevant case studies, giving “before and after” analyses. 
Also, professional bodies, such as engineering and branch-specific working 
groups, and supplier and user associations, could become more involved in 
disseminating such information.  
At national level, understanding of the link between energy and the 
environment could receive encouragement. In turn there could be 
encouragement to make the environment an issue among shareholders and 
in the boardroom, with the supply of public information on, and 
encouragement for, certification to environmental standards and “ethical” 
funds. The energy regulators could require energy suppliers to make 
meters and bills clear and informative, showing trends of the customer’s 
energy use, so that purchasers can become more energy numerate. Energy 
labelling and efficiency standards would simplify decision-making and save 
time, and should be promoted. Sectoral associations to promote third party 
finance companies, contract energy management or ESCOs would be 
worth investigating. National fiscal policy needs gradual pre-announced 
correction to address the failure to charge for energy users’ external costs. 
The carrot in such a policy might be financial help with undertaking audits. 
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The mechanical engineering sector could by and large stand to gain if 
carbon taxes are introduced at the same time as reductions in labour taxes. 
In sum, the aim of policy should be to provide accessible, relevant and 
credible information on opportunities and encourage audits, energy 
monitoring and numeracy. This should occur in a supportive regulatory 
and pricing environment that is as risk-free as possible and that accounts 
for external damage costs. Given that one policy measure on its own 
cannot be the solution, action is required on many fronts. 
Annex 3.1:   Detailed Summary of the Importance of Barriers to Energy Efficiency in 
the Irish Mechanical Engineering Sector 
 
 
Potential barrier 
Assessed 
Importance 
(Respondents’ 
average scores 
in brackets*) 
 
 
Comments 
1. Heterogeneity 
 
Medium (1.9) 
 
The sector is varied but generic energy 
use is similar.  
   
2. Hidden costs 
   of which: 
 Analysing/tendering 
 Disruptions/hassle 
 Staff training 
 Poor performance 
 Information: equipment 
 Time/other priorities 
High (2) 
 
(2.3) 
(2.3) 
(2.1) 
(1.7) 
(1.7) 
(2.4) 
Management time is the most serious 
hidden cost 
   
3. Access to capital 
   of which: 
 Other priorities 
 Lack of capital 
 Strict adherence: budgets 
High (2.4) 
 
(2.6) 
(2.4) 
(2.3) 
Access to borrowing is not a barrier, but 
tight payback rules or capital budgets 
restrict some good investments.  
Rarely use NPV or IRR with “realistic” 
lifespan. 
   
4. Risk 
   of which: 
 Market uncertainty 
 Technical risk 
Medium  
 
(1.7) 
(1.4)  
Genuine risks exist, contributing to short 
payback rule, therefore, indirectly 
significant. 
   
5. Imperfect information 
   of which:  
 Opportunities for energy saving 
 Energy use of equipment 
 
 
      Form of information 
High (1.9) 
 
(2) 
(1.7) 
 
 
High 
Undertaking an audit and consulting the 
Irish Energy Centre helped overcome 
barrier.  
Other sources also useful. 
Information on use of energy by 
equipment and buildings is poor. 
Important barrier if availing of information 
takes much time 
   
6. Split incentives 
   of which: 
 Accountability of departments 
 Leasing 
 Job rotation 
Medium to low 
 
(2.1) 
Low 
Probably low 
 
 
Important although impractical in short 
run. 
Not important (leasing). 
No evidence of job rotation.  
   
7. Credibility of information and trust High Information must be relevant and 
convincing.  
   
8. Values/organisational culture 
   of which: 
      Staff awareness 
High 
 
(2.1) 
Barrier reduced if head office or MD take 
the lead 
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9. Power/status of energy manager High Especially important if much investment is 
underway 
 
* Note: The scores in brackets are respondents’ ratings, where 1 = rarely important, 2 = sometimes important,  
3 = often important. 
Assessed importance takes respondents’ scores into account, but can differ from them slightly in some cases, owing 
to further information emerging from in-depth interviews. 
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4. THE BREWING INDUSTRY  
4.1.1 SIZE, COMPOSITION AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 
The brewing industry sold 12.58 million hectolitres (or 1,258 million litres) 
of beer in 1998. Its sales were worth £960.4 million, up from £509.8 million 
in 1995.15 According to the Census of Industrial Production, brewing 
accounted for 1.6 per cent of total Irish manufacturing production and 0.9 
per cent of total manufacturing employment in the mid-1990s. 
The brewing industry in Ireland is very highly concentrated in three 
principal companies that together produce over 99 per cent of the 
industry's output.  Guinness Ireland is by far the largest of these three, and 
a large majority of the whole industry's production comes from this one 
company. 
Guinness was originally established in Dublin in the eighteenth century 
but it eventually became a predominantly British-owned company mainly 
as a result of floating its shares on the London Stock Exchange. The 
company built a large new brewery in England in the 1930s, and it 
subsequently established breweries in many other countries and then 
moved its corporate headquarters from Ireland to England. Guinness 
Ireland today is one of the top twenty companies in Ireland (ranked by 
turnover), but it is now only a part of the multinational Guinness group.  
The whole Guinness group, in turn, is one part of Diageo, a major 
predominantly British-owned multinational company, with interests not 
only in brewing but also in other sectors such as distilling and fast food 
restaurants. 
In Ireland, the principal Guinness brewery is in Dublin, and this is one 
of the largest breweries in the world producing millions of hectolitres of 
beer per year. (The industry uses hectolitres as the measure of output, 
where one hectolitre equals 100 litres). However, Guinness has a total of 
five breweries in Ireland, with two in Dundalk and one each in Kilkenny 
and Waterford in addition to the Dublin brewery.16 Two of these other 
breweries, apart from the Dublin one, are large by most standards with 
production of over a million hectolitres per year, while production in the 
remaining two is in the range 0.2-0.5 million hectolitres per year. Guinness 
Ireland produces a range of different beers, including its own brands of 
 
15 Central Statistics Office, PRODCOM – Product Sales, 1998 and 1995. Later editions do not 
present data on brewing output. 
16 The information here was correct at the time when our research was undertaken.  
However, in July 2000 Guinness announced that it would be closing one of its breweries in 
Dundalk and would be cutting employment by 60 per cent in the other Dundalk brewery. 
4.1 Description 
of the Brewing 
Industry 
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stout, ale and lager, as well as a variety of foreign brands under licence. 
The individual breweries tend to specialise in producing one or more 
particular beers.  But there is also a degree of flexibility as regards which 
brands are produced where, depending on factors such as the strength in 
demand for different brands and the location of the availability of spare 
production capacity. 
Murphy Brewery Ireland and Beamish & Crawford are the two other 
principal brewing companies. They are also long established, being more 
than 140 years old. These two companies have one brewery each, both of 
them located in Cork. Production in each of these two breweries is less 
than 1 million hectolitres per year, but more than 0.2 million hectolitres per 
year. Although these companies originated in Ireland, they are both now 
part of much larger foreign-owned companies. The Dutch multinational 
brewing firm, Heineken, is the parent of Murphy Brewery Ireland, while 
Beamish & Crawford’s parent company is Scottish and Newcastle, one of 
the largest firms in the UK brewing industry. Both of the Cork breweries 
produce their own brands of stout and ale, while they also produce foreign 
brands of lager. 
Since about the mid-1990s, a number of very small “microbreweries” 
have commenced operations in Ireland. There were about ten or more 
such microbreweries operating in Ireland by the late 1990s. However, the 
volume of output from these companies is insignificant in relation to the 
scale of the Irish brewing industry and some of the microbreweries sell to 
only one or two individual retail outlets.17 Thus, to sum up on the 
structure of companies in the Irish brewing industry, there are three major 
companies, operating seven substantial breweries, which together account 
for over 99 per cent of the industry's production. In addition, there are a 
number of very much smaller microbreweries. 
Most of the beer produced in Ireland is sold in the domestic market, 
but exports are quite substantial. Exports accounted for about 15 per cent 
of the value of sales and about 26 per cent of the volume of products sold 
in 1998. Ireland has a relatively strong competitive position in international 
trade in beer, since the value of exports exceeds the value of imports by a 
ratio of almost three to one while the volume of exports exceeds the 
volume of imports by a ratio of almost four to one. 
The output of the brewing industry grew quite rapidly in the 1990s, 
with the value of output rising from IR£415.2 million in 1991 to IR£542.6 
million in 1995, which was an increase of 6.9 per cent per year, in current 
values (Census of Industrial Production). There is no official price index for 
brewing as such but, using the price index for the drinks industry as a 
whole, we estimate that the increase in the volume of production in the 
brewing industry amounted to over 6 per cent per year in 1991-95. More 
recently, in the period 1995-98, data on the volume of product sold by the 
brewing industry show an increase from 8.13 million hectolitres in 1995 to 
 
17“New Taste for Old-Fashioned Drinks”, The Irish Times, 17 April 1998.  “Craft Brewers Want 
Excise Cut to Boost Industry”, Sunday Business Post, 17 November 2002. 
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12.58 million hectolitres in 1998 (PRODCOM – Product Sales).  This 
amounted to growth of over 15 per cent per year.18 
4.1.2 ENERGY USE IN BREWING 
The brewing process is basically quite similar in any brewery, with similar 
energy using technologies being employed. However, there can be 
variations in the amounts of energy required per unit of output because of 
factors such as differences between breweries in their scale of operations 
and differences in the mix of products and packaging. A notable 
characteristic of the Irish industry, compared to countries such as the UK 
or Germany, is that only a tiny fraction of Irish production comes from 
small breweries with output of less than 0.2 million hectolitres per year.  
UK data indicate that large breweries tend to use less energy per unit 
volume of beer than small ones (Harris, 1979). 
The brewing industry is a relatively energy-intensive sector compared 
to most other industries in Ireland, and it is also regarded as being 
relatively conscious of energy efficiency issues.  In 1995, the brewing 
industry spent IR£7.5 million on fuel and power, which amounted to 1.4 
per cent of the value of its gross output.  Expenditure on fuel and power 
can also be expressed as a percentage of purchases of “industrial inputs”, 
meaning purchases of materials for processing, industrial services, and fuel 
and power combined. Spending on fuel and power in 1995 amounted to 
6.6 per cent of purchases of industrial inputs in brewing. For comparison, 
expenditure on fuel and power amounted to just 2.4 per cent of purchases 
of industrial inputs in all Irish manufacturing.19  The principal energy 
source used by the brewing industry is gas, followed by electricity. 
Since the mid-1980s, the value of energy purchases by the brewing 
industry has declined considerably.  As the value of the industry's 
production was increasing at the same time, its expenditure on fuel and 
power as a percentage of the value of its gross output fell very substantially 
from almost 6 per cent in 1985 to under 2 per cent by 1995. The 
expenditure on fuel and power expressed as a percentage of purchases of 
“industrial inputs” fell from over 15 per cent in 1985 to under 7 per cent in 
1995.  Much of this decline occurred in the second half of the 1980s, and 
sharply declining fuel prices between 1985 and 1987 were partly 
responsible for this trend.  But even allowing for this, we estimate that 
there was a significant real decline in the energy-intensity of the brewing 
industry. 
A number of government policy measures have aimed to improve 
energy efficiency in Irish industry, including the brewing industry. These 
include a grant scheme for energy audits, a scheme to support investment in 
energy efficiency, an energy self-audit and statement of energy accounts 
scheme, information programmes on best practice, and a scheme to promote 
 
18 More recent data on the value of brewing sales or the volume of output are not available 
from these sources. 
19The data quoted come from the Census of Industrial Production, which does not distinguish 
brewing as an industry separate from distilling and malting in later years. 
     THE BREWING INDUSTRY 69 
 
fuel savings in the use of boilers. The content of these schemes is outlined in 
more detail above in Section 3.1 in the chapter on the mechanical engineering 
industry. 
 
 For the purpose of our research on the brewing industry we undertook a 
number of case studies of breweries. There was little scope to be selective 
in choosing these case studies, as there are only three principal companies 
with seven sizeable breweries in the Irish brewing industry. While there are 
also a number of very small microbreweries, it seemed clear that the scale 
and nature of their operation is so very different from the mainstream of 
the industry that they would not be appropriate as case studies. 
Consequently, we decided to approach all seven of the larger breweries, 
and the five of those that agreed to co-operate constituted our case studies. 
Given that the five participating breweries together account for a large 
majority of production in the industry, they provide a good representation 
of the industry. Each of the breweries concerned is part of a larger multi-
plant enterprise but we were satisfied that, in matters relating to managing 
energy efficiency, the more appropriate unit to study was the individual 
brewery rather than the enterprise as a whole. 
In carrying out the case studies, we used an initial “pre-interview” 
questionnaire, sent by post, to obtain certain types of basic but important 
information on energy use, energy management, energy efficiency 
measures employed and perceived barriers to energy efficiency.20 Then we 
followed this up with more in-depth and qualitative face-to-face interviews. 
These interviews were semi-structured, using a detailed questionnaire to 
ensure that all potentially important issues would be covered, but allowing 
for variations in the amount of attention given to different issues 
depending on the circumstances of each case and the results from the 
“pre-interview” stage. (The questionnaire for these face-to-face interviews 
is shown in Appendix 2.) 
The number of interviews carried out in each brewery ranged from one 
to three. The priority was to interview the energy manager (if such a 
position existed) or the person who had most responsibility for energy 
management. In practice, the people giving these priority interviews were 
generally described as the engineering manager or production services 
manager, or a variation on these titles. We also carried out additional 
interviews where possible with other relevant people, such as maintenance, 
production or environmental managers. The objective of the interviews 
was to obtain both factual information and perceptions and opinions 
relating to a variety of topics such as the conduct and status of energy 
policy and energy management, energy performance, energy information 
systems, information on energy efficiency opportunities, procedures 
 
20 The pre-interview questionnaire employed was similar to the one used for the mechanical 
engineering industry, as shown in Appendix 1, apart from some industry-specific details such 
as the question about implementation of specific energy efficiency measures. The brewing 
questionnaire is available from the authors. 
4.2 Methodology 
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governing budgeting and investment, and the importance of a range of 
potential barriers to greater energy efficiency. 
 
 In this section we describe the five breweries that participated as case 
studies. In doing this, we are constrained by the need to preserve 
confidentiality as promised to all those who co-operated in the study. 
Therefore, we cannot present detailed descriptions of each of the case 
studies in turn, but instead we describe the five of them collectively as a 
group. 
4.3.1 CONTEXT OF THE CASE STUDIES 
The five breweries are quite diverse in size. In terms of the quantity of 
beer produced per year, the smallest is in the 0.2-0.5 million hectolitres 
category, with the largest being well inside the category of a million 
hectolitres plus. However, compared to the size distribution of breweries 
existing in the UK or Germany, these can all be regarded as either large or 
medium-size breweries. In the UK for instance, over 40 out of 87 
breweries produce less than 0.2 million hectolitres per year, and none of 
the five Irish cases are as small as that. The numbers employed in the five 
Irish breweries range from less than 200 to about 400. All of them are 
long-established, for the most part originating in the eighteenth or 
nineteenth centuries, but of course investment and new developments over 
time have meant that many of their present buildings and facilities are 
much more modern; there is considerable variation in this regard between 
the five cases. 
All of the five produce more than one brand of beer, and some of 
them produce two or three of the categories ale, stout or lager on the one 
site. While packaging (in kegs, cans or bottles) is performed on-site in some 
cases, this is not true for all of the output of all of the breweries. Some 
output leaves the breweries in larger bulk containers to be packaged 
elsewhere for the retail trade. 
Most of the variations between the different breweries that are 
mentioned above would have some implications for energy requirements 
or energy intensity. Thus, other things being equal, energy requirements 
per litre of output could be expected to decline with scale, to rise with age 
of production facilities, to be higher for lager than for other beers, and to 
be higher where more packaging is carried out. In addition, some other 
variations between the breweries were encountered which would give rise 
to differing energy requirements per unit of output. Examples are the 
presence on-site of substantial research and development facilities, office-
based service activities, tourism- or heritage-related facilities, or other 
energy-using production facilities not directly and solely related to the 
brewery’s own production requirements. Where such activities are present, 
this would tend to raise energy usage per unit of output above what it 
would be otherwise. 
In each of the five companies, expenditure on electricity accounts for 
more than half of total energy expenditure, but this mainly reflects the 
higher price of electricity than other energy sources. In fact, electricity 
4.3 Description 
of Case Study 
Companies 
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accounts for a relatively small minority of total energy usage in all five 
cases, and they all rely mainly on gas as their principal energy source. In 
most cases, gas and electricity are supplied directly to the breweries by the 
relevant public utility companies, but in one case there is a CHP plant on-
site that uses gas as an input and provides steam and electricity to the 
brewery. 
A final point worth noting here is that breweries are substantial 
producers of CO2, as a by-product of the fermentation process. 
Traditionally, this CO2 was simply released into the atmosphere. However, 
breweries also use CO2 as an input for carbonating the beer, and they used 
to have to purchase this from outside suppliers. In recent years, since 
about the mid-1990s, all five of our case study breweries have introduced 
systems to recover and use their own CO2, and by now they are mostly 
either self-sufficient or largely self-sufficient in CO2, while at least one of 
them has a surplus to sell outside the brewery. This required significant 
investment, but it has generally proved worthwhile financially because of 
the reduction in input costs. While this is not an energy efficiency measure 
as such, it has had similar effects both in cutting the breweries’ costs and in 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions attributable to the brewing industry. 
4.3.2 ENERGY POLICY 
There is considerable variation in the degree to which formal and 
systematic energy policies are in place in the five different breweries. 
However, a significant point worth noting is that none of the five suggest 
that they have no explicit energy policy. Having said that, at one extreme 
one of the breweries indicated that it has just an “unwritten set of 
guidelines”. At the other extreme, one of the breweries indicated that it has 
a fully developed “energy policy, action plan and regular review with 
commitment of top management”. The other three place themselves 
somewhere between these situations, indicating that they have an energy 
policy set by a senior departmental manager, but perhaps not formally 
adopted and generally without very active commitment from top 
management to energy policy as such.  In most of the companies, it seems 
that there is a real interest among top management in reducing costs in 
general, and energy policy or management is seen as essentially an aspect 
of that broader objective. 
The companies are generally well aware of their performance on 
overall energy use and its relation to their output. They have targets for use 
of energy as well as water, and sometimes for recovery of CO2. 
In recent years, they have been required to obtain IPC (integrated 
pollution control) licenses from the Environmental Protection Agency. 
This licensing system involves the implementation within companies of 
environmental management programmes which aim to ensure that there is 
continuing improvement in their environmental performance. 
4.3.3 ENERGY MANAGEMENT 
There is some variation among the five breweries in the degree to which 
energy management is formally organised and integrated into the overall 
72 BARRIERS TO ENERGY EFFICIENCY 
 
 
management structure. However, the first point to note here is that all of 
the five do have some type of formal energy management with some 
formal delegation of responsibility for energy consumption. In one case, 
the structure is highly developed and energy management is fully integrated 
into the management structure, with clear delegation of responsibility for 
energy consumption. The other four cases are fairly similar to each other, 
with energy management generally being the part-time responsibility of 
someone with limited authority. Typically, the persons concerned have 
broader responsibilities beyond energy management alone, such as plant 
maintenance, new investment projects and environmental management. 
Reflecting these responsibilities, they are not described as the “energy 
manager” but are usually called engineering managers or some variant of 
that title.  The proportion of their time that is devoted to energy 
management as such varies from about 10 per cent to about 50 per cent or 
more, although there are usually also other staff, and occasionally outside 
consultants, available to work on improvements in energy efficiency. They 
generally report to a more senior manager within the brewery who would 
have to give clearance for significant expenditures on energy efficiency 
measures. 
Since all of the five breweries are part of larger enterprises, they must 
also seek clearance from a higher level for substantial expenditures on 
energy efficiency measures or other investments. They are generally subject 
to specified payback criteria for investments and they must put forward a 
case justifying substantial expenditures. Also arising from their position as 
part of larger enterprises, they share ideas and experiences with their 
parent and sister companies, and can benefit appreciably from such 
exchanges of information and from co-operation on technical matters 
including energy efficiency. This process facilitates the diffusion of 
technical improvements to different breweries within larger enterprises. 
In most of the breweries, energy management is essentially conducted 
in-house, without ongoing use of outside contract energy management or 
ESCOs (energy service companies). However, in some of these cases it is 
possible that there may be future changes in this regard. Up to the present, 
these breweries have made use of outside consultants, but only from time 
to time for specific purposes. In one of the five cases, there is a CHP plant 
on-site that is operated by an outside contractor, with the brewery paying 
them agreed prices for the electricity and steam supplied. 
As regards the status of energy management, there is general agreement 
that it is taken quite seriously. There is real recognition in brewing 
companies that energy is an appreciable cost for them, and this fact alone 
would ensure that energy management is given significant attention. Some 
interviewees felt that the status of energy management is essentially 
proportionate to its role in the cost structure and that it has little further 
significance for top management; it receives no special attention when 
things are going well, but it does if performance goes off target. However, 
a few of the interviewees felt that energy management is accorded a 
somewhat higher status and importance in their companies. This is mainly 
because, as an aspect of environmental performance in general, it can have 
implications for the corporate image and public relations. 
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4.3.4 ENERGY INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
All five of the breweries record their energy use regularly, although there 
are variations in the level of detail and frequency with which they do so. 
For example, electricity use is metered at the detailed level of individual 
processes in four out of five cases, and at the level of individual buildings 
in the fifth case. Use of steam/hot water is metered at the level of 
individual processes in two cases, at the level of individual buildings in one 
case, and only at the level of the site as a whole in two cases. As regards 
the frequency of recording energy use, this is done daily in one of the 
breweries and weekly in all of the others, although several of them have 
the capability to monitor energy use in detail much more closely if the 
need arises. 
One of the five cases has a very comprehensive system for using 
information on energy consumption. It sets targets, monitors consumption, 
identifies faults, quantifies savings and provides budget tracking. Three of 
the others also have quite elaborate systems, using their information to 
calculate energy consumption per unit of production, to compare this with 
sector benchmarks, and to apply monitoring and targeting schemes for 
energy use. The fifth one also records energy consumption per unit of 
output and compares this information with sector benchmarks, without 
employing a monitoring and targeting scheme. In general, if adverse trends 
occur in aspects of energy consumption, these are investigated as they 
arise. 
In most cases, information and analysis on energy use, or at least 
energy expenditure, is passed on regularly to senior management. Most of 
the interviewees were broadly satisfied with the quality of their energy 
information systems, although they do see some room for improvements. 
Apart from their regular gathering and review of information on energy 
consumption, most of the breweries have also used more in-depth energy 
audits at times. 
4.3.5 ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ENERGY USE 
The five case study breweries have little or nothing in the way of 
arrangements for charging energy costs to individual subdivisions within 
the brewery. Nor do they use devolved energy budgets for individual 
subdivisions, or financial incentives for subdivisions or staff to use energy 
more efficiently. 
Several of the breweries would be able, or almost able, to measure the 
energy consumption of individual subdivisions and to charge them for it, 
although they have acquired such capabilities only quite recently. But at 
least one of the breweries does not have the equipment to implement such 
a system and would have to make significant additional investments to do 
so. Most, but not all, of the interviewees felt that such a system of 
devolved accountability would result in improvements in energy efficiency, 
but perhaps not very large improvements. A few of them suggested that 
there might be savings of about 3 to 5 per cent. A few potential obstacles 
to implementing devolved accountability were mentioned, including the 
fact that steam meters are not very accurate and that there would be some 
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need for vigilance to ensure that product quality would not suffer. In 
addition, as mentioned above, at least one of the breweries would need to 
undertake significant expenditure to measure energy consumption by 
individual subdivisions, and it is not clear that this would be financially 
worthwhile. 
While there are generally no systems of financial incentives for 
individual subdivisions to minimise energy use, the senior managers with 
most responsibility for energy management in some of the breweries do 
have personal financial incentives related to performance, including energy 
performance. But such incentives related to energy performance are 
generally only a small part of their total remuneration. Some of the people 
concerned indicated that such incentives have rather little impact on their 
motivation to improve energy performance, because the incentives are 
relatively small and because they would be sufficiently motivated in any 
case. 
4.3.6 ENERGY EFFICIENCY PERFORMANCE 
The energy efficiency performance of the case study breweries looks 
relatively good by comparison with benchmarks available from the UK. 
Average energy consumption in UK breweries in 1996 was 178 MJ per 
hectolitre (or 1.78 MJ per litre). The figure tended to be higher for the 
smaller breweries, so that it was 251 MJ per hectolitre for those producing 
0.2-0.5 million hectolitres per year, 167 MJ per hectolitre for those 
producing 0.5-1 million hectolitres, and 168 MJ per hectolitre for those 
producing over 1 million hectolitres per year.21 Compared to these figures, 
four of the five Irish case study breweries had energy consumption rates in 
1999 that were no more than 81 per cent of the overall UK average for 
1996, and that ranged between 57 per cent and 76 per cent of the UK 
average for their own size class. The fifth Irish brewery had an energy 
consumption rate that was not better than the UK average and hence was 
out of line with the other Irish cases. However, there appeared to be good 
explanations for this on account of the mix of activities carried out at the 
site concerned, which would give rise to significant additional energy 
consumption. Given these explanations, together with other indications of 
exceptional attention being given to energy efficiency measures in the 
brewery concerned, it appears that that this case too can be regarded as a 
relatively good performer on energy consumption. As regards trends over 
time, the Irish breweries were able to show significant reductions in energy 
consumption per hectolitre in the 1990s. 
Consistent with the impression given by the figures, the breweries 
generally regard themselves as having an above-average performance on 
energy efficiency (obviously they cannot all be above average for Ireland, 
but their frame of reference tends to be Ireland plus the UK). One of the 
breweries estimated that it is in the top 10 per cent on energy efficiency 
performance, another reckoned that it is in the top 30 per cent, and a third 
 
21 Brewers & Licensed Retailers Association Energy Survey 1996. 
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one was estimated to be “one of the best”. The other two were less 
specific about this. 
In our pre-interview questionnaire, the five case study breweries were 
presented with a list of 41 possible measures for reducing energy 
consumption and they were asked to indicate whether they had 
implemented or at least considered implementing each of the measures. 
Nearly all the breweries pointed out that some of the measures were not 
applicable to them for various reasons (although this applied to quite a 
small minority of the measures). Leaving aside the measures that were 
regarded as not applicable to each case, three of the five breweries have 
implemented half or more of the possible measures, and they have 
implemented or considered two-thirds or more of them. Thus, in these 
three cases, only one-third or less of the possible energy-saving measures 
have been neither implemented nor considered. In the remaining two 
breweries, less than half of the possible measures have been implemented, 
but they have considered many of the other measures. Consequently, in 
these cases too, only one-third or less of the possible energy-saving 
measures have been neither implemented nor considered. 
It is perhaps of interest to note that there is no clear correspondence 
between the ranking of breweries in terms of energy consumption per 
hectolitre and their ranking in terms of the proportion of energy-saving 
measures implemented. No doubt this is partly (or largely) a reflection of 
diversity among the breweries in terms of size, age, mix of production, etc., 
which would mean that their energy requirements would differ even if they 
all gave the same attention to energy efficiency measures. Because of this 
situation, it is difficult to perceive a clear overall ranking on energy 
performance among these breweries. However, the relatively low 
proportion of possible energy-saving measures that have neither been 
implemented nor considered tends to confirm the impression that 
probably all of these breweries are relatively good performers on energy 
efficiency. 
Nonetheless, most of the breweries believe that there are significant 
energy saving opportunities that they have not yet implemented. Three of 
them agreed with the proposition that there is a wide range of energy 
efficiency measures that could be implemented in their breweries that 
would yield paybacks of less than five years at current energy prices. One 
of the others was doubtful whether this proposition applied in their case, 
while the fifth one disagreed with this proposition. (The one case that 
disagreed with this proposition was also the one that had actually 
implemented the highest proportion of energy-saving measures.) The 
reason they gave most commonly for not implementing possible energy 
efficiency measures that would yield paybacks of less than five years was 
because the investments they make are subject to payback criteria which 
are more demanding than a five-year criterion (see Section 4.3.7 below). 
This is also a common reason for not even considering some possible 
measures, since it can be quite obvious that some measures would not get 
close to satisfying their payback criteria.  However, the breweries also 
indicated that there is a range of other barriers or obstacles to 
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implementing energy saving measures which can be significant at times, as 
will be discussed in Section 4.4 below. 
4.3.7 CAPITAL AND INVESTMENT 
None of the five breweries has a separate budget for investment in energy 
efficiency as such. Instead, investment in improving energy efficiency is 
usually treated as an aspect of investment in general. Apart from some 
rather exceptional circumstances, this means that investment in energy 
efficiency is generally subject to the same payback criteria as other 
investments, which are usually quite short-term payback criteria. 
Since there is generally no separate budget for energy efficiency 
investment, and since the managers who are most responsible for energy 
management must also divide their time among other responsibilities, the 
breweries usually cannot put a precise figure on their overhead costs of 
energy management. The rough estimates that they provided for this 
indicate that the overhead costs of energy management range from the 
equivalent of less than one person-year up to perhaps three person-years. 
In assessing investments in energy efficiency measures, the breweries 
usually apply payback criteria that are the same as for other investments, as 
mentioned above. The payback criteria are generally quite tight, typically 
about three years or so. Some of the interviewees said that the criterion 
applied to them has been tightening in recent times, for example from a 
four year payback a few years ago to three or even two years now. These 
tight payback criteria for investments would not usually apply to 
replacement of plant that is absolutely necessary for the core function of 
producing beer. Rather they apply to other desirable but not entirely 
essential investments, which would include many energy efficiency 
measures. 
The payback criteria for investment are generally set at the top level of 
the company as a whole, above the level of the individual breweries. When 
seeking capital to make investments, usually above a specified amount (for 
example £50,000 or £100,000), the breweries generally have to make a 
formal case to parent companies justifying the investment in terms of the 
payback criteria. 
Our interviewees put forward some reasons why the payback criteria 
are generally so tight. A key reason is that there is competition within the 
whole company for the available capital from all types of other projects, 
including investments in marketing which are important for brewing 
companies. The payback criterion is a method for making selections 
among diverse types of projects, given a limit on capital availability. The 
companies appear to be mostly unwilling to borrow significantly more 
capital to invest in additional projects, even though there may be some 
additional projects that could adequately repay the cost of borrowing over 
a longer period than the specified payback time. Another reason suggested 
for the tight payback criteria is because this is a means of allowing for 
some risk that projects will not be as successful as expected by those 
proposing the projects. 
The payback criteria are not entirely rigid in all cases and there seems 
to be some flexibility depending on the circumstances. For example, if 
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grants can be secured to help fund investments this can allow the payback 
criteria to be relaxed. Or an exception might be made if it is possible to 
argue a case that a highly visible investment in energy efficiency would 
have additional benefits for the company’s public relations, or that an 
investment in energy efficiency would have additional benefits in 
improving safety or in reducing maintenance costs. However, most of the 
breweries were able to identify some realistic potential investments in 
improving energy efficiency that are effectively ruled out by the strictness 
of their company’s payback criterion. 
There are some risks or threats in the overall business environment 
that appear to have an influence on investment criteria for the breweries. 
For example, the breweries are very aware of the effects of competition 
and market trends (in the UK as well as Ireland) and this puts constant 
pressure on them to reduce costs and expenditure. Some interviewees felt 
that strict investment payback criteria are partly a reflection of competition 
and the resulting general pressure to minimise expenditure. In addition, 
there has been a considerable amount of recent speculation concerning 
possible mergers, acquisitions, sales or closures of breweries or brewing 
companies. It seems that such possibilities have led to a climate of some 
uncertainty about the future which has tended to put more emphasis on 
short-term rather than longer-term goals in relation to assessing investment 
expenditure. This would reinforce any preference for using short payback 
criteria and avoiding borrowing to fund investment. 
4.3.8 NEW BUILDINGS AND REFURBISHMENT 
The issue of incorporating energy efficiency considerations in the design of 
new or refurbished buildings has not been very significant in recent years 
for most of the breweries, as relatively little new building has occurred. In 
so far as it has occurred, energy efficiency has generally been taken into 
account at the design stage. 
4.3.9 PURCHASING 
The brewing companies generally do take account of energy efficiency 
considerations when purchasing equipment, although there may be no 
written rules or policy documents governing this to ensure that it is done 
systematically. Some of the interviewees indicated that energy efficiency is 
considered seriously when purchasing equipment that uses a good deal of 
energy, but that it may tend to be neglected to some extent in the case of 
purchasing other equipment that uses less energy. Several of them also said 
that there can be a difficulty sometimes in obtaining reliable information 
on the energy performance of equipment that they are thinking of 
purchasing, although this is not usually a problem. 
4.3.10 AWARENESS AND CULTURE 
Some of the breweries organise regular staff awareness programmes 
concerning energy efficiency, and the others at least carry out ad hoc staff 
awareness training and dissemination of information. These measures seem 
to be reasonably successful for the most part, since nearly all of the 
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interviewees say that lack of staff awareness is rarely significant as a barrier 
to energy efficiency. 
The breweries all experience some external pressures to improve their 
energy/environmental performance. In particular, in recent years they have 
been required to obtain IPC (integrated pollution control) licenses from 
the Environmental Protection Agency. These licenses involve the 
implementation within companies of environmental management 
programmes which aim to ensure that there is continuing improvement in 
their environmental performance. In addition, the breweries are conscious 
of a need for good public relations, with the local community and more 
widely, which means that they need to be concerned with their 
environmental performance. 
As regards internal pressures to improve energy or environmental 
performance, most but not all of the interviewees said that there are some 
pressures of this type from employees, who are often local people sharing 
the same environment. There are also such pressures from top-level 
management. All the interviewees agreed that energy efficiency and energy 
management are taken quite seriously by their top management. At the 
least, there is real recognition by top management that energy is an 
appreciable cost for breweries, and this fact alone would ensure that energy 
management is given significant attention. Most of the interviewees felt 
that a concern for good public relations gives a further motivation for their 
senior management to be concerned with energy performance and 
environmental performance more generally. In addition, a couple of the 
interviewees said that there is also a somewhat deeper commitment to 
environmental values by their top management, going beyond the 
motivations mentioned above. 
At the same time, most of the interviewees said that there is an ongoing 
need for individuals within the breweries to champion and push for 
particular energy saving or environmental projects. It is generally necessary 
for the managers with responsibility for these areas to put forward a case 
justifying expenditures on such projects. Most of these managers describe 
themselves as being motivated to some degree by environmental values. 
4.3.11 ESCOS 
Most of the breweries make no regular use of outside contract energy 
management or ESCOs (energy service companies), although in some 
cases it is possible that there may be future changes in this regard. Several 
of the breweries were having wide-ranging reviews of their operations 
undertaken at about the time we carried out our interviews, which could 
result in significant changes. In one large case study brewery, there is a 
CHP plant on-site that is operated by an outside contractor. There was a 
temporary situation during which time they would not gain from 
improving energy efficiency, so this constituted a barrier, but this no longer 
applies. It demonstrates the importance of contractual arrangements. The 
brewery now pays agreed prices for the electricity and steam supplied and 
there is a 15-year contract between the brewery and the contractor.  
     THE BREWING INDUSTRY 79 
 
Breweries expressed some degree of openness to considering contract 
energy management as a possibility. In general they were keeping their 
options open. 
4.3.12 VIEWS ON GOVERNMENT POLICY 
Most of the case study breweries had fairly positive views about 
government policy measures to promote energy efficiency, although a 
minority had neutral or slightly negative views on this. Specifically, three 
out of five regarded the Irish Energy Centre (now Sustainable Energy 
Ireland) as a good or excellent source of information on energy efficiency 
opportunities, while the others described it as average. More generally, the 
view was expressed that the government has been quite progressive and 
effective to date, although it remains to be seen if it would have the resolve 
to impose radical measures. Several of the breweries said that they had 
found government-funded grants and subsidies to be useful. 
As regards recommendations concerning what the government should 
do to improve energy efficiency, one suggestion was that companies could 
be taxed on above-average CO2 emissions, while receiving tax credits for 
below-average emissions. This might be acceptable to many companies, 
more so than a straightforward tax alone. In addition, it was suggested that 
it is useful for government agencies to identify energy efficiency 
opportunities, to disseminate this information through demonstration 
projects or free (or grant-assisted) energy audits, and to provide grants to 
support implementation of such energy saving measures. 
4.3.13 VIEWS ON BARRIERS TO ENERGY EFFICIENCY 
As was noted in Section 4.3.6, most of the case study breweries agreed 
with the proposition that there is a wide range of energy efficiency 
measures that could be implemented that would yield paybacks of less than 
five years, although a couple of them felt that the remaining energy 
efficiency opportunities are rather limited. Most of them also said that they 
could readily identify a number of specific energy efficiency projects that 
could be implemented. 
When they were asked to identify the main barriers or obstacles to 
implementing more energy efficiency measures, they pointed to quite a 
wide range of barriers as being of some significance at times, and we 
discuss these barriers individually in Section 4.4 below. However, it is 
worth noting here that the reason they gave most commonly for not 
implementing possible energy efficiency measures is because the 
investments they make, including investments in energy efficiency, are 
subject to quite stringent payback criteria (as was outlined in Section 4.3.7). 
These payback criteria are a reflection of competition for capital within the 
companies, from a wide range of potential investment projects, and the 
payback criteria are a means of making selections among these projects. 
The tight payback criteria tend to rule out a significant number of possible 
investments in energy efficiency. 
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As was noted above, it is mostly agreed that there are some measures 
that could be implemented in the Irish breweries to improve energy 
efficiency, which have not actually been implemented. In this section we 
consider the various barriers to energy efficiency which might explain why 
energy efficiency measures have not been implemented more widely. 
4.4.1 HETEROGENEITY 
An energy efficiency measure may be known to be financially attractive for 
a “typical” or “average” company, but it may not be attractive in fact for all 
individual companies because of diversity or heterogeneity among companies. 
We found some examples of such situations among the case study 
breweries. Our pre-interview questionnaire presented the companies with a 
list of 41 conventionally recommended measures for reducing energy 
consumption in breweries and asked if they had implemented these 
measures. Four of the five breweries said that some of these recommended 
measures would not be appropriate in their particular circumstances, 
although this applied to only one measure in two of the breweries and to 
only six measures (out of 41) in the other two breweries. Commonly 
occurring examples were to be found among the measures intended to 
reduce energy consumption in packaging, since some of the breweries do 
not carry out certain types of packaging operations such as bottling or 
canning and hence they could gain little or no benefit from some of the 
recommended measures. 
Overall, however, heterogeneity did not arise very frequently as an 
important explanation for non-implementation of energy efficiency 
measures. 
4.4.2 HIDDEN COSTS 
Hidden costs are costs that can arise indirectly or in association with 
energy efficiency measures, but are not usually counted explicitly as part of 
the cost of implementing the measures as such. Hidden costs might 
include, for example, the cost of identifying and assessing the measure, the 
cost of retraining staff to use new equipment, the cost of disruption to 
production and general inconvenience. 
In our pre-interview questionnaire, the companies were presented with 
a list of different types of hidden costs and they were asked to indicate 
how often these arise as important barriers to improving energy efficiency. 
The ones that emerged as most often important were those relating to 
demands on management time – specifically “lack of time/other priorities” 
and the “cost of identifying opportunities, analysing cost effectiveness and 
tendering”. All of the interviewees described the first of these as often 
important or sometimes important, while four out of five described the 
second one as often important or sometimes important. The less important 
types of hidden costs were “possible poor performance of equipment”, 
“cost of production disruptions, hassle and inconvenience” and “cost of 
staff replacement, retirement and retraining”. The interviewees were about 
evenly divided between describing each of these as sometimes important 
and rarely important. 
4.4 
Evidence of 
Barriers to 
Energy 
Efficiency 
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When the issue of hidden costs was explored in more depth, all of the 
interviewees said that some hidden costs can be important, particularly 
those relating to demands on management time, and they can often have 
the effect of delaying the introduction of energy efficiency measures. At 
the same time, three of the five breweries also said that the hidden costs 
were seldom important enough to actually prevent the implementation of 
possible energy efficiency measures, except perhaps in the case of new and 
unfamiliar technologies that could be particularly costly and time-
consuming to examine. However, one of the other two breweries 
suggested that hidden costs – specifically demands on management time – 
would actually represent one of the two biggest obstacles to energy 
efficiency, in their experience. The remaining one suggested that the “cost 
of identifying opportunities, analysing cost effectiveness and tendering” – 
again an aspect of demands on management time – is probably the single 
greatest barrier to improving energy efficiency in his experience. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, there appears to be some relationship here 
between size of company and the perceived importance of the barriers 
presented by demands on management time. For the larger breweries with 
a larger and more specialised management structure, this is seen as less of a 
barrier than it is for the smaller breweries. 
Overall, therefore, the aspects of hidden costs that relate to demands 
on management time are often important enough to delay significantly the 
introduction of energy efficiency measures. But they seldom result in 
ultimate non-implementation of such measures in larger breweries, 
although they can be more serious barriers in the smaller breweries. 
4.4.3 ACCESS TO CAPITAL 
The interviewees who are responsible for energy management in the 
breweries all agreed that lack of access to sufficient capital, for the purpose 
of investing in energy efficiency, is one of the major barriers to improving 
energy efficiency. Overall, this seems to be the single most important 
barrier. 
The constraint on access to capital for investment in energy efficiency 
occurs in the form of quite stringent payback criteria which are imposed by 
the brewing companies on investment in general, including investments in 
energy efficiency measures. The payback criteria vary a little between 
different breweries but they are typically about three years or so, and in 
some cases they have been tightening in recent times. The process of 
applying the payback criteria does not usually discriminate in favour of 
energy efficiency investments, nor does it discriminate against them. 
The payback criteria are used as a means of making selections among 
potential investment projects. The fact that the payback criteria are so tight 
is seen primarily as a reflection of the amount of competition for capital, 
within the company as a whole, from a wide range of potential investment 
projects. Thus, in the pre-interview questionnaire, four of the five 
breweries said that “other priorities for capital investment” is often 
important as a barrier, while the fifth one said that it is sometimes 
important. 
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For the most part, the parent companies of the breweries are not 
regarded as being especially constrained in terms of their access to capital, 
but it seems that they have an excess supply of potentially rewarding 
investment projects. In principle, the parent companies should be able to 
borrow more capital, but in practice they appear to be mostly unwilling to 
borrow significantly more to invest in additional projects even though 
some additional projects could adequately repay the cost of borrowing 
eventually. It seems that this partly reflects concerns about market trends 
and the existence of a degree of uncertainty about the future, arising from 
the possibility of mergers, acquisitions, disposals or closures of breweries.22 
This may tend to put more emphasis on short-term rather than longer-
term goals in relation to assessing investment expenditure. This would 
reinforce any preference for using short payback criteria and avoiding 
borrowing to fund investment. 
It is also worth noting that a couple of the breweries suggested that 
there is another reason for the tight payback criteria, apart from being a 
means of allocating capital between a relatively large number of competing 
investment projects. This is because this is a means of allowing for some 
risk that projects will not be as successful as expected. 
To conclude on this, when the interviewees were asked what would 
they regard as the biggest obstacle to making further improvements in 
energy efficiency, two of them said that strict payback criteria and the 
associated constraint on access to capital was the greatest obstacle, while 
two others said that this is one of the two greatest obstacles.  The fifth one 
identified it as one of the greatest barriers, but not the single most 
important one. Nearly all of the interviewees could identify a number of 
feasible energy saving projects that could not go ahead because of the strict 
payback criteria, and one of them said that all the substantial energy saving 
opportunities that have not yet been implemented are ruled out for this 
reason. 
4.4.4 RISK 
There are a number of types of risks that could generate barriers to 
investment in greater energy efficiency. These include, for example, risks 
perceived in the general economic environment or in the specific business 
sector, the possibility of changes in energy prices, or technical risks 
associated with specific energy-saving technologies. 
The interviewees in the breweries indicated that there are two main 
types of risk that can create barriers to energy efficiency measures, namely, 
technical risk related to specific projects, and business/market uncertainty. 
In the pre-interview questionnaires, all of the respondents said that both 
these types of risk are often important or sometimes important as obstacles 
to implementing energy efficiency opportunities. In the more in-depth 
interviews it emerged that, for most of them, the area of risk related to 
 
22 Giving some substance to these suggestions, in July 2000 (after our field work was 
completed), Guinness announced that it would be closing one of its breweries in Dundalk 
and would be cutting employment by 60 per cent in its other Dundalk brewery, having 
apparently decided initially to close both of these breweries. 
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business/market uncertainty was perceived as the more significant of these 
two types of risk. 
Most of the interviewees put rather little stress on problems of 
technical risk. It seems that for most of them this can be a cause of some 
delay in checking out the merits of the technologies involved before 
deciding to implement energy efficiency measures, but it is seldom 
experienced as a critical barrier that would actually prevent measures being 
undertaken. As an exception, one of the breweries was untypical in saying 
that technical risk is one of the two biggest barriers to implementing more 
energy efficiency measures. This was the same brewery that had already 
implemented the highest proportion of the 41 conventionally 
recommended energy saving measures listed in our pre-interview 
questionnaire. It seems that they have undertaken most of the well-tried 
measures and would now be close to the frontier of proven energy-saving 
technology. Thus, there would be greater technical risk associated with 
further, less well-tried technologies that they could consider now. 
As regards risk related to business/market uncertainty, most of the 
interviewees maintained that this is generally a significant factor, more so 
than technical risk. The most common concern was that there seems to be 
a degree of uncertainty about the future, arising from adverse market 
trends and/or the possibility of mergers, acquisitions and disposals of 
breweries. As was noted above in Section 4.4.3, this is seen as a factor that 
would tend to lead to more short-term thinking and short payback criteria. 
Thus, it could help to explain why payback criteria have been tightening in 
some breweries in recent times, creating a significant barrier to 
implementing more energy efficiency measures. However, it is worth 
noting too that, to some extent, tight payback criteria could also be a 
means of simply allowing for some risk (for technical or other reasons) that 
projects will not be as successful as expected. 
4.4.5 IMPERFECT INFORMATION 
Barriers to improvements in energy efficiency could be created by 
imperfect information on three principal areas, namely, inadequate 
information on the company’s own energy consumption patterns, poor 
information on the energy consumption of equipment being purchased, or 
imperfect information on available opportunities to improve energy 
efficiency. 
The situation of the breweries regarding information on their own 
energy consumption was described above in Section 4.3.4, and the 
situation regarding information when purchasing equipment was described 
in Section 4.3.9. To recap, most of the interviewees were broadly satisfied 
with the quality of their energy information systems and they would not 
see this area as a particularly important source of barriers to energy 
efficiency. As regards information issues when purchasing equipment, the 
interviewees indicated that this area also is not a very important source of 
barriers to energy efficiency. 
As regards information on available opportunities to improve energy 
efficiency, imperfect information in this respect emerged as only a 
relatively minor barrier to energy efficiency for nearly all of the breweries. 
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The pre-interview questionnaire asked how important is “lack of 
information/poor quality information on energy efficiency opportunities” 
as a barrier to energy efficiency improvement. Four of the five responses 
said that this is “rarely important” or only “sometimes important”, 
although the fifth one said that this is “often important”. In the more in-
depth interviews, it was clear that nearly all of the respondents saw little or 
no real problem with information on energy efficiency opportunities. They 
did not regard lack of information on such opportunities as a barrier of 
primary importance, and they said that constraints on actually using 
existing information were much more of a problem. However, one of the 
respondents was noticeably less satisfied about the availability of 
information on energy efficiency opportunities. 
The interviewees find a range of different sources useful for 
information on energy efficiency opportunities. Among the most useful 
sources that they cited (in approximately the following order) are: 
colleagues within the company, the Irish Energy Centre (now Sustainable 
Energy Ireland), contacts in other companies, technical conferences and 
seminars, trade/technical journals and energy manager groups. The least 
used sources of information are equipment suppliers and trade 
associations, while energy supply industries are found to be useful by some 
but are not used at all by others. 
4.4.6 SPLIT INCENTIVES 
The main examples of split incentive situations that might arise concerning 
energy efficiency in companies include: situations where buildings or 
equipment are leased rather than owned, excessively short-term incentives 
facing key individuals (e.g. because of frequent job rotation), or lack of 
appropriate accountability for energy consumption or waste of energy. 
If buildings are leased, both the landlord and the tenant might face 
insufficient incentive to invest in making the buildings more energy 
efficient. Similarly, if equipment is leased, both parties might face 
insufficient incentive to retrofit energy saving measures. In the brewery 
case studies, however, situations of this type scarcely arose to any 
significant extent. 
Another problem that might arise would occur if key individuals, such 
as the managers responsible for energy consumption, were effectively 
judged only on short-term performance, because of frequent job rotation. 
However, this type of situation was not an evident feature of the brewery 
case studies. The interviewees who had the main responsibility for energy 
management had generally been in their posts for ten years or more. Thus, 
the managers’ own employment situation would not induce an excessively 
short-term perspective. 
The other main example of inadequate incentives could arise if there is 
a lack of appropriate accountability for energy consumption, so that 
individual departments or sub-divisions in a company have little incentive 
to reduce energy consumption. The situation in this regard in the case 
study breweries was outlined in Section 4.3.5 above.  To recap, the five 
case study breweries have little or nothing in the way of arrangements for 
charging energy costs to individual subdivisions within the brewery. Nor 
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do they use devolved energy budgets for individual subdivisions, or 
financial incentives for subdivisions or staff to use energy more efficiently. 
It is worth noting, however, that this does not mean that they have simply 
no incentive to be careful in their use of energy.  The breweries do 
monitor energy consumption regularly, they identify unusual trends 
occurring in aspects of energy consumption, and these are investigated as 
they arise. 
Most, but not all, of the interviewees felt that a more formal system of 
devolved accountability would result in improvements in energy efficiency, 
but probably not very large improvements. Thus, while it seems that 
defects in the devolution of accountability and incentives do present 
something of a barrier to improving energy efficiency, this is probably not 
a very important barrier.  
4.4.7 ADVERSE SELECTION 
Adverse selection occurs when purchasers cannot readily obtain reliable 
information on some important aspects of a good. Consequently, they tend 
to select goods based on visible aspects such as the price, although in other 
respects this may be the wrong choice for them. For our purposes, the 
relevant questions under this heading are: do breweries commonly have 
difficulties in obtaining reliable information about the energy efficiency 
performance of equipment they wish to purchase? And do they 
consequently tend to purchase equipment that uses energy inefficiently and 
will therefore cost them more in the long run? 
It was already noted above that the brewing companies generally are 
able to take reasonable account of energy efficiency considerations when 
purchasing equipment. Thus, adverse selection does not appear to be an 
important source of barriers to energy efficiency. 
4.4.8 PRINCIPAL-AGENT 
Principal-agent relationships occur when the interests of one party (the 
principal) depend on the actions of another (the agent). For example, top-
level management depends on lower level management and staff to act in 
the interests of the goals of the firm. The principals (top level 
management) generally cannot be as well informed as their agents (in lower 
level management) about the merits of particular investment projects 
proposed by the agents. Since the principals may have some doubts about 
investment proposals put forward by their agents, they may tend to impose 
rather strict investment criteria in an effort to play it safe in ensuring that 
all investment projects that go ahead really will be profitable. This type of 
principal-agent relationship could present barriers to energy efficiency, 
since it may cause companies to effectively rule out some investments in 
energy efficiency that actually would be in their own interests. 
In the brewing companies studied, the criteria imposed on investments 
in energy efficiency, as on investments in general, are indeed quite strict. 
But this in itself is not necessarily evidence of a principal-agent problem. 
Before one could conclude that there is a problem of this type, the 
question to be answered is precisely why are the investment criteria so 
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tight. As was discussed above, the prevailing view among our interviewees 
was that the strict payback criteria are primarily a reflection of the amount 
of competition for capital, within the company as a whole, from a wide 
range of potential investment projects. 
It was also commonly felt that the tight payback criteria and reluctance 
to borrow more to finance more investment at least partly reflect the 
existence of a degree of business/market uncertainty, arising from adverse 
market trends and/or the possibility of mergers, acquisitions and disposals 
of breweries. 
In addition, a couple of the breweries suggested that another, 
apparently less important, reason for the tight payback criteria is because 
this is a means of allowing for some possibility that projects will not be as 
successful as expected, for reasons of technical risk or other reasons. It is 
here that there could be some influence of the principal-agent relationship 
in causing the tight payback criteria, although there is little hard evidence 
that this is an important aspect of the situation. 
4.4.9 BOUNDED RATIONALITY 
Bounded rationality occurs when people have to make decisions subject to 
significant constraints on their attention and time as well as their ability to 
use information. Rather than expending much time and effort in searching 
for the very best decision, they tend to aim for decisions that are 
reasonably satisfactory, given the limitations on their time and their ability 
to use information. The relevance of this for energy efficiency in 
companies is that managers may be highly constrained in terms of time or 
their technical ability to use information. They may habitually give 
relatively little attention to secondary matters, such as energy efficiency, 
when they are making decisions about matters such as production or 
purchasing that have some implications for energy consumption. 
There is some evidence relating to this issue from our brewery case 
studies. As regards technical ability to use information relating to energy 
efficiency, this aspect does not appear to present much of a problem. Our 
pre-interview questionnaire asked how important is “lack of technical skills 
to analyse/operate” as a barrier to energy efficiency, and the responses 
were almost unanimous in saying that this is rarely important. In addition, 
as was outlined above in Section 4.4.5, nearly all of the interviewees felt 
that there is no very important barrier to energy efficiency arising from 
difficulties in accessing appropriate information, although this can 
occasionally be a problem. 
All of the interviewees did indicate that constraints on management 
time can be important, and this can often have the effect of delaying 
improvements in energy efficiency, as was outlined in Section 4.4.2. At the 
same time, however, three of the five breweries also said that this was 
seldom important enough to actually prevent the implementation of 
possible energy efficiency measures. But two of the five suggested that 
constraints on management time would represent particularly important 
obstacles to energy efficiency, in their experience. This issue appears to be 
most important for the smallest breweries. 
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Finally, the pre-interview questionnaire asked whether important 
barriers to energy efficiency often arise as a result of energy objectives not 
being “integrated into operating, maintenance or purchasing procedures”. 
The responses to this were about equally divided between saying that this 
is sometimes important or rarely important, which suggests that this can be 
something of a barrier but not a major one. If energy objectives are not 
always integrated into the procedures mentioned, this could create 
situations where energy efficiency is neglected in favour of more central 
concerns, because of constraints on management time. 
4.4.10 THE FORM OF INFORMATION 
Information may be available to companies on opportunities to improve 
their energy efficiency, but if the information is unclear, unduly complex or 
inaccessible to the target group, this will present a barrier to its use in 
improving energy efficiency. 
As regards the brewery case studies, however, this type of problem 
does not appear to arise to any very significant extent. As was discussed in 
various places above but particularly in Section 4.4.5, deficiencies in the 
availability of information on opportunities to improve energy efficiency 
emerged as only a relatively minor barrier to energy efficiency for nearly all 
of the breweries. Furthermore, as was mentioned in Section 4.4.9 above, 
the interviewees generally have little or no problem in terms of their 
technical ability to use the available information relating to energy 
efficiency. 
4.4.11 CREDIBILITY AND TRUST 
Obstacles to improvements in energy efficiency could arise if the potential 
users of information on energy efficiency do not adequately trust the 
sources of such information. 
Such a problem did not arise to any significant extent in our brewery 
case studies, and this does not seem to be a real barrier to energy 
efficiency. As was noted above in Section 4.4.5, the interviewees had 
reasonably favourable views on quite a wide range of different sources of 
information on energy efficiency opportunities. The most useful sources, 
in approximately the following order, were: colleagues within the company, 
the Irish Energy Centre, contacts in other companies, technical 
conferences and seminars, trade/technical journals and energy manager 
groups. With one exception, the breweries were making little or no use of 
contract energy management or ESCOs (energy service companies), but 
there was little suggestion that this was because of a lack of trust. 
4.4.12 INERTIA 
The idea of inertia as a possible barrier to energy efficiency is essentially 
that people may tend to resist making changes because they are committed 
to what they are already doing. Such tendencies can be reinforced by past 
experiences of failed or disappointing attempts to make positive changes. 
On the other hand, past experiences of successful changes can have the 
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opposite effect of creating a continuing momentum leading towards 
further positive changes. 
There is no evidence of inertia in this sense being a significant barrier 
to energy efficiency in the breweries. They have implemented a 
considerable number of energy efficiency measures, and they said that 
generally favourable experiences with measures previously undertaken tend 
to encourage consideration of further measures. 
4.4.13 VALUES AND ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE 
Environmental values or environmental concern, either at the level of the 
company as a whole or at the level of key individuals, could in principle 
have important influences in motivating improvements in energy 
efficiency. 
In the case study breweries, the general situation is that there is an 
awareness and concern about energy efficiency issues, motivated most 
obviously because of their significance for costs. There is also a concern 
about environmental/energy performance that is motivated by a number 
of external and internal pressures, as was outlined in Section 4.3.10. For 
example, the breweries are conscious of a need for good public relations 
and a good corporate image, which means that they need to be concerned 
with their environmental performance. In addition, a couple of the 
interviewees felt that there is also a somewhat deeper commitment to 
environmental values by their top management, going beyond the 
motivations mentioned above. 
At the same time, most of the interviewees said that there is an ongoing 
need for individuals within the breweries to champion and push for 
particular energy saving or environmental projects. It is generally necessary 
for the managers with responsibility for these areas to put forward a case 
justifying expenditures on such projects. Most of these managers described 
themselves as being personally motivated to some degree by environmental 
values. 
Overall, values and organisational culture could hardly be seen as 
barriers to energy efficiency. They are more like favourable influences. 
This is true even if the predominant motivations for being concerned 
about energy efficiency or the environment are standard commercial 
motivations and concern for the corporate image, more than 
environmental concern per se. 
4.4.14 STATUS OF ENERGY MANAGEMENT 
If energy management has only a low status within a company, this could 
present a significant barrier to improving energy efficiency since the issue 
might not be taken sufficiently seriously. 
In the case study breweries, there was general agreement that energy 
management is accorded a reasonable level of status, with some even 
saying that it is treated as “important” or “high status”. There is real 
recognition in brewing companies that energy is an appreciable cost for 
them, and this fact alone would ensure that energy management is given 
significant attention. Some interviewees felt that the status of energy 
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management is simply proportionate to its role in the cost structure and 
that it has little further significance in the eyes of top management. 
However, some of the interviewees felt that energy management is 
accorded a somewhat higher status and importance in their companies. 
This is mainly because, as an aspect of environmental performance in 
general, it can have implications for the corporate image and public 
relations. 
To conclude, it could not be said that energy management is accorded 
such a low status that this amounts to a real barrier to energy efficiency. 
 
 Table 4.1 lists all of the possible barriers to energy efficiency that were 
considered in part 4.4, and it attempts to summarise very briefly their 
actual importance as barriers to improving energy efficiency in the Irish 
brewing industry. As far as possible, the importance of each potential 
barrier is rated in one of four categories, from “not a barrier” through 
“low” and “medium” to “high”. Given that some of the potential barriers 
are rated as “not a barrier”, the term “low” here means that something is a 
barrier, but that its importance is low compared to those described as 
being of medium or high importance. 
To clarify matters, it may be worth pointing out that the potential 
barriers to energy efficiency listed in Table 4.1 are not all entirely separate 
and independent from each other, since there are certain overlaps between 
some of them. Specifically, “access to capital” is listed as one potential 
barrier. In practice, the constraint on access to capital for investment in 
energy efficiency in the brewing companies occurs in the form of quite 
stringent payback criteria. At the same time, the potential barriers called 
“risk” and “principal-agent” would typically have their effects by causing 
payback criteria to be tightened, so that these barriers would be part of the 
reason for the “access to capital” barrier. Another example of 
interdependence between the potential barriers is the fact that “imperfect 
information” is listed as one potential barrier, while at the same time 
various types of imperfect information could be at least part of the cause 
of other potential barriers such as “adverse selection” or “bounded 
rationality”. A third example is the fact that demands on management time 
is listed as part of the “hidden costs” barrier. At the same time, demands 
on management time would be part of the cause of the “bounded 
rationality” barrier. 
Table 4.1: The Importance in Practice of the Potential Barriers to Energy Efficiency 
Potential Barrier to Energy Efficiency Importance as a Barrier to Energy Efficiency 
Heterogeneity Low.  Occurs infrequently 
  
Hidden costs:- 
Demands on management time 
 
Other hidden costs  
 
Low to medium for larger firms; can cause delays. Possibly 
high for smaller firms 
Low 
Access to capital High. The single most important barrier 
  
Risk:- 
Business/market risk 
Technical risk 
 
Medium.  Contributes to access to capital barrier 
Low in most cases. Medium for new technologies. Contributes 
to access to capital barrier 
Imperfect information Low for nearly all firms 
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Split incentives Low, for devolved accountability. Not a barrier in other 
respects. 
Adverse selection Low 
Principal-agent Probably low to medium. Contributes to access to capital 
barrier. 
Bounded rationality Probably low to medium 
Form of information Not a barrier 
Credibility and trust Not a barrier 
Inertia Not a barrier 
Values and organisational culture Not a barrier 
Status of energy management Not a barrier 
As Table 4.1 indicates, five of the fourteen possible barriers, are rated 
as “not a barrier”, meaning that they have virtually no importance in the 
Irish brewing industry. These five potential barriers are the ones at the end 
of the table. 
At the other extreme, one of the potential barriers, namely access to 
capital, is rated as being of “high” importance in the Irish brewing 
industry. Related to this, the risk and principal-agent barriers, rated as low 
or medium, contribute to the access to capital barrier, as mentioned above. 
Demands on management time and bounded rationality are related to 
each other, as mentioned above, and these are rated as being of low to 
medium importance, or possibly high for smaller firms. 
The remaining potential barriers are all considered to be of generally 
low importance – namely imperfect information and adverse selection 
(which are related to each other), as well as heterogeneity, other hidden 
costs, and split incentives (specifically lack of devolved accountability). 
We now need to consider possible policy responses that could aim to 
overcome the barriers to greater energy efficiency. In doing this, it is worth 
bearing in mind that the energy efficiency performance of the Irish 
brewing industry looks relatively good, at least by comparison with 
benchmarks from the UK, while its energy intensity in relation to output 
has also been declining for some time past. Given that brewing is a 
relatively energy-intensive industry, companies in the sector do tend to give 
quite serious attention to energy management, and they are not easily 
deterred by minor barriers from making improvements in energy 
efficiency.  It should also be borne in mind that there are already in place a 
number of policy measures to promote energy conservation in Irish 
industry. Thus, in examining possible policy responses here, we focus 
particularly on measures that would aim to overcome those remaining 
barriers to energy efficiency that are found to be most important in our 
study. 
We review the policy issues at three different levels, (i) internal 
company policies, for individual firms in the brewing industry, (ii) 
government policy relating specifically to the brewing sector, and (iii) 
government policy for energy efficiency in general, applicable to many 
sectors. 
4.5.1 COMPANY POLICY 
The findings of our study suggest that there are three main issues for 
brewing companies to consider with regard to overcoming barriers to 
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improving energy efficiency in their own firms. These three issues relate to 
the payback criteria employed, demands on management time, and 
devolved accountability for energy consumption. 
Companies need to consider whether the payback criteria that they 
apply to investments in energy efficiency are too tight. Would it not be in 
their interests to take a longer-term view or to be less averse to risk, and to 
apply somewhat less stringent criteria, even if this means borrowing more 
to finance more investment? The use of more relaxed criteria could still be 
consistent with positive financial returns for the company, so from the 
company’s point of view the question is whether it may be forgoing 
possible significant benefits by applying criteria that are too strict. 
Companies could also consider whether they are giving sufficient 
management time to energy efficiency issues. Would it be in their interests 
to allocate more management time to this area if that would result in 
worthwhile savings from greater energy efficiency?  As part of this, they 
could consider whether adequate time and attention is consistently given to 
energy efficiency matters in the course of procedures such as operating, 
maintenance or purchasing procedures. 
Finally, companies could review the situation relating to incentives and 
devolution of accountability for energy consumption within the firm. 
Would it be in their interests to have more formal systems of devolved 
accountability, so as to improve the incentive for subdivisions or staff to 
minimise energy use? 
4.5.2 SECTOR-SPECIFIC GOVERNMENT POLICY 
The issues that arise for government policy from our study of the Irish 
brewing industry are for the most part not unique or specific to that 
industry. The most important barriers to energy efficiency in the industry 
are barriers that could occur in many different sectors rather than being 
peculiar to the brewing sector. These most important barriers to energy 
efficiency in brewing are those related to access to capital and strict 
payback criteria, as well as limitations on management time. Other types of 
potential barriers that could be more sector-specific – such as those related 
to imperfect information, credibility and trust, or values and organisational 
culture – are generally of more limited or no importance in the brewing 
industry. 
In principle, there are a number of different policy approaches that 
government could adopt to address the sort of barriers to energy efficiency 
that are found to be most important in the brewing industry. One such 
approach could involve regulation or licensing. That type of approach is 
being introduced in Ireland for certain industries including brewing, and it 
includes elements that are specific to individual industries. But it is worth 
bearing in mind that there are also other policy approaches that need not 
be industry-specific, and we refer to these policy approaches in Section 
4.5.3 below. 
First, however, as regards regulation or licensing measures, breweries in 
Ireland are among the industries that have been required for some time to 
have IPC (integrated pollution control) licenses from the Environmental 
Protection Agency. The IPC licensing system requires the licensed activity 
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to use the best available technology not entailing excessive costs 
(BATNEEC) to prevent or eliminate or reduce emissions from the activity 
at source through the use of cleaner technology. The IPC system of 
licensing is now being updated to meet the requirements of the EU 
Directive concerning Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC). 
This new system specifically requires that the regulated activities should 
use energy efficiently. This approach, therefore, has the potential to push for 
significant improvements in energy efficiency in brewing and the other 
targeted industries, although the outcome will depend on the specific 
licensing conditions that are introduced for individual industries and how 
these compare with previously existing practice. 
4.5.3 GENERAL GOVERNMENT POLICY 
The most important barriers to energy efficiency that are found in the Irish 
brewing industry are those related to access to capital and strict payback 
criteria, as well as limitations on management time. These types of barriers 
could occur in many different sectors rather than just the brewing industry 
alone, although their relative importance could vary across sectors. 
As regards the barriers presented by strict payback criteria and the 
associated constraints on access to capital for investment in energy 
efficiency, in principle there are a number of different policy approaches 
available to government in attempting to overcome such barriers.  One 
approach would be to influence the payback calculations so as to favour 
greater energy efficiency, by means of increasing the benefits to be gained 
from investment in energy efficiency. This could be achieved by higher 
taxes on energy inputs, thereby raising their cost, so that the benefits of 
reducing energy use would be increased. As part of this approach, 
companies could be compensated for higher energy taxes by reducing 
other taxes such as taxes on labour or profits, if it is desired not to increase 
their overall tax burden while still enhancing their incentive to invest in 
improving energy efficiency. 
Another approach would be again to influence the payback calculations 
so as to favour greater energy efficiency, but to do so by means of 
reducing the cost of investing in energy efficiency.  This could be achieved 
by greater financial assistance, such as grants, subsidies or low-cost loans, 
for investments in improving energy efficiency. This would enable a 
greater number of potential energy efficiency projects to pass the test of 
the payback criteria. 
A third approach would be to impose regulations, such as specifying 
the energy efficiency standards that must be achieved or the energy 
efficient measures that must be employed. A fourth approach could 
involve some combination of elements from the approaches mentioned 
above. 
Recent and emerging policy developments in Ireland amount to a 
choice of a combination of various approaches. For some time past, 
Ireland has had grants and free or subsidised services that would reduce 
the cost of undertaking energy efficiency measures. More recently, the 
introduction of carbon taxes and emissions trading has been announced. In 
addition, as mentioned above, the Integrated Pollution Control licensing 
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system, which governs environmental performance for targeted companies 
including breweries, is being updated so as to include an element focusing 
specifically on energy efficiency performance. 
These types of policies should have the potential to promote significant 
improvements in energy efficiency, depending on how precisely they are 
implemented. It seems likely that a combination of policies amounting to a 
“carrot and stick” approach should be a more effective means of 
overcoming tight payback criteria than a tax-based approach alone, as well 
as being more readily acceptable. 
As regards the barriers presented by limitations on management time, 
the various policy approaches mentioned above can again be appropriate. 
The type of policy measures that give companies cause to invest more in 
energy efficiency should, at the same time, give them cause to allocate 
more management time to energy efficiency matters. In addition, there are 
other measures that can ease demands on management time in improving 
energy efficiency, such as advisory site visits and energy audits, which 
already have some place in Irish energy conservation policy. 
Finally, there are some other barriers to energy efficiency that were 
identified above as being of generally low importance in the Irish brewing 
industry. Of these, heterogeneity generally requires no particular policy 
response from government, since there would be no good reason to press 
companies to implement energy efficiency measures that are not 
appropriate to them. To a somewhat lesser extent, there would also be no 
particular policy response required from government to address “other” 
hidden costs (i.e. apart from demands on management time). In addition, 
to the extent that there is some barrier to energy efficiency arising from 
split incentives (specifically lack of devolved accountability), this is a matter 
that needs to be addressed primarily by companies themselves more than 
by government policy. The remaining barriers of low importance, namely 
imperfect information and adverse selection (which are related to each 
other), can be addressed within the framework of existing Irish energy 
conservation policy. 
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5. THE HIGHER 
EDUCATION SECTOR 
The higher education or third level sector comprises the universities, the 
technological colleges and the teacher training colleges, as well as some 
non state-aided private higher education colleges that are not covered in 
this study. There were 119,991 full-time students and a further 32,265 part-
time students enrolled in funded higher education institutions in 
2000/2001 and the breakdown of enrolment was as follows: 
Table 5.1:  Number of Students Enrolled in Higher Education 
Courses in Institutions Aided by the Department of 
Education and Science in 2000/2001 
Institutions Full-time Part-time 
Universities 69,254 11,313 
Technological Colleges 48,360 17,700 
Other including Teacher Training 2,377 3,251 
TOTAL 119,991 32,265 
Source: Department of Education and Science (2002), 2000/2001 Statistical Report. 
 
There are four universities in Ireland, the National University of 
Ireland, the University of Dublin, the University of Limerick and Dublin 
City University. Each university is a self-governing body and each receives 
annual grants from the Higher Education Authority (HEA) to finance 
operational and capital expenditure. The National University of Ireland, 
the largest in the state, is a federal university but its constituent colleges 
have a wide degree of autonomy.  
The Technological Colleges comprise principally the Dublin Institute 
of Technology and a network of eleven institutes of technology 
throughout the country. The institutes of technology  offer a wide range of 
courses, principally in Science, Technology and Engineering, leading to 
Certificates, Diplomas and, in some instances, Degree qualifications 
awarded by the National Council for Educational Awards (NCEA).  
The higher education sector is concentrated to a considerable degree in 
a few large institutions, which, with the exception of the Dublin Institute 
of Technology (DIT), are all in the universities sector. The largest single 
higher education institution in the State is University College Dublin (see 
Table 5.2), which has a total of 14,974 full-time and 2,936 part-time 
enrolments. The five largest higher education institutions in the state, 
shown in Table 5.2, account for approximately 48 per cent of full-time 
enrolments and 44 per cent of part-time student enrolments.     
5.1 
Characterising 
the Sector  
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Table 5.2:  Number of Students Enrolled in Higher Education 
Courses in the Five Largest Institutions in 2000/2001 
Institutions Full-time  Part-time  
University College, Dublin (UCD) 14,974 2,936 
Dublin Institute of Technology (DIT) 9,793 5,747 
University College, Cork (UCC) 11,694 1,200 
Trinity College, Dublin (TCD) 11,039 2,758 
University of Limerick (UL) 9,852 1,457 
Source: Department of Education and Science (2002), 2000/2001 Statistical Report. 
5.1.1 FUNDING AND GROWTH 
Funding for higher education institutions is received either through the 
HEA (Higher Education Authority) or directly from the Department of 
Education. The HEA, set up in 1968 and given statutory powers under the 
Higher Education Authority Act, 1971, has advisory powers over the 
whole of the higher education sector but its funding role relates mainly to 
universities. Each year, the Department of Education gives block grants to 
the HEA to fund recurrent and capital spending by bodies aligned with the 
HEA. Recurrent funding for each institution is largely determined by the 
number of students in each organisation and by unit costs, which have to 
be submitted to the HEA each year by the universities. The HEA does not 
have any substantial input into the way in which funds are allocated within 
a particular university. It is therefore left to each individual institution to 
decide if it wants to invest in energy efficiency and put the savings from its 
energy bill to other uses. Any energy savings in a given year should not 
translate into reduced funding in the next year as long as the money saved 
is spent in the same college year.  
Growth in the higher education sector was hampered by constraints on 
funds during the late 1970s and early 1980s, when Ireland’s public finances 
were under pressure. With rapidly improving public finances in the 1990s 
and a growing demand for higher education, there has been both a 
substantial rise in funding and a rise in expenditure by higher education 
institutions.  
Where universities are concerned, the important point to note is that 
while income has kept pace with recurrent expenditure, they have come 
under increasing pressure to generate income themselves. An increasing 
share of income is raised from fees, and also increasingly from “other 
income”.  
Of late large capital programmes have come on stream, coming under 
specific areas such as the Undergraduate Expansion Programme but at the 
time of this analysis these may not have been accessible for energy 
efficiency investment. In its reports for 1996, for example, the HEA (1999) 
pointed to the erosion of the discretionary element of their Capital 
Building Grant. This grant, it says, would be used for “refurbishment and 
adaptation of existing buildings to optimise utilisation, improvement to 
infrastructural services (e.g. replacement of boilers, electrical and other 
power systems)… such works can, and have, provided a very good return 
for a modest investment”. 
We turn now to describe the funding of those institutions, consisting 
mainly of the institutes of technology, that receive their aid directly from 
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the Department of Education. Each year, the Institutes submit estimates 
based on the previous year’s outturn, rather than on “unit costs” as we saw 
to be the case for universities, along with their projects. The Institutes do 
not receive money for discretionary investment (at the time of the 
interviews), but if by some chance they saved money on foot of installing 
energy efficiency items, they would re-spend any money saved. Given the 
inadequacy of many of their buildings, capital grants are directed primarily 
at satisfying essentials such as space requirements. Given the urgency of 
these requirements, proposals that reduce energy consumption need to 
have quite short paybacks, of say three to five years, in order to be funded.  
Growth in the higher education sector over the decade has been 
strong. The number of full-time students in aided institutions has risen 
over the decade from 64,137 in 1989/90 to 115,696 in 1999/2000 
(Department of Education and Science, 2001). Total employment in the 
month of December in higher education institutions rose from 19,000 to 
30,700 over the same period (CSO, 1996, 2001).  
There are several reasons for the growth in total student numbers. 
Demographic change has been one of the principal reasons, with an 
estimated increase of over 31,000 people in the 15 to 24 age cohort during 
the years 1991-1996. Increasing returns to higher education may also have 
contributed to increased participation in higher education. Returns to 
holding a third level degree are estimated to have risen in the period 
between 1987 and 1994 (Barrett, Fitz Gerald and Nolan, 2002). In addition 
to demographic and educational returns another reason for increased 
student numbers was the depressed state of the economy and shortage of 
job opportunities in the first half of the 1990s, causing school-leavers to 
prolong their education.  
Although participation rates are predicted to rise slightly over the 
coming decade or so, the driving force behind changes in total student 
numbers over that period is likely to be demographic change. The total 
population in the 15-24 age cohort, from which the bulk of the student 
population is drawn and which has been rising steadily since the early 
nineties, is predicted to have peaked at approximately 660,000 in 2000 and 
to fall to approximately 552,000 by the year 2010 (Duffy et al., 2001). On 
the basis of these projections, assuming little upward movement in 
participation rates, pressure from student numbers is expected to slacken.   
 
5.1.2 ENERGY EFFICIENCY POLICY 
The principal government intervention in the area of energy efficiency has 
been through the Operational Programme for Economic Infrastructure 1994-1999. 
Included in the energy element of the programme was a sub-programme 
on energy efficiency (EI1.2), which mandated the expenditure of £34 
million over the life of the programme.   
The co-ordination and implementation of the programme was the 
responsibility of the Irish Energy Centre (IEC, now replaced by 
Sustainable Energy Ireland) established in 1994. The IEC was a joint 
initiative of the Department of Public Enterprise and Forbairt, a national 
agency with responsibility for the development of indigenous industry. The 
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principal schemes set up as a result of the Operational Programme that are 
of relevance are as follows (Greer, 1998): 
• Energy Audit Grant Scheme (EAGS), 
• Energy Efficiency Investment Support Scheme (EEISS), 
• Steam System Boiler Evaluation Scheme (SSBES), and  
• Best Practice Programme (ALERT). 
A brief description is given of each in turn. The EAGS provided 
assistance to organisations that enlisted consultants to carry out energy 
audits. The scheme, which was also open to all higher education 
institutions, had a budget of £1.6 million that was fully allocated. The 
importance of the EAGS scheme was twofold. First, it allowed 
organisations to identify potential energy cost savings, and second, it 
encouraged organisations to think strategically about energy management 
issues.   
Under the EEISS, grant aid was available to organisations which 
undertook to invest in energy saving technologies, having already 
undertaken an energy audit, like the EAGS, or a feasibility study that was 
deemed satisfactory to the Irish Energy Centre. The maximum grant 
available for any particular scheme was 40 per cent of the total cost of the 
project and was not to exceed £100,000 per site. In addition to the grant 
aid available under the EEISS, the programme also had a Priority 
Technology Calls scheme, whereby interested parties could be advised on 
energy efficient technologies such as building energy management systems, 
CHP, good practice in boiler houses and the like. 
The SSBES scheme aimed to increase awareness of potential energy 
savings through training schemes, awareness programmes and national 
boiler awards.  
The best practice (ALERT) scheme promoted energy efficient 
technologies and practices. Information on best practice technologies was 
transmitted through seminars, workshops, site visits and the publication of 
best practice guidelines. The ALERT scheme had targeted two of the 
technologies that are of interest here, namely, Building Energy 
Management Systems and Boiler Systems.  
A number of universities have undertaken energy audits under the 
EAGS scheme. Some of the largest universities were considering 
investment, with the help of EEISS, in CHP systems.  
In addition to these national schemes, the Irish Energy Centre funded a 
report entitled “Survey of Energy Usage in Colleges”. The report, which 
was undertaken by Overy and Associates, analysed energy consumption, 
emissions and expenditure per student and per square foot. The survey 
results were confidential and provided information to each organisation as 
to their energy performance, which they can compare against sector 
benchmarks.  
As for so-called voluntary environmental initiatives, any such initiatives 
that have taken place in the sector so far have been done on an ad hoc basis 
by concerned individuals or groups within the sector. There is little 
evidence of college authorities systematically taking initiatives and putting 
energy saving measures in place. Some concerned individuals in the higher 
education sector aim to promote green campus schemes. These, however, 
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seem to revolve around the (larger) universities rather than the (smaller) 
institutes of technology.  
5.1.3 ENERGY USE 
Energy expenditure forms a small part of the budget for higher education 
institutions, typically less than 3 per cent for the universities. The total 
energy expenditure, based on the IEC survey of 9 universities and 12 
institutes of technology (with approximately 56,800 and 39,800 full-time 
student equivalents23 respectively), was £7.6 Million. On a straight 
averaging basis this works out at just over a third of a million pounds per 
institution. Table 5.3 breaks this figure down into expenditure on 
electricity, gas, oil, turf and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) by universities 
and institutes of technology.  
Expenditure on electricity, at £5.3 million per year, comprises the 
single largest component of the total energy bill. Gas ranks second, while 
oil, turf and LPG all constitute very small parts of total energy expenditure. 
The contrast between the universities and the institutes of technology is 
marked. Expenditure on gas is proportionately higher in the universities 
than in the institutes of technology, while for turf, oil and LPG the reverse 
is true. This is partly due to the fact that many of the institutes of 
technology are not on the gas grid.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.3: Total Energy Bill, £ million 
 Universities Institutes of 
Technology 
Total 
Electricity 3.7 1.6 5.3 
Gas 1.25 0.35 1.6 
Oil 0.3 0.25 0.55 
Turf 0.0 0.10 0.10 
LPG 0.03 0.03 0.06 
TOTAL 5.25 2.35 7.6 
Average per institution 0.58 0.20 0.36 
Source: IEC (1998). 
 
Gas is used mainly for space heat, water heating and cooking. Oil is 
used for space heat and motive power. LPG is used mainly for cooking 
and space heat. Electricity, in general, is used for lighting, cooking and 
other electricity specific uses such as  computers. 
Table 5.4: Total Energy Bill, £/Square Metre 
 Universities Institutes of 
Technology 
       Total    
 £ £ £ 
 
23 One part-time student = 0.4 full-time students. 
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Electricity 4.84 4.69 4.80 
Gas 1.64 1.03 1.45 
Oil 0.39 0.73 0.50 
Turf 0.00 0.28 0.09 
LPG 0.04 0.08 0.05 
TOTAL 6.87 6.89 6.88 
Source: IEC (1998). 
 
To compare the energy costs of the universities and the institutes of 
technology it is necessary to factor in a measure of the total size of the 
establishments in question. The measure to hand is total floor space, which 
for the universities surveyed was 764,255 square metres, while for the 
institutes of technology it was 340,852 square metres. When the total 
energy expenditure per square metre is calculated as in Table 5.4, a 
comparison of the expenditures on energy by universities and the institutes 
of technology yields remarkably few differences. The only major 
differences in energy expenditures per square metre are that universities 
tend to be more gas intensive and slightly less oil and turf intensive.   
Differences in energy expenditure can be due either to differences in 
energy consumption and/or to differences in the unit cost of energy. 
Energy consumption in actual volume terms per square metre in 1996/7 
was higher in the universities, at 253 kWh per square metre, than in the 
institutes of technology that used 228 kWh per square metre, as seen from 
Table 5.5. This was primarily due to differences in electricity consumption. 
Fuel consumption (gas, oil, turf and LPG) is marginally higher in the 
institutes of technology. Total energy cost works out at 2.7p per kWh for 
the universities and 3.0p per kWh for the institutes of technology, 
universities being better placed to avail of the cheaper fuel, gas. 
Table 5.5: Energy Consumption, kWh per Square Metre  
 Universities Institutes of 
Technology 
Electricity 99 71 
Fuel 154 157 
TOTAL 253 228 
Source: IEC (1998). 
5.1.4 OPPORTUNITIES FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY 
The higher education sector is one where potential for quite substantial 
energy savings is thought to exist. Energy expenditure forms a small part 
of the expenditure of a higher education institution and as a result until 
recently relatively little attention seems to have been paid to energy 
management by higher education institutions. Given the absence of a 
profit motive, cost minimisation has to take its place but management 
could generally have other priorities and little personal financial incentive 
to adopt efficient technologies. The end result may be sub-optimal 
expenditure on energy efficient technologies.  
The energy using technologies employed in the higher education sector 
are typically generic in type. In identifying relevant technologies we have 
relied primarily on a study by the then Irish Energy Centre on the energy 
savings potential in the higher education sector, and the list below of 
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energy saving technologies below draws on this study. The technologies of 
interest are: 
• Building Energy Management Systems (BEMS). A BEMS is a 
computer-controlled system designed to ensure efficient energy usage. 
It achieves this by controlling heating, lighting, ventilation systems, air 
conditioning systems and so forth. It may also be referred to as an 
Energy Management System (EMS), Building Management System 
(BMS) or Direct Digital Control System (DDCS). The BEMS may, 
among other things, monitor and adjust temperature in a building, 
ensure different heating levels for different sections within a building, 
and switch heating systems on and off automatically at optimal times. 
The Irish Energy Centre (1996a) has estimated that Building 
Energy Management Systems installed in new buildings may result in 
savings of up to 20 per cent of total energy usage. In the case of 
existing buildings the potential energy savings depend on the type and 
age of the buildings and on how well energy is being managed at 
present. The IEC estimate that BEMS may be economically feasible in 
buildings with energy bills as low as £10,000.  
The payback period of a BEMS varies with the complexity of the 
system and the current level of efficiency of energy usage. The average 
payback period for BEMS is thought to be “quite short”. Given the 
average energy consumption of higher education institutions it is likely 
that BEMS would be economically justified in the majority of higher 
education institutions. 
• Combined Heat and Power (CHP). CHP or co-generation is a process 
of generating heat and electricity from the same source, usually gas. 
CHP recovers and uses surplus heat, which is a by-product of 
electricity generation thus increasing overall efficiency. Hennessy 
(1994) estimates that the installation of CHP may increase energy 
efficiency to approximately 80 per cent compared with 30-40 per cent 
efficiency offered by conventional power generation plants.  
The suitability of CHP depends on a number of factors including: 
whether the site has a base heat load, especially in the summer 
months, large enough to absorb heat output; whether the electrical 
load is sufficient to absorb CHP electrical power; does the site have 
access to natural gas? In the case of the higher education sector the 
larger institutions’ demands for electricity and heat could be sufficient 
to justify CHP.  
However, one factor that mitigates against the introduction of 
CHP is the seasonal demand for electricity and heat output, given that 
the demand for electricity and heat by the average higher education 
institution would drop considerably during the summer months. Also, 
since CHP is most efficient when natural gas is used as the energy 
source and since the gas grid does not cover all of Ireland, a CHP 
system will not be economically justifiable for all institutions in the 
higher education sector.   
• Motive Power Applications. The Irish Energy Centre (1996b) has 
produced a Good Practice Guide on Motive Power Applications. The 
guide indicates that only 20 per cent of energy consumption in the 
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commercial sector, which would cover the higher education sector, 
goes on motive power applications. However according to the IEC a 
reduction of 10 per cent in energy consumed in motive power 
applications is possible through the implementation of sensible 
efficiency projects. Thus savings of the order of 2 per cent of the total 
energy bill of the higher education sector might be possible through 
good motive power practices.  
The IEC pointed out that the electric motor is only one link in the 
energy chain, the other links being efficient design, efficient 
purchasing, effective use of tariffs, efficient operation as well as 
efficient technologies. The IEC suggested prioritising the expenditure 
on improving links in the energy chain according to respective 
paybacks. 
In addition to BEMS, CHP and motive power applications, the 
following technologies have been identified by specialists in the energy 
management field as having large energy savings potential for the higher 
education sector, under the right conditions: 
• Low energy lights 
• Energy efficient appliances  
• Building related technologies, such as airlocks. 
As well as identifying energy efficient technologies, the IEC report on 
energy usage in higher education institutions identified a number of 
barriers to energy conservation, including: 
• Lack of resources especially financial, manpower and technical 
expertise; 
• Lack of energy management structure and/or management 
commitment; 
• Lack of awareness among students and staff; 
• The procurement policies for IT equipment.  
Some of these barriers will be covered in the case studies, to which we 
now turn. 
 
 A brief description is now given of the case studies in the higher 
education sector and the methodology employed. As with the other sectors 
covered by this project, interviews were conducted by economists from 
The Economic and Social Research Institute and, where possible, at least 
three face-to-face interviews were conducted for each case study. A few 
interviews were undertaken by telephone. The objective of the interviews 
was to elicit the opinions of the relevant persons (energy managers, 
building officers, finance officers, those responsible for purchasing, 
buildings technicians and so forth) on a wide range of topics relating to 
energy efficiency in general and their institution in particular. In addition, 
several interviews were conducted with experts on the sector. 
Prior to interview, each institution filled in a short “pre-interview 
questionnaire”. As an example, the pre-interview questionnaire composed 
for the mechanical engineering sector is given in Appendix 1. There 
followed a semi-structured interview based on an “interview protocol” 
composed for the higher education sector to ensure that information was 
5.2 
Case Studies 
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sought on all possible barriers. However, where interviewers thought it 
appropriate, they were free to deviate from the questions on the protocol 
in order to obtain a fuller picture of the situation. Appendix 2 gives the 
interview protocol directed at the energy manager in the brewing industry, 
as an example. 
The case studies were selected in such a way as to obtain a 
representative selection of organisations. It was decided that medical, 
veterinary and horticultural schools should be avoided as well as research 
institutions, as their energy use may differ markedly. Selection also aimed 
at obtaining a mixture of institutions that are and are not pro-active as 
regards energy efficiency. 
 
 
5.2.1 DESCRIPTION OF INSTITUTIONS SELECTED 
Interviews were completed with staff members of five institutions out of 
the seven initially contacted. As each university or institute of technology 
was assured anonymity in this study, they are not named in this report. For 
simplicity and in order to preserve confidentiality, the five case studies are 
referred to as institution A, B, C, D or E. 
For the same reasons, we do not present full descriptions of the size, 
location, and policies of each one in turn as this could reveal its identity. 
The organisations selected were diverse in terms of size (as measured by 
either student and/or staff numbers or total floor space). The total number 
of enrolled students in the selected case studies ranged from a couple of 
thousand students to over ten thousand students, including both full-time 
and part-time students. However, the mix of case studies was weighted 
somewhat towards the larger end of the spectrum, as a higher response 
rate was achieved with the larger institutions.  
The organisations selected were principally campus based, as is the 
norm in Ireland. A couple of the older institutions selected had a 
proportion of their buildings located off campus but, in all cases bar one, 
more than 50 per cent of the floor space was located in one particular site.  
For each of the case studies that could provide us with the required 
information, expenditure on electricity accounts for more than 50 per cent 
of the total energy expenditure and sometimes substantially more. Those 
institutions on the gas grid typically spend more on gas than on any other 
fuel, excluding electricity. Expenditure on oil, coal and turf typically 
accounts for between 2-15 per cent of energy expenditure. These patterns 
of energy use are consistent with figures derived in the larger study by the 
Irish Energy Centre, described above, and in this respect the selection here 
is reasonable. 
The principal mode of heat delivery varied between the institutions 
studied. Three of the institutions had at least considered or installed CHP. 
One institution was not on the gas grid yet and thus was not actively 
considering CHP, while another was considered too decentralised for CHP 
to be viable and funding was also cited as an issue. For those institutions 
where CHP did not constitute the principal mode of heat delivery, either 
centralised and/or decentralised boilers were in operation depending 
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principally on the layout of the institution’s premises, that is, on whether it 
was a campus or metropolitan in layout. One reckoned that the 
introduction of carbon taxes would make them look at CHP. 
Three of the institutions studied are funded under the Higher 
Education Authority (HEA), which in turn receives a block grant from the 
Department of Education. The other two institutions are funded directly 
by the Department of Education. As already described in Section 5.1.1, 
funding is typically based on student numbers, unit costs or previous 
outturns and on proposed capital projects, and discretionary funding is 
small or non-existent as far as energy managers were concerned. 
In management structure, the institutions differ quite substantially. In 
one case the Buildings Officer reports directly to the Finance Officer, 
while in all other cases the Buildings Officer is separated from the Finance 
Officer. While the autonomy and position of the “Buildings Office” differs 
widely some patterns emerge when looking at the structure of the buildings 
office itself. First, the key individual with respect to energy decisions is 
typically the Buildings Officer although in larger universities energy 
decisions are left to a “Technical Services” manager who is in charge of 
services such as electricity, gas, heating, water and so forth. Second, the 
person with formal responsibility for decisions on energy matters typically 
oversees a number of supervisors who in turn supervise engineers, 
plumbers, electricians et cetera, and the number of such staff reflects the 
size of the institution. Table 5.6 summarises some characteristics of the 
institutions studied. 
Table 5.6: Summary of Characteristics of Five Higher Level 
Education Institutions Used as Case Studies 
Feature Summary of Case Studies 
Size of institution A wide range of sizes is represented, but 
the mix is weighted towards the larger 
end. 
Campus/off-campus In all cases bar one, more than 50 per 
cent of floor space was located on one 
site. 
Parameters of energy use: 
  Energy per student 
  Energy per cu. m. of floor area 
 
Not forthcoming. The pre-interview 
questionnaire asked for energy use, floor 
area and number of students. In general 
insufficient information was supplied from 
which energy per student or energy per 
unit of floor area could be calculated. 
Fuel mix Over 50 per cent of energy expenditure is 
on electricity. 
5.2.2 POLICIES OF SELECTED CASE STUDIES 
None of the five case studies had a formal or written environmental policy 
and only one had a formal energy policy. Several of the Buildings 
Officers/Service Engineers reckoned that their particular institution had a 
de facto unwritten energy policy, that is, it is the policy of their particular 
office to minimise energy usage and cost. None of the institutions was 
certified to an environmental management scheme but one was 
considering application for ISO certification.  
While there was little indication of formal energy/ 
environmental objectives being laid down, informal targeting of energy 
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consumption (per person or square metre) was reported to be undertaken 
by several institutions. However, some institutions, and one in particular 
which has experienced rapid growth, felt that simply targeting energy 
expenditure was not feasible as it does not take into account either growth, 
in terms of campus size or student numbers, or an increase in the energy 
intensity (owing for example to a higher ratio of computers per student).   
Little information relating to the extent to which energy/environmental 
objectives are integrated into other policy guidelines (e.g. purchasing) was 
received. In the case of purchasing, one Finance Manager felt that the 
purchasing guidelines were defined in so far as all tenders for 
procurements are supposed to go to the “economically most 
advantageous” option. The individual in question said that the 
economically most advantageous is, however, typically interpreted as the 
least cost option and thus energy efficient products that have a higher 
initial price but save money over their lifetime may not be purchased.  
 
 The aim of this section is to identify the nature and operation of barriers 
to energy conservation that were noted during the course of interviewing 
persons within the higher education sector. Owing to the small size of the 
sample, evidence to support the existence or otherwise of particular 
barriers within the sector is primarily… qualitative and anecdotal but, subject 
to these limitations, the wide-ranging discussions allowed a comprehensive 
picture to be formed.  
No in-depth energy audits could be undertaken in the conduct of this 
study and, therefore, we are not certain as to whether energy efficiency 
opportunities exist within each institution studied and, if they do exist, the 
extent to which they could be profitably implemented. However, we have 
received indications from each institution as to their “performance” in 
relation to the average for the sector with regard to energy usage per 
square metre or per student. This could be taken as a crude indicator of 
how energy efficient each institution is. 
As we cannot identify for certain which technologies are highly cost 
effective or not, we rely almost entirely on the opinions of individuals 
within the institutions to gauge the extent of opportunities available. We 
also rely on such individuals to provide us with the information necessary 
to judge whether a hypothesised barrier is a true barrier to investment that 
is cost effective. Ten potential barriers in the case studies are now 
investigated. 
5.3.1 HIDDEN COSTS 
Hidden costs are costs such as staff retraining, potential loss of reliability 
and the like that may not be taken into account in assessing the cost of 
introducing a particular technology. If, however, they are taken into 
account they may very well make the adoption of a particular technology 
economically unfeasible.  
Prior to analysing evidence we first consider what costs universities 
typically do or do not look at in their investment decision-making process 
that could be hidden in the initial feasibility analysis. Responses were 
5.3 
Evidence of 
Barriers in 
Higher 
Education 
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received from individuals within three institutions as to what “potential 
hidden costs” they typically consider, or should consider, when 
contemplating investments in energy efficient technologies. The responses 
are shown in Table 5.7. The item of agreement between the three energy 
managers (including a de facto energy manager) is the potential loss of 
benefit, that is, all three institutions consider the possibility that the benefit 
may not materialise. Each of the other hidden costs is considered by two 
out of three institutions – these other costs are overhead costs of energy 
management, disruption, costs of identifying opportunities and staff 
replacement/retraining. 
Table 5.7: Hidden Costs that are Considered in the Decision 
Making Process by the Energy Manager in Three 
Institutions  
 Are These Costs Considered? 
(Yes/No) 
 Institutio
n 
A 
Institutio
n 
B 
Institution 
D 
Overhead costs of energy 
management 
N Y Y 
Disruption/inconvenience N Y Y 
Cost of identifying opportunities N Y Y 
Staff replacement/training Y N Y 
Potential loss of benefit Y Y Y 
   
Two institutions (A and B) cited instances where hidden costs were 
large enough to prevent a project from going ahead. In other cases, hidden 
costs such as the potential loss of benefit were diverted to a third party so 
as to ensure that the project went ahead. An example of this would be the 
attempt to get CHP installed in institution E. The individuals involved in 
the energy decision-making process here are aware that potential 
unreliability could cause difficulties in this particular instance and are thus 
negotiating for a third party to operate the CHP system. Thus only by 
transferring the hidden costs onto a third party could the project go ahead. 
5.3.2 ACCESS TO CAPITAL 
Access to capital is a common barrier to energy conservation and lack of 
access to external funds or lack of a budget from which funds for energy 
efficient investments could be drawn was an issue for all case study 
participants. Different organisations had different ways of addressing this. 
In general, the issue of whether capital constraints were considered to be a 
binding constraint in the sector hinges on the distinction between the 
universities and institutes of technology. For example, one university was 
able to borrow money from campus companies within the college. 
Both institutes of technology that were surveyed mentioned finance 
constraints as being a barrier to the adoption of energy efficient 
technologies. Key individuals within one institute petitioned for the use of 
a different fuel rather than the fuel originally specified as the prime fuel 
source for a new building. The adoption of the different fuel would have 
been better environmentally but it entailed an upfront cost over and above 
the cost of using the original fuel. Despite this it would have had a 
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relatively short payback period. The petition was rejected on a cost basis. 
Another institute mentioned that funding for buildings was so inadequate 
that they could not, at present, even contemplate energy efficient 
investments as all their budget went on “fire fighting” measures. The 
indications suggest that energy managers in the institutes of technology 
could not access capital for investment in energy efficiency. 
While capital availability was also a consideration for universities 
(which tended to have undertaken more energy efficient investments), it 
appears to pose less of a constraint to them than it does for the institutes 
of technology. For example, one university recently put up several 
thousands of pounds of its own money to help co-fund an energy 
efficiency investment. In addition, the recurrent buildings budget is often 
used by the three HEA-funded universities surveyed to implement energy 
saving projects that have a payback period of less than one year. It 
appeared that a higher status is bestowed upon energy management 
activities in the universities than in the institutes of technology that were 
interviewed, which makes it easier for the universities’ energy management 
staff to obtain the funds necessary for energy efficient investments. 
In sum, the organisations surveyed generally fund some energy efficient 
investments from their recurrent budget, which necessitates a short 
(typically one year) payback on investments. The ability of organisations to 
find funding for larger projects with longer payback periods varies 
substantially but, from the cases studies, energy managers in the 
universities had less difficulty in accessing capital. 
5.3.3 RISK 
The standard calculations that predict whether a particular energy 
efficiency investment is cost effective may not fully take account of the 
inherent riskiness of the project. In some cases, even if a technology is 
thought to be cost effective, an individual or organisation may not take on 
the project because the return is considered to be too low given the risk. 
Thus for reasons of risk, it may be rational to decide against investing in a 
particular energy efficient technology. 
In setting up the investment criteria, the riskiness of a particular project 
may be reflected in either (a) high discount rates, or (b) short payback 
periods. The use of either may reflect rational risk averse behaviour.  
During the course of interviewing the cases, no evidence pertaining to 
the use of stricter investment criteria as a result of the risk associated with 
energy efficient investments was uncovered. Each of the five institutions 
typically use simple payback as their investment criterion, although one 
institution uses life-cycle costs in its assessment of some types of plant. 
Three of the institutions use a short payback period, of less than a year, for 
investments in energy efficiency. This was, however, principally due to 
budget constraints, which dictated that energy efficiency investments can 
only be undertaken out of the recurrent budget and provided their payback 
was within the year, rather than as a result of the inherent riskiness of 
energy efficient projects.  
Although there is no evidence that the riskiness of a project manifests 
itself in terms of higher discount rates or shorter payback periods, there is 
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evidence that risk is a factor in the decision-making process relating to 
energy efficiency. Two institutions in particular noted that CHP brought a 
sizeable risk in terms of potential loss of reliability. These sought to 
minimise risk by taking on a partner who would take on at least part of the 
risk by financing and running their CHP plant.  
It could be maintained that the short length of payback period that was 
required was in fact evidence of perceived risk. However, the payback 
period required for energy efficiency was not, as far as one can tell, any 
shorter than for any other type of investment. 
5.3.4 IMPERFECT INFORMATION 
The previous barriers are thought of as “non-market”’ barriers, that is, they 
are economic barriers to entry that are not predicated on the failure of 
markets to allocate resources optimally. The next barriers analysed 
(imperfect information, its form and trustworthiness, split incentives, and 
principal-agent issues) are what are commonly referred to as “market 
barriers”; these barriers are predicated on the failure of, or absence of the 
conditions required for, markets to work properly.  
The first such market barrier we analyse is imperfect information. If 
one or more of the parties to a transaction does not have full information 
then a sub-optimal level of energy efficient investment could result. The 
information in question can be separated into three different categories, 
which will be discussed in turn, namely: 
• information on current energy consumption, 
• information on energy specific investment opportunities, and 
• information on the energy consumption of new buildings/equipment 
purchases. 
The level of information available to each organisation on current 
energy consumption varies widely between institutions. The larger 
institutions have access to a wide range of data (daily or monthly 
consumption, degree days data etc.) on energy consumption broken down 
by building. All major buildings have BEMS systems installed. These 
institutions monitor and target energy usage. The constraints seem to be 
more in the nature of availability of personnel and time to monitor energy 
usage rather than a lack of information relating to energy consumption. 
The quantity and quality of information available to the smaller institutions 
was adjudged to be not as good. Another institution can get detailed 
information with regard to the buildings in which BEMS has been 
installed, if information is monitored and logged. Most though not all of 
their buildings have BEMS installed. Consumption is compared with the 
sector benchmarks that are available from the study sponsored by the IEC.  
Energy management staff in two institutes of technology expressed 
dissatisfaction at the level of information available relating to energy 
consumption. One has BEMS systems installed in only 50 per cent of the 
building area and cannot get adequate information on energy consumption 
elsewhere. The other only has information relating to the organisation’s 
annual energy consumption and expenditure, and the Buildings Officer 
considered that sub-metering would be needed to monitor energy trends 
adequately. 
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As regards the information sources on energy efficient opportunities, 
the individuals in charge of energy management in all five institutions 
surveyed considered that adequate information was available on energy 
efficiency opportunities. A wide range of sources of information relating to 
energy efficient opportunities is used within the sector, including: 
• the Irish Energy Centre, 
• City of Dublin Energy Management Agency (CODEMA), 
• Energy Research Group, University College Dublin (ERG), 
• Chartered Institute of British Services Engineers (CIBSE), 
• American Society of Refrigerating and Air Conditioning  Engineers 
(ASHRAE), 
• European Commission – THERMIE projects, 
• Electricity Supply Board (ESB), 
• an Bord Gais (BGE), and 
• informal networks and energy manager groups. 
It is noted that those institutions that have implemented the most 
energy saving measures tend to use a more diverse array of sources of 
information relating to energy efficient opportunities. In addition, these 
institutions give more weight to the importance of informal networks and 
energy manager groups. 
Turning to the level of information available on energy consumption in 
new buildings, three out of five institutions surveyed specify stringent 
energy targets in the design specifications for new buildings. The extent to 
which designers take energy consumption seriously in designing new 
buildings was questioned by a number of individuals involved in the energy 
management process. The Buildings Officer in one university felt that new 
building designs should include independently validated predictions of 
energy consumption which should be certified on commission and 
penalties should be included in contracts to ensure performance as 
projected. 
Energy management staff were not forthcoming as to their satisfaction 
with the available information on energy performance of new equipment. 
In some cases, as in an institute of technology where the Buildings Office 
does not have a formal role to play in equipment purchases, such 
information is typically not sought prior to purchase.  
In sum, the quality of energy information available to each institution 
varied widely. In general it was found that the larger more pro-active 
institutions had a range of information available at a disaggregated level, 
while the smaller and less pro-active organisations tended to have less 
precise information.  
5.3.5 THE FORM OF INFORMATION 
The form that information takes may influence its effectiveness. If 
information is presented in a manner that is not conducive to clear 
interpretation, the information may be discarded or not interpreted 
correctly. As regards barriers to investment in energy efficiency, two 
questions arise: 
• what form of information is generally preferred, and 
• what form does generally available information take?  
     THE HIGHER EDUCATION SECTOR 109 
 
Referring to the first question, it became evident from the case studies 
that the preferred form of information is through the provision of clear and 
concise case study seminars of individual technologies, in which individuals 
can impart their own experiences and the audience can comment and ask 
questions. This concurs with their earlier indications that a preferred 
source of information is informal networks/energy manager groups.   
As regards the second question, information presently available takes a 
wide array of forms including: 
• leaflets, 
• case study seminars, 
• internet websites, 
• brochures, 
• information sheets, 
• conference/workshop papers, 
• books, 
• posters and, 
• published reports. 
The manner in which information is, at present, disseminated may 
constitute a sizeable barrier to energy conservation in so far as much of the 
information is conveyed through booklets/ 
papers/websites which do not afford easy interaction with the audience.  
 
 
 
5.3.6 CREDIBILITY AND TRUST 
While the form that information takes could constitute a barrier to energy 
efficiency, it is also possible that the credibility, and trust in, the source of 
information is equally important. If the source of information is not 
trusted, the information passed on by the source could be discounted. The 
issue at stake is whether the individuals involved in energy management in 
the higher education sector discount valid information for reasons of trust 
or credibility, which therefore represents a barrier to investment in energy 
efficiency.  
Table 5.8: Sources of Information Used (Yes/No) and the Source that is Most Trusted 
 Institution 
Sources of Information Used? A B C D E 
 
Irish Energy Centre  
Energy manager networks 
Electricity Supply Board 
An Bord Gais 
CIBSE 
Web sites 
ESCOs 
Y 
Y 
N 
N 
Y 
Y 
N 
 
N 
Y 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
 
Y 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
 
Y 
N 
Y 
N 
N 
N 
N 
 
N 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
N 
N 
 
The most trusted source    IEC No 
    View 
IEC ESB   Bord 
Gais 
Note: CIBSE is the Chartered Institute of British Services Engineers. 
 ESCOs are Energy Service Companies. 
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Table 5.8 shows which sources of information relating to energy 
efficient investment are used by the institutions surveyed. It is apparent 
that the most commonly used sources of information are the Irish Energy 
Centre and energy manager networks. The least trusted source of 
information is Energy Service Companies (ESCOs).  
None of the individuals surveyed who were involved in energy 
management thought that ESCOs were a reliable source of information. 
Individuals in two institutions expressed strong misgivings about ESCOs 
in the light of past experiences. Both had taken on an ESCO to negotiate 
tariffs on their behalf but felt that they were charged too much for the 
service provided. None of the institutions surveyed was thinking about 
participating in projects with energy service companies except perhaps as 
third party financiers of CHP.  
5.3.7 SPLIT INCENTIVES 
The problem of split incentives may cause a party to fail to undertake an 
action that would normally be considered beneficial. This may be because 
the party would not be able to appropriate the ensuing benefits. The classic 
example of split incentives is the landlord-tenant relationship. The tenant 
has little incentive to improve the dwelling he is living in as he may not 
reap the long-term benefits of his actions. The landlord in turn may not 
wish to undertake new investments unless he can extract a higher rent 
from the tenant.  
Here we consider the forms of split incentives that could prevail in the 
higher education sector, namely: 
• leasing of buildings or equipment, and  
• lack of accountability for energy costs. 
If an institution leases buildings or equipment, it may well not have the 
incentive to undertake energy efficient investments as the benefits of 
reduced energy bills only accrue to them for the duration of the lease, 
which may not be long enough to render the investment worthwhile. The 
improvement to the asset is foregone on relinquishing the lease unless, that 
is, they have entered into some arrangement with the owner.  Buildings are 
leased by three of the five institutions. The individuals responsible for 
energy management in these institutions by and large felt that only minor 
work (typically with a payback of less than one year) would be undertaken 
in leased buildings. However, the proportion of total floor space leased 
was generally small. The institution with the highest proportion had only 
16 per cent of floor space leased.  
The leasing of equipment was generally thought to create even less of a 
problem of split incentives than the leasing of buildings. We were only 
informed of three cases where some equipment was probably leased and in 
the words of the Buildings Officer this just consisted of “bits and bobs” 
from various departments. No individual surveyed conveyed a belief that 
equipment leasing represented a major barrier to energy efficiency.  
The problem of split incentives can also be seen not just in terms of 
leasing but also in terms of purchasing of equipment such as low energy 
computers – with individuals having little incentive to purchase energy 
efficient equipment. Only one institution had formal structures to ensure 
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purchase of energy efficient equipment where possible. In three other 
cases, energy management staff had some degree of influence over 
equipment purchases made within their own institution. However, with 
computer procurement typically devolved to either individuals or 
departments who are unlikely to seek out or possess information relating 
to energy efficiency prior to purchasing equipment, it is likely that energy 
efficiency criteria are ignored in the purchase of new equipment, by and 
large. 
The second possible form of split incentives investigated here was 
accountability for energy costs. For example, if a particular individual or 
department has no incentive to reduce energy expenditure then they may 
use more energy than is optimal.  As shown in Table 5.9, of the five 
institutions surveyed not one had in place a system for billing individuals 
or departments for their energy usage, as shown in Table 5.11. Energy 
management staff were generally of the opinion that such a system would 
prove difficult to set up. The most often cited difficulty was the need to 
sub-meter each department separately, which could prove difficult in some 
cases with departmental offices scattered over several buildings. Thus even 
though energy management staff were in favour of the principle of giving 
incentives to energy efficiency in this way, in general they expressed 
reservations as to how viable such a system would be.  
In sum, not one of the institutions had in place a formal system of 
charging departments for their energy usage. While the desirability of such 
a system tended not to be questioned, the feasibility was challenged in 
some cases.  
Table 5.9: Accountability for Energy Usage in the Institutions Studied  
 Institution 
 
Does the Institution… 
 
A 
 
B 
 
C 
 
D 
 
E 
Charge departments for energy usage? 
(Yes/No) 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
Ensure that all equipment is energy 
efficient? (Yes/No) 
 
N 
 
Y 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
It is worth noting, however, that the one institution that was relatively 
pro-active on energy efficiency also had an arrangement in place whereby 
any savings gained through energy efficiency were allowed to be retained 
by the energy manager’s department.   
5.3.8 PRINCIPAL-AGENT 
Principal-agent relationships may inhibit energy efficiency when the 
interests of one party (the principal) are affected by the actions of another 
(the agent) and the incentives facing the two parties diverge. In delegating 
responsibility to the agent, the principal necessarily sacrifices a measure of 
control over the activities delegated. In order to counteract this, principals 
are likely, for example, to impose strict or simple investment criteria in an 
effort to play it safe and ensure that only definitely profitable projects are 
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undertaken.24 Thus the principal-agent problem could manifest itself in 
either of two ways: 
• discount rates that are higher than warranted, or 
• required payback periods that are shorter than warranted. 
No direct evidence was uncovered in support of the existence of the 
principal-agent problem as a barrier to energy efficiency within the higher 
education sector. Each of the institutions questioned did use strict payback 
rules for investment criteria, some with payback less than one year, but 
these were applied for reasons of capital scarcity. No explanation was 
received to the effect that this was for reasons other than capital constraints, 
which generally require investments in energy efficiency to be undertaken 
out of the recurrent budget.  
That said, it is possible that capital constraints indirectly reflect the 
principal-agent relationship at several levels. In addition to the 
relationships within the institutions, there is the relationship between the 
ultimate funding body, the Department of Finance, the Department of 
Education and Science, and in the case of the universities the Higher 
Education Authority, and finally the institutions themselves. In sum the 
decision-making criteria used are likely to be at variance with principles for 
public investment decisions as laid down, for example, in the Department 
of Finance’s guidelines25 for evaluating projects. 
While we saw in the section on split incentives that decision-making 
processes with respect to equipment purchases were wanting, the situation 
in relation to buildings is more positive. Three of the five institutions (two 
universities and one institute of technology) include energy targets in 
building specifications. The Buildings Officer in one of the other 
institutions says that he works closely with the design team to ensure that 
energy is considered in the design process. This is not to say that the final 
buildings turn out to be energy efficient however. Several individuals were 
strongly of the opinion that energy consumption targets do not get taken 
seriously by the building consultants. Several suggestions were put forward 
to remedy this situation including: 
• life-cycle costs of buildings should be analysed rather than the simple 
construction cost, 
• design of new buildings should include independently validated 
predictions of energy consumption, and 
• penalties should be imposed on the design team if the building fails to 
meet certain energy targets. 
5.3.9 VALUES AND ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE 
 
24The idea is best summed up by De Canio “…the underlying idea…is that the owner’s 
general problem of acquiring information and exercising control leads to the imposition of 
second-best expedients that may maximise profits subject to organisational constraints but 
are not first-best solutions that would optimise allocations of resources ..” (De Canio, 1993, 
p. 910). 
25Guidelines drawn up in partnership with the European Commission, for evaluating 
projects under the Community Support Framework (CSF Evaluation Unit, 1999). 
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The issues of personal values and organisational culture are now 
investigated. Those individuals responsible for energy management in each 
institution were asked whether they were influenced by environmental 
concerns and whether environmental concerns were more important than 
cost savings.  
All responded that they were personally motivated by environmental 
concerns but that, at organisational level, environmental concerns were 
low. Their answers to three other questions were also recorded. They were 
asked how the importance of environmental performance compared with 
that of cost saving, and did they perceive any internal pressures from 
colleagues and students, or external pressures from the government, 
media, NGOs, local community, funding councils et cetera? Energy 
managers gave the responses listed in Table 5.10. 
Table 5.10: Importance of Environmental Concerns and of Internal 
and External Pressures 
Institutions Responses of Energy Managers 
A 
 
The internal environment, such as heating, is a priority. An 
external stimulus would be the comparisons of energy 
performance with other institutions in the higher education 
sector. 
B 
 
The quality of the internal environment is important but the 
quality of the external environment has not arisen. There are 
pressures to improve the internal environment. External 
pressures or public perception are important and it is nice to 
be seen as being green. 
C 
 
Environmental performance is a factor in the decision-
making process. No real internal pressures, but being seen 
externally as being green is a good PR exercise. 
D 
 
Cost saving would be more important and saving of 
expenditure on energy might need to be over £20,000 for the 
investment to be considered. There are no internal or 
external pressures to improve environmental performance. 
E 
 
Environmental performance is not important. There are no 
internal pressures, only external pressures owing to 
resentment of construction activity and planning 
applications. 
 
As the table shows, while individuals within the institutions may be 
committed to the idea of environmental performance, at the level of the 
organisation environmental concerns and internal pressures, other than for 
warmth, are low. External pressures rather than internal pressures would 
have some influence on environmental performance.  
5.3.10 STATUS 
If the status of energy management is low this could be a barrier to energy 
conservation.  The institutions generally rated to be top performers with 
respect to energy conservation considered that the status afforded to 
energy management activities was either high now or high in the past when 
the bulk of energy efficient investments took place.  
The relatively high status of energy management activities within those 
organisations that had taken action was thought to have helped them to 
fund energy conservation projects. One of the staff remarked that their 
unit had taken a lot of initiatives a while ago, after the OPEC-induced fuel 
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price increases, presumably because the bigger value of potential savings 
imparted higher status. The Buildings Officer felt that the dominant barrier 
at present was “without doubt” low energy tariffs. The three other 
institutions, where the status of energy management was rated as low, 
generally find it more difficult to fund energy efficient investments. 
This completes the summary of replies about the importance of the 
potential barriers to investment in energy efficiency from the five 
organisations in the higher education sector that were interviewed. It is 
clear that many of the barriers apply to some extent and that several are 
related, such as access to capital and short payback rules laid down under 
principal-agent relationships. The next section will classify the barriers and 
proceed to investigate the policy implications. 
 
 The case studies have shown that a wide range of barriers exist. These 
are now summarised in Table 5.11, which shows instances of each barrier 
and comments on them. As described, some of these barriers are related 
and could reinforce each other. For example, the principal-agent 
relationship results in the use of simplified investment rules that have the 
effect of restricting access to capital. This range suggests that, if the energy 
efficiency of the higher education sector is to be significantly improved, a 
wide range of policy measures is likely to be required.  
As is common in a sector in which funding is at arm’s length and is 
determined at several removes from the ultimate source, the Department 
of Finance via the Department of Education, energy managers have 
limited discretion on energy efficiency investments. Universities, however, 
which are even further removed, have in fact more devolved responsibility 
and more scope for manoeuvre.  
It is paradoxical that educational institutions, which have assured 
longevity and have long-term societal returns as their raison d’être, are not 
required routinely to use social long-term investment criteria. These criteria 
would require analyses to cover a longer horizon, using societal costs of 
resources (of water, for example) and emissions (e.g. the estimated 
greenhouse gas penalty), and some energy efficiency projects would by 
consequence not appear so unfavourable. As things stand, access to capital, 
hidden costs, compounded by small returns on foot of low energy prices, 
split incentives and the like, militate further against energy efficiency 
investment and require strong personal commitment on the part of energy 
managers in order to achieve results. 
Measures to combat these barriers can be applied at three levels: (1) at 
the level of the organisation, (2) at the level of the sector and (3) at the 
level of national policy. This chapter concludes with a brief investigation of 
key policy initiatives for each of these levels in turn. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.4 
Possible Policy 
Responses 
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Table 5.11: Barriers Found to be of High Importance in the Higher Education Sector 
Barrier Specific Instance Comments 
Access to capital Availability of capital to the 
institution or energy 
manager.  
Short payback requirement 
by the institution. 
Inadequate funding, especially in the institutes of 
technology, is a barrier.  Application of short 
payback rule (sometimes one-year) meant no funds 
for longer projects. Third party finance could help but 
it is only applied to certain projects, such as CHP. 
 
Hidden costs Loss of benefit. 
Managerial time. 
Disruptions. 
Cost of identifying options. 
Staff replacement/training. 
Perceived hidden costs can prevent a project from 
going ahead. Shortage of time, especially time to 
investigate energy efficiency, was stressed 
repeatedly.  
Low energy prices were cited forcefully by two 
institutions. 
 
Imperfect 
information 
Information on 
organisational energy use. 
Lack of information relating to energy consumption 
results in reduced level of energy management 
generally. 
 
 On equipment’s energy use. Efficient equipment may be overlooked. 
 
 On energy specifications of 
new building. 
Possible barrier (also a problem of enforcement, see 
split incentives, below). 
 
 The form of information may 
not be suitable, given 
scarcity of managerial time. 
Information that requires further investigation on the 
part of energy managers can constitute a barrier to 
investment. 
 
Split incentives Departments not 
accountable for energy 
costs. 
Perceived as a barrier, but the costs and difficulties 
associated with introducing devolved budgeting 
make it difficult to overcome this barrier. Where 
energy cost savings could be kept, this was an 
incentive. 
 
 Purchasers of equipment 
not accountable for energy 
costs. 
Purchasers of new equipment sometimes take 
account of energy use but this was by no means 
universally the case. There are some attempts, 
sometimes successful, at integrating energy 
concerns into purchasing criteria. 
 
 Designers and contractors 
for new buildings are not 
accountable for their running 
cost. 
It could prove very difficult to enforce the 
incorporation of energy efficient standards in new 
buildings and hard to make designers and builders 
take energy efficiency instructions seriously.  
 
Principal-agent 
relationship 
Short payback rules rather 
than full appraisals seemed 
to be the principals’ means 
of control. 
Principal uses wrong rule. 
Investment criteria are over-simplified to the 
detriment of investments that are good when 
considered over their lifetime. The principals 
involved are the Departments of Finance and of 
Education, the Higher Education Authority. Institutes 
of technology in particular had little devolved 
responsibility for energy efficiency. 
 
Credibility and 
trust as regards 
ESCOs 
ESCOs could in theory help 
overcome many barriers. 
Suspicion, bad track record, difficulties with 
supervision and desire to hold on to control inhibit 
resort to this means of overcoming barriers.  
 
Values and culture The attitude of actors in the 
institution and of the energy 
manager in particular. 
There was little by way of internal values, except 
emanating from pressure for warmth etc., though 
external pressure such as to “be seen to be green” 
was in general a possible stimulus at least. 
Commitment on the part of the energy manager 
seems to matter. 
 
Power Energy management has 
low status, though this can 
be countered by personal 
motivation. 
Academic priorities can predominate, energy prices 
are low and the energy manager may not get 
sufficient staff or have sufficient say to get funding. 
 
5.4.1 POLICY AT THE LEVEL OF THE INSTITUTION 
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There is good literature on measures that the higher education sector can 
implement to improve its energy efficiency. In order to set the framework 
for such action, adoption of an energy policy and an effective information 
system, alongside the conduct of regular energy audits, are useful starting 
points. Routine energy numeracy, and access to key numbers, such as 
energy use per student or per square (or cubic) metre in various 
departments, should be made easy. 
Purchasing guidelines should include energy efficiency standards for 
equipment, such as computers, copiers and the like. 
Where investments in new buildings are being considered, estimates of 
discounted values of energy expenditure entailed in various options should 
be a requirement prior to decisions on investment. Institutions should 
make decisions relating to lifetime cost of the building including energy 
use, rather than mainly the initial cost of building and refurbishment. 
Other measures that ought to be implemented at the level of the 
institution include the introduction of departmental charging for energy 
costs (where feasible), establishing energy awareness campaigns and, where 
appropriate or necessary, considering external financing. 
Methods for giving staff incentives for efficient, expenditure-saving, 
investment are notoriously difficult to implement in grant-aided 
institutions. If staff cannot be rewarded and the fruits of such effort accrue 
to central administration or beyond, then there is little incentive. Some 
method of reward needs to be established as it appears to be worthwhile, 
as was seen in the mechanical engineering sector for example. If part of the 
savings could be kept for the person or department that makes the savings 
in order to counter some of the hidden costs, involving extra personal 
effort in many cases, this could help. 
5.4.2 POLICY AT SECTORAL LEVEL 
There are three areas where initiatives could be undertaken at the level of 
the higher education sector as a whole: 
• Information: Provision of more targeted information of an interactive 
nature would help break down the information barrier. Sustainable 
Energy Ireland, previously the Irish Energy Centre, would be well 
placed to undertake this and to help produce benchmarks of energy 
use. Regular provision of information on current technologies and 
examples in the form of case studies of like institutions could be 
provided. Also user-friendly calculation packs or seminars could be 
supplied for estimating lifetime costs and NPVs of proposals. 
Similarly, institutions should be required to undertake pre- and post- 
investment assessments of any projects that they undertake. This 
could be set up and made mandatory where public funding is involved 
and will provide a record of “like case studies” for other institutions, 
enabling lessons to be learned. 
• Funding requirements: Somewhere along the chain of funding (from the 
Department of Finance through the Department of Education and, 
where applicable, the Higher Education Authority, to the institution) 
the attitude to investment becomes transformed into the inimical and 
unsound short payback rule. This is probably because it was felt that 
only “recurrent” funds could be accessed. There is now a framework 
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in place that enables universities to borrow. Where the institutes of 
technology are concerned funds can be accessed through the annual 
“Programmes and Budget Submissions” or from discretionary 
amounts. The important task for the institutions is to draw up a 
programme of energy efficiency investments that have good NPVs, 
using societal costs where items such as water are subsidised, and 
accounting also for other externalities where these are known, in the 
manner recommended by the CSF Evaluation Unit (1999).  
Encouragement to build up internal expertise is needed, combined 
with mandatory internal reporting requirements on energy 
consumption and energy efficiency. Reporting should form part of the 
management process, for automatic comparison with benchmarks, 
ideally. The qualification “ideally” is added because there are 
differences in circumstances that would need to be taken into 
consideration, which may be complicated by the need for quick and 
easy reporting. 
• Purchasing: Advice on standards for equipment that is being purchased 
would help institutions to avoid locking themselves in to inefficient 
technology. New buildings ought to have BEMS installed, where 
feasible. Energy performance targets should be specified in the design 
specifications for new buildings and refurbishment, and Sustainable 
Energy Ireland could help with a user-friendly procedure to document 
and report actual performance afterwards in a disciplined manner.  
Given the difficulties mentioned in relation to ensuring that 
standards are incorporated in new buildings, the scope for application 
and monitoring of enhanced building regulations in this sector needs 
to be given serious consideration or even, perhaps, fiscal measures are 
needed (OECD, 2003). 
5.4.3 NATIONAL MEASURES 
The above measures will only be effective in the context of a broadly 
based commitment to reducing energy-related emissions. Fiscal, regulatory 
and information measures all have a role to play.  
Universities now have a framework for borrowing and the institutes of 
technology can submit projects for funding or avail of discretionary funds. 
Therefore, proposals for investment in energy efficiency need to be drawn 
up using standard NPV techniques with prices that reflect societal costs. 
Those techniques for appraising investment proposals recommended by 
the evaluation unit of the Community Support Framework, for example, 
ought to become routine and Sustainable Energy Ireland might help to 
make them specifically applicable to investments in energy efficiency. 
The lack of enthusiasm for engaging Energy Service Companies 
(ESCOs) needs to be confronted. Measures that would engender trust on 
the part of those institutions that could benefit and that would otherwise 
avail of their services could help.  
In the field of fiscal policy generally, the failure to account for the 
external damage of greenhouse gas emissions in the prices of fuels needs 
to be corrected. A carbon tax is now official policy and respending of the 
revenues in the form of reduced labour taxes, for example, could on 
balance benefit the institutions.  
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The rate of VAT is an area of concern, in so far as higher education 
institutions are exempt VAT. This exemption means that they pay non-
reclaimable VAT on their inputs. The different levels of VAT rate mean 
that the institutions’ energy purchases are subject to VAT at 12.5 per cent, 
while energy efficiency services such as audits are subject to 21 per cent 
VAT. This represents a penalty to energy efficiency investment because its 
relative price is disadvantaged to the tune of nearly 8 per cent. A removal 
of the difference in rates is evidently desirable. 
The rating of new buildings by energy use, with follow up to document 
the outturn, would be worthwhile. Funding ought to be closely tied to 
adherence to standards. The National Development Plan has a measure 
devoted to energy conservation under the Sustainable Energy priority, of 
the Economic and Social Infrastructure Operational Programme. The 
energy performance of tertiary buildings is one of the areas of focus, 
including energy rating and the programme states “Public sector leadership 
in procurement and demonstration will play a role in market 
transformation” (Department of the Environment, 2000). 
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6. CONCLUSIONS AND 
POLICY ISSUES 
This chapter draws together findings from earlier chapters and aims to 
provide answers to a number of the issues raised in the Introduction. 
Three representative sectors have been studied, namely, mechanical 
engineering, brewing and higher education and the key issues that we need 
to address here are the following. Is it the case that many cost-effective 
opportunities to improve energy efficiency are being neglected? What is 
the relative importance of each type of barrier to energy efficiency and 
how does this vary between different sectors? Is there a legitimate role for 
public policy intervention? What would be the most effective and 
appropriate forms of policy measures for overcoming the identified 
barriers? 
 
 First we consider the question whether many cost-effective opportunities 
to improve energy efficiency are being overlooked. Cost-effective in this 
context means that, considering the measurable costs such as capital costs 
and energy costs (i.e. ignoring hidden costs or risk), the investment has a 
significantly better rate of return than the cost of capital to the 
organisation. 
The findings from the organisations in the three sectors studied suggest 
strongly that there are many cost-effective opportunities available in most 
of the organisations concerned. A majority of interviewees in each of the 
sectors agreed that there were many energy efficiency opportunities 
available in their organisations that would have quite short payback periods 
(namely three years, or five years in the case of brewing). This suggests that 
there would be even more opportunities that would have a better rate of 
return than the cost of capital. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, our research on barriers to energy 
efficiency in three sectors in Ireland was conducted as part of an 
international project that was carried out simultaneously on the same three 
sectors in the United Kingdom and Germany. The overall findings from 
the three countries also concluded that there were many cost-effective 
opportunities to improve energy efficiency that were not being taken up in 
most of the organisations studied (Sorrell et al., 2000, Chapter 8). 
In the UK, large postal surveys were conducted of wide samples of 
organisations in higher education and brewing, in addition to smaller 
numbers of more in-depth case studies. In the higher education postal 
survey undertaken for the UK, 79 per cent of respondents either agreed or 
strongly agreed that there were many opportunities with four-year 
6.1 
Existence of 
Energy 
Efficiency 
Opportunities 
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paybacks, with 14 per cent neutral and only 7 per cent disagreeing. The 
corresponding results from the UK brewing industry postal survey were 48 
per cent agreeing, 19 per cent neutral and 33 per cent disagreeing. This 
suggests that somewhat fewer opportunities were perceived in the brewing 
sector than in higher education – a result that was backed up by the case 
study interviews in the UK and is also consistent with the case study 
interviews in Ireland. Since brewing is a more energy-intensive sector, 
which should cause it to pay more attention to energy efficiency, it is not 
surprising that the brewing industry would already have taken up more of 
the available energy-efficiency opportunities (see also Section 6.2.2 below). 
 
 Next we consider what is the relative importance of the different types 
of barriers to energy efficiency and how does this vary between different 
sectors. This is a question that cannot be answered with great quantitative 
precision. For one thing, as indicated in Section 2.6, there is a degree of 
overlap and interdependence between the various barriers, while the case 
study results are also partly qualitative and require some interpretation. 
For each of our three sectors, it was attempted as far as possible to rate 
the importance of the individual barriers. The chapters on the three sectors 
have discussed this in some detail, and Table 6.1 identifies those barriers 
that were considered to be of high importance in each sector. The barriers 
are listed in descending order of the frequency with which they were 
reported.
Table 6.1: Barriers Considered to be of High Importance in the Different Sectors 
Barrier Mechanical 
Engineering 
Brewing Higher 
Education 
Total 
Access to capital * * * 3 
Hidden costs *     *(1) *    3(1) 
Imperfect information *  * 2 
Split incentives   * 1  
Principal-agent   *  1 
Form of information, credibility 
and trust 
  *  1 
Values and organisational 
culture 
*   1  
Power   * 1 
Notes: * The asterisk means that the barrier is identified as being of high importance.  
(1) Hidden costs can be of high importance for smaller brewing firms, but not for large firms. 
 
6.2.1 THE MOST IMPORTANT BARRIERS 
It can be seen from Table 6.1 that eight barriers have been identified as 
being of high importance in at least one of the sectors studied. But within 
this group of eight barriers that appear at least once in Table 6.1, two stand 
out as being particularly important, namely access to capital and hidden 
costs. These two are very important in all three of the sectors studied. 
Imperfect information is very important in two of the sectors studied, 
while the other five barriers are of high importance in only one sector. It is 
also worth noting that a number of other potential barriers were identified 
in Chapter 2, and although these are not included in Table 6.1, they are all 
of some importance in some sectors. 
6.2 
The Relative 
Importance of 
Different 
Barriers 
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These findings from Ireland are similar in significant respects to the 
overall results from the studies conducted in the UK and Germany. In 
particular, access to capital and hidden costs were found to be the most 
important barriers overall, since they were identified as being very 
important in all three sectors studied in all three countries (Sorrell et al., 
2000, Chapter 8). In addition, imperfect information, together with risk, 
were found to be the next most commonly occurring barriers, being very 
important in six of the nine sector/country studies. The remaining barriers 
were found to be of high importance in smaller numbers of the 
sector/country studies, but they were all important in some of the studies. 
Sorrell et al. (2000) concluded that problems associated with access to 
capital and hidden costs appear to be the primary reasons for not investing 
in energy efficiency in the case study sectors. 
6.2.2 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SECTORS 
Problems with access to capital and hidden costs are common to all 
sectors. But there are differences between sectors with respect to the other 
barriers. In particular, it is noticeable in Table 6.1 that the number and 
range of barriers of high importance varies between sectors, with the 
widest range occurring in higher education and the narrowest occurring in 
brewing. It is perhaps understandable that interviewees in the brewing 
industry perceived only one or two really important barriers to energy 
efficiency while those in the other sectors identified more, since this is 
probably a reflection of the fact that brewing is more energy-intensive. 
Since energy accounts for a larger part of total costs in brewing, the 
benefits that brewing can gain by investing in energy efficiency would 
amount to savings of a greater proportion of total costs than in the case of 
less energy-intensive sectors. Compared to these relatively large benefits, 
most potential barriers to energy efficiency would appear to be quite small 
and it would be considered worthwhile undertaking the effort and expense 
required to overcome such barriers. In less energy-intensive sectors, 
however, the benefits that can be gained by investing in energy efficiency 
would amount to savings of a less significant proportion of total costs. 
Consequently, a range of barriers that would be overcome in a more 
energy-intensive sector may appear sufficiently great in less energy-
intensive sectors actually to prevent investments in energy efficiency. 
Hence such barriers would be rated as very important. For example, 
imperfect information is found to be a barrier of high importance in both 
higher education and mechanical engineering, but not in brewing. 
It is also worth noting that a number of barriers are found to be of 
high importance in higher education although they are less important in 
the other sectors. For example, the power or status of energy management 
tends to be rather low in higher education due to the dominance of 
academic priorities such as research and teaching, so that energy managers 
may not get sufficient staff or have sufficient funding. Split incentives are 
also a significant problem in higher education, but appear to be of less 
importance in brewing and mechanical engineering. In higher education, 
the importance of split incentives results to a considerable extent from a 
combination of the large size of universities and the significance of 
individual departmental decisions for energy consumption (including 
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equipment purchasing), together with a lack of devolved accountability for 
energy costs. The resulting application of simple rules in the principal-
agent relationship with the funders was particularly constraining in the case 
of the institutes for technology. 
A final point worth noting here is that it might have been expected that 
business risk would play a substantially more important role as a barrier to 
energy efficiency in the private sector (brewing and mechanical 
engineering) than in higher education. Although business risk is not 
identified in its own right as a barrier of high importance for any sector in 
Table 6.1, it is in fact quite a significant contributory factor that helps to 
explain the importance of the access to capital barrier in the two private 
sectors, as will be discussed below. 
6.2.3 CAPITAL CONSTRAINTS 
A strong general message from the research is the importance of limited 
access to capital as a barrier to energy efficiency. This can apply at two levels: 
an overall limitation on access to capital for the organisation as a whole; 
and restricted access to capital for energy efficiency within internal capital 
budgeting procedures. The result of either or both of these factors, from 
the perspective of those responsible for energy management, is that they 
lack sufficient capital to invest in energy efficiency improvements. 
The limitation on access to capital tends to take different forms in the 
different sectors. In the higher education sector, there were constraints 
associated with public sector funding, as well as internal budgeting 
constraints. But in mechanical engineering and brewing, the firms in 
principle have access to commercial capital markets. There was practically 
no evidence that the case study firms had difficulties in obtaining capital at 
reasonable rates – as would be the case if there were capital market 
failures. Instead, the restrictions on access to capital were largely self-
imposed through a reluctance to take on additional borrowing. This was 
manifested primarily in the use of tight payback criteria for assessing 
proposed investments, including investments in energy efficiency as well as 
other types of investments.26 
As was discussed in Chapter 2 (especially in Section 2.3.4) and later in 
the chapters on the sectors, there are a number of possible explanations 
for companies’ use of stringent investment criteria. In particular: 
• Risk: Projects could be required to have a rapid payback to allow for 
current business and market risk, including the possibility of closure. 
There are also risks associated with increased gearing (increasing the 
ratio of loan finance to equity), and there can be technical risks that 
are specific to individual projects. 
 
26 It could be the case at times that potential energy efficiency projects fail the test of tight 
investment criteria because there is inadequate accounting for the full benefits of such 
projects and there is exaggerated estimation of the costs.  In such cases, it could be said that 
barriers such as imperfect information are part of the problem. Nevertheless, the widespread 
use of stringent investment criteria is a common barrier in its own right, and would continue 
to be so even if there were no information problems or other difficulties in applying the 
criteria.   
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• Principal-agent: Monitoring and control problems can lead principals to 
impose stringent investment criteria to ensure that only 
unambiguously high value projects are undertaken. 
• Hidden costs: Projects could be required to have a rapid payback on 
capital cost alone, to accommodate the significant salary and other 
costs associated with energy management. 
• Strategic priorities: Top management may have strategic goals that have 
priority over internal investment when using whatever capital is 
available to the company, such as mergers and acquisitions or 
expansion into new activities. 
• General capital constraint: If the organisation has a difficulty overall in 
borrowing money, it may use stringent payback criteria for 
discretionary cost-cutting projects as a method of rationing capital. 
The information available from the case studies is not really sufficient 
to determine the relative importance of each of these hypotheses or to 
draw definitive conclusions as to which hypothesis is most important. 
However, we can say with some confidence that most of the case study 
companies did not appear to experience a general capital constraint with an 
overall difficulty in borrowing money. 
Risk was a common concern, with the area of business and market risk 
generally being more significant than technical risk with respect to energy 
efficiency investments. However, we can also make the observation that 
stringent investment criteria were common even in those case study 
organisations where business seemed very healthy, as well as being a 
generally widespread phenomenon throughout all sectors of industry. This 
makes it unlikely that business or financing risk alone would provide an 
adequate explanation for the general reluctance to borrow for non-essential 
cost-saving investments. 
Therefore, it seems likely that principal-agent relationships and the 
desire to cover hidden costs are quite commonly part of the explanation, 
while other strategic priorities are undoubtedly significant in some cases. 
The precise explanation must vary somewhat depending on the 
circumstances of the individual organisation. For some companies, it may 
be the case that all these factors apply to some extent, making the decision 
to impose stringent investment criteria over-determined by good reasons. 
It is not clear to what extent the general reluctance to increase 
borrowing represents rational behaviour. Firms could be reacting quite 
rationally to factors such as risks, concerns about gearing, and hidden 
costs. But assessment of whether the firms are behaving rationally lies 
outside the scope of our study. To the extent that firms are not behaving 
rationally, the use of stringent investment criteria would represent a form 
of internal organisational failure, perhaps resulting from monitoring 
problems in principal-agent relationships or other factors. 
6.2.4 HIDDEN COSTS 
A second strong general message from the research is the importance of 
time constraints as a barrier to energy efficiency. The general importance of 
hidden costs as a barrier as shown in Table 6.1 is primarily a reflection of 
the aspects of hidden costs that involve putting demands on management 
time. Many interviewees across the different sectors emphasised that there 
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were great demands on their time. This caused difficulties for them in 
keeping fully up to date with technical information, in identifying energy 
efficiency opportunities and in implementing energy efficiency projects. 
Salary costs for energy management staff represent a form of hidden 
costs, as does the operation of energy information systems and the time 
spent on specification and tendering for capital works. In each case, time 
constraints on the relevant staff are an indication that these costs are 
important. Unfortunately, however, it was generally not possible to 
quantify these costs. This was commonly because the relevant duties were 
only part of the broader duties of key individuals, and they were also 
spread between a number of staff. 
We can think of the time spent by energy management staff as being 
divided into: (a) time spent specifically on identifying, assessing and 
implementing projects to improve energy efficiency; and (b) time spent on 
other necessary and more general tasks such as negotiating with energy 
suppliers, controlling the Building Energy Management Systems and 
overseeing maintenance. If it were possible to quantify the hidden costs of 
the time spent specifically on energy efficiency projects (category a), it 
would be justifiable to count those as part of the cost of such projects. It is 
possible that the stringent payback criteria used for investment projects 
might be at least partly justified as a means to recover these hidden costs. 
However, it should be said that recovery of these hidden costs was never 
an explicit rationale for stringent investment criteria in the organisations 
studied. Investment criteria were generally identical for all forms of cost 
saving investment and the reasons given for the choice of criteria usually 
centred most on the area of business and market risk. In no case were 
hidden costs relating to management time explicitly quantified and 
included in investment appraisal. 
As regards the time spent on other more general energy management 
tasks under category (b) above, much of this can be seen as an essential 
overhead, involving work that is necessary for the functioning of the 
organisation and the comfort of employees. It would not be appropriate to 
treat this as a cost to be recovered from savings from energy efficiency 
projects. 
Energy Service Companies (ESCOs) can save management time as well 
as provide third party finance and shoulder risk. Some institutions in 
higher education had unsatisfactory experiences with the use of ESCOs 
while the breweries on the other hand tended to have an open mind. Many 
firms engaged in mechanical engineering would, by dint of low energy use, 
be unattractive to ESCOs. Overall the ESCO solution to barriers has 
variable potential and low take-up, at least at present. 
 
 As indicated above, the most important barriers to energy efficiency 
were identified as being: access to capital (in the private sector, specifically a 
reluctance to borrow as manifested in the use of stringent payback criteria); 
and hidden costs (specifically demands on management time). A feature of 
both of these barriers is that they may imply that organisations are 
behaving rationally to a great extent in allowing such barriers to deter them 
from investing in energy efficiency. Such barriers may not necessarily be a 
6.3 
The Rationale 
for Policy 
Intervention 
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result of market failure. If so, such barriers do not in themselves provide 
grounds for governments to intervene to correct market failure.  
However, as discussed in Section 2.6, there is another form of market 
failure that can provide good grounds for government intervention. The 
basic reason why governments would wish to improve energy efficiency is 
because of the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions so as to combat 
undesirable climate change. If energy users cause environmental damage 
through greenhouse gas emissions, thereby imposing costs on society at 
large that are not reflected in a commensurate cost or penalty attached to 
the use of energy, this is called an environmental externality and it is a 
form of market failure. In this situation, there is a good case for policy 
intervention to improve energy efficiency and reduce energy consumption 
– even if the most important barriers to energy efficiency are not in 
themselves market failures. 
For example, the access to capital or hidden cost barriers can be 
reduced by the use of revenue neutral energy taxation (such as higher taxes 
on energy offset by lower taxes on labour, for instance as described in 
Bergin et al. (2002). By increasing energy costs and at the same time 
decreasing labour costs, the benefits of greater energy efficiency would be 
increased relative to the costs of installing energy efficiency measures. Such 
a policy can be justified on the grounds that it internalises the external 
costs of energy use. 
Apart from access to capital and hidden costs, many of the other 
barriers to energy efficiency identified in this report provide an even 
clearer justification for government intervention. This is because they stem 
from either neo-classical market failures or from some form of 
organisational failure, as discussed in Chapter 2. For example, in the case 
of imperfect information, the energy service market produces and 
transmits insufficient information about the energy performance of 
different technologies (Section 2.1.1). This is a form of market failure and 
it leads energy consumers to make sub-optimal decisions based on 
provisional and uncertain information, and consequently to underinvest in 
energy efficiency. In addition to standard market failures, there are also 
examples of organisational failures, as in the case of principal-agent 
relationships that can impede profit maximising behaviour. 
It is also clear from our case studies that many individuals who have a 
role in energy management are subject to severe constraints on their time. 
They may habitually overlook, or at least give relatively limited attention to, 
matters that are seen as secondary or peripheral, such as energy efficiency. 
This indicates that the concept of bounded rationality (discussed in Section 
2.4.1) is of real significance, meaning that decision-making in organisations 
is often less than optimal – aiming to make quick and fairly satisfactory 
decisions rather than expending a great deal of time in order to make 
optimal decisions. 
These observations can provide a rationale for government 
intervention. The objective of such intervention is both to overcome neo-
classical market failures and to strengthen internal organisational decision-
making. The rationale for the latter is that, as a consequence of bounded 
rationality and organisational failure, there is scope for governments to 
help individuals and organisations to help themselves. One example of a 
government policy measure to help overcome organisational failures and 
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bounded rationality could be an information programme. However, there 
may be a limit to what can be achieved by such measures since it may be 
more difficult to modify the behaviour of actors who are heavily 
preoccupied with other priorities. In that case, shortcomings in individual 
and organisational decision-making can be bypassed through the use of 
regulatory standards, such as minimum levels of energy efficiency in 
energy-using equipment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 One conclusion from the research is that there are considerable 
variations in the nature of the barriers to energy efficiency that apply to 
different sectors or organisations. While some barriers are very significant 
in most contexts as indicated above, the importance of other barriers 
varies considerably across sectors or companies. Therefore, effective policy 
solutions need to address the particular circumstances of energy-using 
sectors and organisations. It is unlikely that there will be a single best 
policy solution for all. Instead, a variety of approaches is likely to be 
required, addressing the features of individual circumstances. 
For each of the individual sector studies, we have indicated possible 
policy interventions at three levels: organisational, sectoral, and national. 
This gives a range of suggestions that are based on the circumstances in 
each sector, but these suggestions are indicative. It is not possible within 
the constraints of this study to identify an “optimal” policy mix for each 
sector. The results do, however, illustrate the diversity of approaches that 
are likely to be required. 
However, there are certain broadly-based approaches to policy at 
national level that influence many or all sectors, such as policies that affect 
energy prices. In Ireland the introduction of carbon taxes and emissions 
trading should work in the right direction by raising energy prices 
generally. In addition, as mentioned in Chapter 4, the Integrated Pollution 
Prevention and Control (IPPC) licensing system requires an increasing 
number of selected industries to use energy efficiently, as well as control 
their emissions of pollutants in general. The scheduled industries are quite 
wide-ranging and would include nearly all those that are relatively energy-
intensive, such as brewing. These broad national-level policies should have 
the potential to achieve significant improvements in energy efficiency, 
depending on how precisely they are implemented. 
These types of measures are suited to addressing the two most 
pervasive barriers to energy efficiency, namely the access to capital barrier 
resulting from tight payback criteria or capital budgeting, and the hidden 
costs barrier associated with constraints on management time. These 
measures would have the effect of increasing the incentive to invest in 
energy efficiency as compared to other potential investments, while at the 
same time giving organisations cause to allocate more management time to 
energy efficiency matters. Companies can be compensated for higher 
energy costs through reduced taxes on other things such as taxes on labour 
6.4 
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or profits, if it is desired not to increase their overall tax burden while still 
enhancing their incentive to invest in energy efficiency. 
The experience of the UK shows how powerful an energy tax measure 
can be. The climate change levy there was introduced with a corresponding 
reduction in employers’ national insurance. Even before its introduction 
the levy transformed the level of attention given to energy efficiency. The 
effect appeared to be out of proportion to the size of the cost changes 
alone, because the high public profile of the levy effectively captured top 
management attention. 
While carbon taxes, emissions trading and IPPC licensing can address 
the access to capital and hidden costs barriers, these measures would also 
help to overcome some of the other barriers at the same time. For 
example, these measures should increase the importance of the energy 
management function within organisations, thereby helping to overcome 
the barriers associated with values and organisational culture and the 
power or status of energy managers. 
In addition to these broad national-level measures, we have also 
indicated in the individual sector studies how other more specific measures 
can address other barriers to energy efficiency that arise. Such measures 
include, for example, various industry-specific or technology-specific 
information programmes in user-friendly formats, energy audit schemes, 
appropriate subsidies for energy efficiency measures or for research and 
development on energy efficiency, and support for new or emerging 
mechanisms to deliver energy efficiency such as ESCOs. 
For sectors where enterprises are not particularly energy intensive, such 
as in the mechanical engineering sector, keeping informed on energy 
matters takes up management time that is scarce. Informative energy 
labelling, meters and bills as well as demonstration case studies and 
encouragement to undertake audits could be targeted at enterprises 
through their industry association. These associations could also be helped 
with organisation and with provision of generic or technology-specific 
information, mentioned above. 
Enterprises that are bigger energy users, like breweries, could also be 
helped to make investment in energy efficiency less demanding of 
management time. There is scope here for ESCOs, which are specialists in 
energy matters, to provide advice and finance for investments in energy 
efficiency, or else provide energy services on an agency basis. For their 
potential to be realised ESCOs would need to develop a track record, with 
certification probably, and develop an interest in energy efficiency relating 
to buildings and not just to equipment and energy supply. ESCOs’ 
engagements with SMEs, such as smaller firms in the mechanical 
engineering industry, would be best directed through industry associations. 
More widespread use of sectoral guidelines and benchmarks of energy 
use needs promotion. These could be supplied on a regular basis with 
assistance from the new agency Sustainable Energy Ireland and would 
enable enterprises to judge whether their plant or buildings are wanting or 
to satisfy themselves that ESCOs are proposing genuine improvements. 
The types of contract drawn up between enterprises and ESCOs need 
careful attention. The rewards of energy saving activities should ideally be 
reaped by the investors who undertake them, and take-or-pay contracts for 
energy, for example, should be avoided. A possible model is for the 
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contract to fix an annual price below the current fuel bill, and then to share 
any larger than expected annual savings.  
Higher education is a particularly interesting case, where funding 
arrangements exemplify the principal-agent barrier. Though the sector’s 
objective is the long-term gain to society, the institutions studied tended to 
operate a one-year payback criterion for investment in items such as 
energy efficiency. Calculation of Net Present Value or Internal Rate of 
Return should be made easy and widespread, using societal costs of 
externalities and resources that are subsidised. More widespread calculation 
of Net Present Value or Internal Rate of Return should be encouraged 
generally and help should be forthcoming for recording prior and follow-
up information to provide future demonstration studies. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Thank you for participating in this international research project funded 
by the European Commission (DG-XII). Within this project, research 
teams from the UK, Ireland and Germany aim to identify why 
organisations do or do not make cost effective energy efficiency 
investments. This project looks at both public and private sectors and aims 
to identify how government policy can encourage energy efficiency.  
In this questionnaire, we would like to ask a few general questions on 
your company, its current level of energy consumption, and the energy 
efficiency measures that have been realised. The questionnaire should 
take no more than 10-15 minutes to complete. If the information is not 
known or not readily available then please leave the section blank. 
We guarantee the confidentiality of all data and information. The draft 
results of this research will be sent to all participating organisations and full 
opportunity will be given for comment. The anonymity of the participating 
organisations will be preserved in all resulting reports and publications. 
Thank you very much for taking the time to answer this questionnaire. 
Please send the completed forms back in the attached envelope.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Identification 
 
Company ............................................................................................................................. 
Pre-Interview 
Questionnaire 
for the 
Mechanical 
Engineering 
Sector 
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Name ................................................................................................................................... 
Position ............................................................................................................................... 
 
2. The Company 
 
Total employees .................................................................................................................. 
Approximate annual turnover (i.e. sales, £ million) ............................................................ 
Approximate number of shifts per 24 hours ........................................................................ 
Approximate floor area (m2) ............................................................................................... 
(leave blank if information not known) 
 
3. Annual Energy Use 
 
Please indicate your company’s approximate annual consumption of: 
Fuel ........................................... Electricity ................................................ 
(please indicate units) 
Please indicate your company’s approximate annual expenditure on: 
Fuel ........................................... Electricity ................................................ 
(leave blank if information not known) 
 
4. Contract Energy Management 
 
Do you use contract energy management? Yes θ No θ 
If Yes, could you briefly indicate the coverage of the contract: 
  ...................................................................................................................................... 
  ...................................................................................................................................... 
  ...................................................................................................................................... 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Energy Information Systems 
At what level is energy use generally metered? 
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 Site? Building?  Individual equipment? 
Electricity θ θ θ 
Other energy θ θ θ 
 
How frequently is energy use generally recorded? 
 Annually? Monthly? Weekly?  Daily?  
Electricity θ θ θ θ 
Other energy θ θ θ θ 
 
Do you monitor trends in energy consumption? Yes θ No θ 
Are consumption records adjusted for weather conditions? Yes θ No θ 
Is a monitoring and targeting scheme employed? Yes θ No θ 
Is consumption compared with sector benchmarks? Yes θ No θ 
Has an audit of your energy use been undertaken? Yes θ No θ 
 
6. Energy Efficiency Opportunities 
 
How much do you agree with the following statement: 
    “There are a wide range of energy efficiency measures that could be implemented in my          
company  that would yield paybacks of less than three years at current energy prices” 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Don’t know 
θ θ θ θ θ θ 
 
7. Information Sources on Energy Efficiency Opportunities 
 
Please rank the usefulness of each of the following information sources on energy 
efficiency opportunities: 
Source Excellent Good Average Poor Don’t Use 
Colleagues within the company θ θ θ θ θ 
Network of contacts in the sector θ θ θ θ θ 
Energy manager 
groups/networks 
 
θ 
 
θ 
 
θ 
 
θ 
 
θ 
Irish Energy Centre schemes θ θ θ θ θ 
Professional associations  θ θ θ θ θ 
Trade/Technical journals θ θ θ θ θ 
Technical conferences/seminars θ θ θ θ θ 
Energy supply industry θ θ θ θ θ 
Equipment suppliers θ θ θ θ θ 
Consultants θ θ θ θ θ 
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8. SELF ASSESSMENT PROFILE OF ENERGY MANAGEMENT 
 
This page is a “self assessment” exercise developed by the UK Energy & Environmental 
Management Division.  
 
Reading down each column in turn, could you please circle the box that corresponds 
most closely to current practice in your company. 
Policy Organising Information 
Systems 
Awareness  Investment 
No explicit 
policy 
 
No energy 
management or 
formal 
delegation of 
responsibility 
for energy 
consumption 
 
No information 
system. No 
accounting for 
energy 
consumption 
 
No promotion of 
energy 
efficiency 
No investment 
in energy 
efficiency 
Unwritten set of 
guidelines 
Energy 
management the 
part-time 
responsibility of 
someone with 
only limited 
authority or 
influence 
 
Cost reporting 
based on invoice 
data. Engineer 
compiles reports 
for internal use 
within technical 
department 
 
Informal 
contacts used to 
promote energy 
efficiency 
Only low cost 
measures taken 
Unadopted 
energy policy set 
by energy 
manager or 
senior 
departmental 
manager 
Energy manager 
reports to ad hoc 
committee, but 
line management 
and authority are 
unclear 
Monitoring & 
targeting reports 
based on supply 
meter data. 
Energy unit has 
ad hoc 
involvement in 
budget setting 
 
Some ad hoc 
staff awareness 
training 
Investment 
using short term 
payback criteria 
only 
Formal energy 
policy, but no 
active 
commitment 
from top 
management 
Energy manager 
accountable to 
energy 
committee 
representing all 
energy users in 
the organisation 
 
M&T reports for 
individual 
premises based 
on sub-metering, 
but savings not 
reported 
effectively to 
users 
Programme of 
staff awareness 
and regular 
publicity 
campaigns 
Same payback 
criteria as for all 
other investment 
Energy policy, 
action plan and 
regular review 
with 
commitment of 
top management 
Energy 
management 
fully integrated 
into 
management 
structure. Clear 
delegation of 
responsibility 
for energy 
consumption 
 
A 
comprehensive 
system sets 
targets, monitors 
consumption, 
identifies faults, 
quantifies 
savings and 
provides budget 
tracking 
Marketing the 
value of energy 
efficiency and 
the performance 
of energy 
management 
both within and 
outside the 
organisation. 
Positive 
discrimination in 
favour of 
“green” schemes 
with detailed 
investment 
appraisal of all 
new-build and 
refurbishment 
opportunities 
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9. Implementation of energy efficiency measures 
 
The following list contains some measures for reducing energy consumption. Could you please 
indicate whether your company has either: 
1. implemented each measure on a significant scale; or 
2. considered the measure, but not yet implemented on a significant scale. 
 
 Implemented? Considered? Comments  
Space Heating:    
Use of Building Energy Management System 
(BEMS)? 
 
θ 
 
θ 
________________ 
Programming HVAC controls to match 
occupancy patterns and/or outside temperature? 
 
θ 
 
θ 
________________ 
Thermostatic radiator valves?    
Ensure adequate lagging/insulation? θ θ ________________ 
Lighting:    
Use of 26 mm compact fluorescents? θ θ ________________ 
Use of high frequency electronic ballasts? θ θ ________________ 
Photocell, acoustic or movement sensors? θ θ ________________ 
Compressed air:    
Inspection & elimination of leaks? θ θ ________________ 
Generation of compressed air at appropriate 
pressure? 
 
θ 
 
θ 
________________ 
Consideration of energy consumption when 
purchasing new compressors? 
 
θ 
 
θ 
________________ 
Heat recovery? θ θ ________________ 
Heat treatment:    
Furnace insulation? θ θ ________________ 
Furnace heat recovery? θ θ ________________ 
Accurate control of temperature, pressure and 
fuel air ratio? 
 
θ 
 
θ 
________________ 
Boiler plant:    
Insulation of distribution pipes, valves and 
flanges? 
 
θ 
 
θ 
________________ 
Use of energy efficient burners? θ θ ________________ 
Use of condensing boilers? θ θ ________________ 
Building fabric:    
Retrofitting insulation to walls and roofs? θ θ ________________ 
Reduction of draughts from loading bays? θ θ ________________ 
Specification of high standards of energy   ________________ 
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efficiency in new buildings?  θ θ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Electrical equipment:    
Purchase of energy efficient computers and 
office equipment? 
 
θ 
 
θ 
________________ 
Use of variable speed drives (VSD) for motors θ θ ________________ 
Automatic switch off of fans & pumps when the 
equipment they serve is not in use? 
 
θ 
 
θ 
 
________________ 
 
10.  Barriers to Energy Efficiency Improvement 
Studies by technology researchers commonly identify energy efficiency opportunities that appear 
to be highly cost effective. The following have been suggested as reasons why such investments 
are not made. In your view, how important is each suggested reason: 
  Often 
important 
Sometimes 
important 
Rarely 
important 
1 Technology inappropriate at this site θ θ θ 
2 Cost of production disruptions/hassle/ 
inconvenience 
 
θ 
 
θ 
 
θ 
3 Cost of identifying opportunities, analysing 
cost effectiveness and tendering 
 
θ 
 
θ 
 
θ 
4 Cost of staff replacement, retirement, 
retraining 
 
θ 
 
θ 
 
θ 
5 Possible poor performance of equipment θ θ θ 
6 Lack of capital θ θ θ 
7 Strict adherence to capital budgets θ θ θ 
8 Other priorities for capital investment θ θ θ 
9 Technical risk θ θ θ 
10 Business/market uncertainty θ θ θ 
11 Lack of information/poor quality information 
on energy efficiency opportunities 
 
θ 
 
θ 
 
θ 
12 Difficulty/cost of obtaining information on 
the energy consumption of purchased 
equipment 
 
 
θ 
 
 
θ 
 
 
θ 
13 Lack of time/other priorities θ θ θ 
14 Lack of technical skills to analyse/operate θ θ θ 
15 Lack of staff awareness θ θ θ 
16 Department/individuals not accountable for   θ 
 S TO ENERGY EFFICIENCY 
 
energy costs θ θ 
17 Energy objectives not integrated into 
operating, maintenance or purchasing 
procedures 
 
 
θ 
 
 
θ 
 
 
θ 
18 Conflicts of interest within the company θ θ θ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Do you have any further comments on barriers to energy efficiency improvement? 
  ..............................................................................................................................................  
  ..............................................................................................................................................  
  ..............................................................................................................................................  
  ..............................................................................................................................................  
 
Thank you very much for completing this questionnaire! 
Please return this questionnaire in the enclosed pre-paid envelope
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APPENDIX 2: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
FOR ENERGY MANAGER (BREWING) 
IDENTIFICATION 
Name of Brewery .................................................................................................................  
Name .....................................................................................................................................  
Job Title .................................................................................................................................  
Date of Meeting ...................................................................................................................  
 
QUESTIONS 
Background 
• What are your principal responsibilities within the brewery? 
• What proportion of your time is devoted to energy compared to other issues? 
• How long have you been in this post? 
• What is your professional background? 
Energy policy 
• Does the brewery have an Energy/Environmental Policy? What form does it take (e.g. use of 
targets; action plan; designated responsibility and accountability etc.)? 
• How long have these policies been established? 
• What impact has this policy had on energy decision making and the brewery’s energy 
performance? 
• What have the energy/environmental policies achieved? 
• Is the brewery certified to an environmental management scheme? ISO 14001 or European 
EMAS? Does it intend to certify? 
• Are provisions for achieving energy/environmental policy objectives included in other policy 
documents, such as purchasing or maintenance? 
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• Is your company a subsidiary of another company? National? International? If yes, what impact 
does it have on energy management and decision making? Do the same rules apply to all 
subsidiaries? 
Energy management 
• Could you please draw a simplified version of the corporate organisation diagram, showing 
key individuals and departments/divisions with responsibility for energy decision making. 
• Does the brewery have a committee wholly or partly responsible for energy matters?  If so, 
what is the membership of this committee? How does it function? 
• Who do you interact with on a regular basis? 
• Is energy management an in-house activity or are energy service companies, consultants or 
energy suppliers used? What is the rationale for this choice? 
Status 
• How would you assess the status of energy management within the brewery 
(high/medium/low)? 
• How does this status affect energy management activities? 
• How much does status depend on formal authority and how much does it depend on other 
factors such as the support of key individuals (a lot/a bit/not at all)? 
• Are there areas where you would like to have influence but do not (e.g. equipment purchasing, 
building specification)? 
• Are there conflicts of interest within the brewery that inhibit energy management activities? 
Capital 
• Is there a separate budget for energy efficiency investment?   
• If yes: How large is it? (percentage of utility spend) How is it set? How has this changed over 
time? 
• If no: How is energy efficiency investment funded?  
• How has this budget been spent over the last financial year? 
• Is this budget allowed to be carried forward if unused at year end? 
• How does capital availability affect the type of projects that can go ahead? 
• Do you borrow for the purposes of investment in energy efficiency? 
Investment 
• Could you describe the decision-making process for investments in energy efficiency? Who 
are the key individuals/committees involved? What is the impact of the parent company (if 
applicable)? 
• What are the biggest obstacles in this process? How could it be improved? 
• What criteria are used for appraising energy efficiency investments? How do these differ from 
other categories of investment? What are the reasons for this choice of criteria? 
• Are the investment criteria feasible or restrictive? 
• Is there a portfolio of properly justified and costed projects that could be implemented? 
 
 
 
 
• How are investment projects prioritised? What factors are taken into account? 
• Who has the final say?  
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Energy information systems (relate to answers in PIQ) 
• What information is available to you on organisational energy consumption? 
• To what extent is energy sub metering used in the brewery?  
• Is information available on trends in energy consumption? 
• Is information available on the performance of previous efficiency investments and the savings 
achieved? 
• Is the energy performance of the brewery compared against sector or generic benchmarks? 
Where are these used? 
• Is a monitoring and targeting scheme in operation?  How is it used? 
• What information is disseminated to top management and other individuals?  How effective are 
these reporting requirements? 
• Are you happy with the quality of current information systems? How could they be improved? 
What are the obstacles to such improvement? 
Information on efficiency opportunities 
• Do you consider that you have adequate information on energy efficiency opportunities? 
• Have any energy audits been conducted? Are any planned? 
• Do you consider that you have adequate information on the needs of building and equipment 
users? 
• Is the primary problem a lack of information, or constraints on using existing information (e.g. 
lack of technical ability; lack of time)?   
• Which information sources on energy efficiency opportunities are used and why? (see PIQ)  
• Which information sources do you place the greatest trust in and why? 
• Are you aware of any government sponsored information programmes? How useful are they? 
• How could the quality of information be improved? 
Accountability 
• What are the arrangements for charging energy costs? Are subdivisions (e.g. brewing filling, 
packaging) charged individually? 
• To what extent can individual subdivisions influence their own energy costs?  
• Are energy budgets and the responsibility for energy management devolved to individual 
divisions? 
• How are the benefits from efficiency investments distributed? 
• Are targets for energy budgets identified?  
• Are there any incentives created for subdivisions and staff? How effective are they? 
Performance 
• Do you know the energy savings achieved by your brewery over the past five years or so? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Have energy savings measures been taken up for other reasons than to save energy (e.g. 
environmental reasons, such as emissions, odour). 
• What types of energy efficiency measures have been implemented. 
• How would you rate your brewery’s performance on energy efficiency? 
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Overhead costs of energy management 
• Which people are engaged in energy management activities? What is the estimated annual 
person-hours devoted to energy management? 
• Do you know the estimated annual costs devoted to energy management activities? 
Hidden costs 
• Are the following considered when evaluating efficiency investments?  How do you take account 
of them?: 
• overhead costs of energy management 
• disruptions/hassle/inconvenience 
• cost of identifying opportunities, analysing cost effectiveness, tendering and seeking approval for 
expenditure 
• staff replacement, retirement, retraining 
• potential loss of benefit (e.g. unreliability, extra maintenance, beer quality) 
• Have there been cases when such additional costs were the reason for rejecting a project? 
• Which technologies are particularly associated with such hidden costs? 
Risk  
• What, in your opinion, are the main risks facing your brewery (e.g. business economic trends; 
political decisions, take-overs)? 
• What impact have these had on energy efficiency investment (e.g. through strict investment 
criteria)? 
• Have there been cases where technical risk has inhibited the adoption of energy efficient 
technologies? 
Equipment purchasing 
• What influence do you have over equipment purchasing decisions? How does this vary 
between different types of equipment? 
• In situations where you have an influence, what level of information is typically available on the 
energy performance of equipment? How difficult is it to obtain additional information on energy 
performance? 
• In situations where you do not have an influence, do you think energy efficiency is considered?  
If not, why not? 
• How important are written rules & procedures in purchasing decisions? Does energy efficiency 
feature in these rules? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Culture 
• How important is environmental performance compared to cost saving in organisational 
decision-making on energy efficiency?  
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• Do you perceive any internal pressures to improve environmental performance (e.g. colleagues 
etc.)? How important are these pressures? 
• Do you perceive any external pressures to improve environmental performance (e.g. 
government, media, NGOs, local community, industry sector etc.)? How important are these 
pressures? 
• Is senior management aware of the potential for cost effective investment in energy efficiency? 
• Is senior management seriously committed to improving the environmental performance of 
the brewery? How widely is this commitment shared throughout the brewery? 
• How important have changes in management and other key posts been in changing 
organisational performance on energy efficiency? 
Inertia/Previous Experience 
• How is current practice influenced by the experience of previous attempts to improve energy 
efficiency? 
Awareness 
• Have there been any actions taken regarding energy awareness campaigns, energy training and 
incentive schemes? If yes, how effective have these been? 
Perceptions of barriers 
• Many studies have suggested that there are a large number of energy efficiency opportunities that 
are highly cost effective at current prices.  Do you think that this is the case with your brewery? 
If not, why not?  If so, why are these opportunities not taken up?  
• What do you see as the biggest obstacle(s) to improving energy efficiency in your brewery? 
• Which energy savings opportunities are currently not taken up but could be profitably taken up 
in the future? (wish list) 
Government Policy & ESCOs 
• Do you consider contract energy management to be an attractive option for your brewery?  If 
not, why not?  If yes, then for which functions are they most appropriate? 
• What are your views on the effectiveness of government policy on energy efficiency, as this 
impacts on your brewery? 
• Do you benefit from governmental programmes (information, subsidies, tax breaks etc.) in 
other areas, like environmental performance? 
• How should the government act to improve energy efficiency in the brewing sector? What do 
you consider to be the best instruments for improving energy efficiency? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Personal 
• How long do you expect to remain in your current position?  
• How is your performance in this position rewarded?  
• Do you personally benefit from energy savings? 
• What influence does this have on your choice of investment projects? 
• Do you think that making money gets more recognition in this brewery than saving an equal 
amount of money? 
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• Are you motivated by environmental values?  
Final 
• Are there any important points about this topic which we have not discussed?
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